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A CONSIDERATION OF
ALTERNATIVES TO DIVORCE
LITIGATION
Thomas E. Carbonneau*
I. INTRODUCTION
Adversarial adjudication, according to popular and some profes-
sional' perceptions, makes the process of divorce excessively expensive,
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express his sincere gratitude to Professors Couch (Tulane), Jourdan (Georgia), Lorio (Loyola), Samuel
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1. The advocacy of remedial innovation represents a growing ferment that challenges the
traditional status of the court system as the chief vehicle for dispensing justice. "The obligation of
our profession is... to serve as healers of human conflicts." Address by Chief Justice Burger, ABA
Midyear Meeting (Jan. 24, 1982), reprinted in 68 A.B.A. J. 274, 274 (1982). See also State of the
Judiciary Address by Chief Justice Burger, reprinted in 109 N.J.L.J., Feb. 4, 1984, at 1, col. 4.
Envisaging dispute resolution from the perspective of conflict management, proponents of substitute
processes generally see the histrionics of litigation and lawyering as an impediment to the effective
brokering of disputes. See M. DEUTSCH, THE RESOLUTION OF CONFLICT (1973); R. FISHER & W.
URY, GETTING TO YES (1981); J. HIMEs, CONFLICT AND CONFLICT MANAGEMENT (1980); Eisen-
berg, The Bargain Principle and Its Limits, 95 HARV. L. REV. 741 (1982); Eisenberg, Private Order-
ing Through Negotiation: Dispute Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976);
Mnookin & Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J.
950 (1979); Thensted, Litigation and Less: The Negotiation Alternative, 59 TUL. L. REV. 76 (1984).
The current literature on alternative dispute resolution has, quite literally, exploded to unman-
ageable proportions. "[T]he search for alternative methods of resolving disputes has burgeoned to 'a
movement.'" Davidson & Ray, Preface to ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION (H. Davidson, L. Ray & R. Horowitz eds. 1982). Given the veritable explosion of writing in
this area, the following list of sources is not exhaustive, but rather illustrative of the major references
in the area. The sources are organized according to subject matter headings. The literature is of
uneven quality.
The following sources contain general discussions of alternative dispute resolution. The Grow-
ing Field ofAlternative Dispute Resolution, 7 AM. ARB. Assoc. LAW. ARB. LETTER 4-7 (No. 4 Dec.
1983); J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CON-
FLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 4, 4-7 (1984), reviewed in 84 MICH. L. REV. 1036 (1986); Sander,
Family Mediation: Problems and Prospects, 2 MEDIATION Q. 3, 3-5 (1983); POLITICS OF INFORMAL
JUSTICE (2 vols.) (R. Abel ed. 1981); ARBITRATION AND THE LAW (Arb. Assoc. 1982) (General
Counsel's Annual Report); L. FREEDMAN, LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1984) (A.B.A.
Spec. Comm. on Dispute Resolution Monograph No. 2 1984); Kritzer & Anderson, The Arbitration
Alternative: A Comparative Analysis of Case Processing Time, Disposition Mode, and Cost in the
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painstaking, and difficult.2 The volume of cases before the courts, along
with the attention paid to cumbersome procedural matters, often engen-
American Arbitration Association and the Courts, 8 JUST. Sys. J. 6 (1983); NAT'L INST. JUST./NAT'L
CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CUSTOM SEARCH, APPLICATIONS OF Dis-
PUTE RESOLUTION (Medical, Consumer, Labor, Commercial, Family) (1984) (206 documents avail-
able on JURIS SEARCH) (on file with author); Snow & Abramson, Alternative to Litigation: Court
Annexed Arbitrations, 20 CAL. W.L. REV. 43 (1983); D. THOMAS, DISPUTE RESOLUTION FROM AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONALS IN DISPUTE RESOLUTION, Occa-
sional Paper No. 84-1, Mar. 1984; Trends in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 739 (1986).
The following sources contain discussions of alternate dispute resolution mechanisms in specific
areas other than family law:
In commerce: Green, Growth of the Mini-Trial, 9 LITIGATION 12 (1982); Goldstein, Alterna-
tives for Resolving Business Transaction Disputes, 58 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 69 (1983); Hoellering, The
Mini-Trial, 37 ARB. J. 48 (1982); Solove, Alternative Means to Resolve Corporate Disputes: A Survey,
91 COM. L.J. 133 (1986); Trial Alternatives: Alternative Dispute Resolution, 54 U.S.L.W. 2060 (July
23, 1985).
In consumer matters: CONSUMER DISPUTE RESOLUTION: EXPLORING THE ALTERNATIVES
(L. Ray & D. Smolover eds. 1983) (Conference Materials for the American Bar Association Special
Committee on Alternative Dispute Resolution, First National Conference on Alternative Consumer
Dispute Resolution, Jan. 17-18, 1983).
In education: J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO
RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION 196, 196-203 (1984).
In environmental matters: J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra, at 217-32; Watson & Danielson,
Environmental Mediation, 15 NAT. RESOURCES LAW. 687 (1983).
In housing/landlord-tenant disputes: J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra, at 191-96; Salsich &
Fitzgerald, Mediation of Landlord-Tenant Disputes. New Hope for the Implied Warranty of Habita-
bility, 19 CREIGHTON L. REV. 791 (1986).
In medical malpractice: Aslanian-Bedikian, Arbitrating a Medical Malpractice Claim, 62
MICH. B.J. 788 (1983); Heintz, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Viable Alternative, 34 ARB. J. 12
(1979); Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655
(1976); Comment, Alternatives to the Medical Malpractice Phenomenon: Damage Limitations, Mal-
practice Review Panels and Countersuits, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1179 (1977); Note, The Michigan
Malpractice Act's Requirement of a Physician on the Panel Violates the Due Process Right to a Fair
and Impartial Tribunal, 28 WAYNE L. REV. 1843 (1982); Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration:
Time for a Model Act, 33 RUTGERS L. REV. 454 (1981); Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration, A
Comparative Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 1285 (1976); Note, Medical Malpractice Arbitration: A Pa-
tient's Perspective, 61 WASH. U.L.Q. 123 (1983).
In minority relations: J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra, at 214-17.
In neighborhood/community justice: Community Mediation, 5 MEDIATION Q. 1-90 (J. Lem-
mon ed. 1984); NAT'L INST. JUST./NAT'L CRIM. JUST. REFERENCE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
CUSTOM SEARCH, NEIGHBORHOOD JUSTICE CENTERS (1984) (256 documents available on JURIS
SEARCH) (on file with author).
For patent disputes: Goldstein, Arbitration of Disputes Relating to Patent Validity or Infringe-
ment, 72 ILL. B.J. 350 (1984).
In real estate matters: Levy, Resolving Real Estate Valuation Disputes Through Arbitration, 14
REAL ESTATE REV. 61 (1984).
In torts generally: Hoellering, Remedies in Arbitration, 20 FORUM 516 (1985); Symposium:
Alternative Compensation Schemes and Tort Theory, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 548-1002 (1985); Comment,
The Asbestos Claims Facility-An Alternative to Litigation, 24 DUQ. L. REV. 833 (1986). But see
Phillips, In Defense of the Tort System, 27 ARIZ. L. REV. 603 (1985).
2. Criticism of the adversarial process-centering upon its expense, delay, and negative effect
upon litigants-is not confined to domestic relations disputes. According to Lieberman, such criti-
cism applies to the process in most, if not all, areas of litigation:
Important and as effective as the adversary system can be, it is not without a deleterious
side. It can be a hugely inefficient means of uncovering facts; its relentless formalities and
ceaseless opportunities for splitting hairs are time consuming and expensive. It is not available
therefore to everyone, and if it is the only system for obtaining redress then justice cannot be
done. For that reason, it may mislead us as a society into supposing that its availability is a
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guarantee of safety. Litigation is not a panacea; social policies are not necessarily carried out
merely because there is an avenue open to some ...
Moreover, like every other human system, litigation is subject to regular abuse. The limita-
tions of semantics, the fallibility of memory, the will to prevaricate, all contribute to unpredict-
ability. The outcome is never certain, and litigation is therefore frequently an exercise in
anguish and futility. As a mechanism to instill in people a fiduciary regard for others, it can be
effective. But for all that it does not often treat well those who are ensnared in it. Litigation,
and especially the trial itself, can be unremittingly harsh. Lawyers are often adversaries not
only of each other but of their clients; some kinds of litigation are prolonged (and even initiated)
solely to ensure the lawyers sufficient billable hours to earn a decent or even a handsome living.
The process can be psychologically harmful, hurting self-esteem as well as pocketbook. Other
modes of resolving disputes and solving problems bear scrutiny.
J. LIEBERMAN, THE LITIGIOUS SOCIETY 171 (1983). See generally J. AUERBACH, UNEQUAL JUS-
TICE (1976). For a discussion of the origins and development of the adversarial process, see Lands-
man, A Brief Survey of the Development of the Adversary System, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 713 (1983). For
an assessment of the adversarial model of adjudication, see Landsman, The Decline of the Adversary
System: How the Rhetoric of Swift and Certain Justice Has Affected Adjudication in American
Courts, 29 BUFFALO L. REV. 487 (1980).
Vituperative accounts, however, are particularly pronounced when the process is evaluated for
its operation upon family matters:
[I]f one were to set out to design a system poorly adapted to the resolution of family con-
flict or for safeguarding the children, one would, with a little luck, invent the adversarial system
presided over by a perplexed, frustrated judge whose background in law and politics have no
conceivable bearing on the issues before him or her.
Keynote Speech by Frank Sander, ABA National Conference on Alternate Means of Dispute Reso-
lution (June 1982) (quoting J. Wallerstein) (American Bar Association transcription at 22), reprinted
in Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing Family---Mediation Not Litigation, 29 Loy. L. REV.
55, 57 (1983).
The following list of sources pertaining to alternative dispute resolution in family law matters is
more illustrative than exhaustive. For the sake of clarity, it organizes the relevant material accord-
ing to subject matter headings. Given the plethora of writings and the novelty of alternative mecha-
nisms in the family law area, much of the literature is descriptive, sometimes uncritically promotive
and self-interested, and generally of uneven quality (although excellent studies do exist). Finally, the
bulk of the literature centers upon mediation.
The primary alternative remedies in the area of family law are arbitration, conciliation, and
mediation. For a comprehensive discussion of these and other alternative mechanisms in the area of
family law, see ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION (H. Davidson, L. Ray &
R. Horowitz eds. 1982); Herrman, McKenry & Weber, Mediation and Arbitration Applied to Family
Conflict Resolution: The Divorce Settlement, 34 ARB. J. 17 (1979); Meroney, Mediation and Arbitra-
tion of Separation and Divorce Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 467 (1979); Rigby, Alternate
Dispute Resolution, 44 LA. L. REV. 1725 (1984); Spencer & Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Pro-
posal for Private Resolution of Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911.
Specifically, on arbitration in family law matters: Coulson, Family Arbitration-An Exercise in
Sensitivity, 3 FAM. L.Q. 22 (1969); Philbrick, Agreements to Arbitrate Post-Divorce Custody Disputes,
18 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 419 (1985); Spencer & Zammit, Reflections on Arbitration Under the
Family Dispute Services, 32 ARB. J. 111 (1977); Comment, Arbitration-A Viable Alternative?, 3
FORDHAM URB. L. REV. 53 (1974); Comment, The Enforceability of Arbitration Clauses in North
Carolina Separation Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487 (1979). See also N. SHERESKY &
M. MANNES, UNCOUPLING: THE ART OF COMING APART 116-17 (1972).
On conciliation: Foster, Conciliation and Counseling in the Courts in Family Law Cases, 41
N.Y.U. L. REV. 353 (1966); Lightman & Irving, Conciliation and Arbitration in Family Disputes, 14
CONCILIATION Crs. REV. 12 (1976); Mclntrye, Conciliation of Disrupted Marriages by or Through
the Judiciary, 4 J. FAM. L. 117 (1964); Mclsaac, The Family Conciliation Court of Los Angeles
County, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 131 (H. Davidson, L. Ray &
R. Horowitz eds. 1982); Orlando, Where and How-Conciliation Courts, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS
OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION I ll (H. Davidson, L. Ray & R. Horowitz eds. 1982); Parkinson,
Conciliation in Matrimonial Disputes, 14 BRACTON L.J. 30 (1981); Orlando, Conciliation Programs:
Their Effect on Marriage and Family Life, 52 FLA. B.J. 218 (1978); Wolff, Family Conciliation:
Draft Rules for the Settlement of Family Disputes, 21 J. FAM. L. 213 (1982).
Books on mediation: 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT
(1978); R. COULSON, FIGHTING FAIR (1983): J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPRE-
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der delays, and substantially increase the length of proceedings. 3 The
HENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGATION (1984); R. GARDNER, FAMILY
EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION (1982); J. HAYNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION (1981);
H. IRVING, DIVORCE MEDIATION: THE RATIONAL ALTERNATIVE (1980); J. PEARSON & N.
THOENNE, DIVORCE MEDIATION: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION (1982); D. SAPOSNEK, MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES
(1983).
Compilations on mediation: DIVORCE MEDIATION-THEORY AND PRACTICE (J. Folberg & A.
Milne eds. 1981) (Conference Materials for the Association of Family Conciliation Courts, Winter
1981 Conference); Dimensions and Practice of Divorce Mediation, 1 MEDIATION Q. 1-100 (J. Lem-
mon ed. 1983); Successful Techniques for Mediating Family Breakup, 2 MEDIATION Q. 1-93 (J.
Lemmon ed. 1983); Reaching Effective Agreements, 3 MEDIATION Q. 1-112 (J. Lemmon ed. 1984);
Procedures for Guiding the Divorce Mediation Process, 6 MEDIATION Q. 1-89 (J. Lemmon ed. 1984).
Articles on mediation: Bahr, Mediation is the Answer, 3 FAM. ADVOCATE 32 (1981); Coombs,
Noncourt-Connected Mediation and Counseling in Child Custody Disputes, 17 FAM. L.Q. 469 (1984);
Evarts & Goodwin, The Mediation and Adjudication of Divorce and Custody: From Contrasting
Premises to Complementary Processes, 20 IDAHO L. REV. 277 (1984); Flanders, Divorce Mediation-
A New Alternative, 29 LA. B.J. 239 (1982); Fuller, Mediation-Its Forms and Functions, 44 S. CAL.
L. REV. 305 (1971); Gold, Mediation in the Dissolution of Marriage, 36 ARB. J. 9 (1981); Johnson,
Factors Predicting Outcome of Divorce Mediation, 22 CONCILIATION CTs. REV. 31 (1984); Levy,
Comment on the Pearson-Thoennes Study and on Mediation, 1 FAM. L.Q. 525 (1984); McLeod,
Summary of the 1982 Friend of the Court Reform Package, 62 MICH. B.J. 430 (1983); Pearson &
Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes. A Longitudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497
(1984); Phear, Family Mediation: A Choice of Options, 39 ARB. J. 22 (1984); Phillips & Piazza, How
to Use Mediation, 10 LITIGATION 31 (1984); Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer
in Mediation, 26 ARIZ. L. REV. 329 (1984); Saposnek, Hamburg, Delano & Michaelsen, How Has
Mandatory Mediation Fared? Research Findings of the First Year's Follow-Up, 22 CONCILIATION
CTs. REV. 7 (1984); Shaw, Parent-Child Mediation: An Alternative That Works, 39 ARB. J. 25
(1984); Shepard, Philbrick & Rabino, Ground Rules for Custody Mediation and Modification, 48
ALB. L. REV. 616 (1984); Weissman & Leick, Mediation and Other Creative Alternatives to Litigat-
ing Family Law Issues, 61 N.D.L. REV. 263 (1985); Winks, Divorce Mediation: A Nonadversary
Procedure for the No-Fault Divorce, 19 J. FAM. L. 615 (1980-81); Zumeta, Mediation as an Alterna-
tive to Litigation inDivorce, 62 MICH. B.J. 434 (1983); Comment, Divorce Mediation: A New Solution
to Old Problems, 16 AKRON L. REV. 665 (1983); Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing Fam-
ily-Mediation Not Litigation, 29 LOY. L. REV. 55 (1983).
3. It should be noted, however, that there are critics of the "litigation explosion" theory. See,
e.g., Litigation in America, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 4, 72 (1983).
One noted author opposing the "hyperplexis" view offers an interesting "contextual view":
[Tihe scholarly foundation of the "litigation explosion" view is the product of a narrow
elite of judges (mostly federal), professors and deans at eminent law schools, and practitioners
who practice in large firms and deal with big clients about big cases.
The only systematic empirical base that played a role in these formulations was the statis-
tics on the growth of caseloads in the federal courts, including the growth of appeals. Typically,
only gross figures on filings were cited. The fact that little of this was full blown adjudication
was ignored.
Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Disputes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We
Know) About Our Allegedly Contentious and Litigious Society, 31 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 4, 61-62. Ga-
lanter asserts that "[w]hile federal court filings have risen dramatically, the percentage of cases
reaching trial has diminished." Id. at 43 (footnote omitted).
Viewing procedural requirements, Galanter states that "[t]he process is more rational in the
sense that it is free of antiquated and arbitrary formalities. Concealment is discouraged; litigants
have access to more information. It is open to evidence of complicated states of facts and responsive
to a wider range of argument." Id. at 44. He concedes, however, "for the minority of matters that
run the full course, adjudication is more protracted, more elaborate, more exhaustive, and more
expensive." Id.
See also Delgado, Dunn, Brown, Lee & Hubbert, Fairness and Formality Minimizing the Risk
of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359; Fiss, Against Settlement, 93
YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). Accord Kanowitz, Alternative Dispute Resolution and the Public Interest:
The Arbitration Experience, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 239 (1987).
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gamesmanship of adversarial posturing usually exacerbates rather than
attenuates the spouses' conflicts.4 Moreover, the substantive rules of law
that apply in divorce proceedings must intermediate between the de-.
mands of the specific dispute and more impersonal systemic considera-
tions pertaining to history and policy. These rules sometimes develop a
technical consistency and logic of their own, and risk becoming es-
tranged from the human reality that underpins the controversy.5
Adversarial proceedings do have some worthwhile, albeit limited,
advantages. Allowing divorcing couples to voice their anger at one an-
4. The more adversarial the posturing on one side, t.he more the other side will feel obliged to
counter with its own attack. This is a phenomenon not limited to divorce; according to Alberti and
Emmons, in ordinary human relations, "direct aggressive attack provokes additional aggression,
both in the attacker and in the subject." R. ALBERTI & M. EMMONS, YOUR PERFECT RIGHT 110
(6th ed. 1984) (citing Berkowitz, The Concept of Aggressive Drive: Some Additional Considerations,
in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (L. Berkowitz ed. 1965)); L. BERKOWITZ,
ROOTS OF AGGRESSION: A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE FRUSTRATION-AGGRESSION HYPOTHESIS
(1969). See also R. DEWOLFF, THE BONDS OF ACRIMONY 86-95 (1970); R. GARDNER, FAMILY
EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION 11-44 (1982); R. KAHN & L. KAHN, THE DIVORCE
LAWYER'S CASEBOOK 91-95 (1972); S. ROSENBLA-rI, THE DIVORCE RACKETr 17-35 (1969); Wolff,
Family Conciliation: Draft Rules for the Settlement of Family Disputes, 21 J. FAM. L. 213 (1982).
5. Family law litigation abounds with examples of the hiatus that exists between legal rules
and the human dilemma of the given litigation--exemplifying the predominance of systemic consid-
erations in judicial adjudication. For example, under a system of fault-based divorce, an appropriate
evidentiary standard for proof of "fault" (e.g., adultery or mental cruelty) must be articulated.
Given the usually circumstantial nature of the evidence, some courts require a simple preponderance
of proof while others require clear and persuasive proof; and yet others require a level of proof
approaching that required in criminal cases (Le., so convincing as to exclude any other reasonable
hypothesis). Such a judicial controversy is motivated by historical considerations: adultery was
deemed at one time to be at least a quasi-criminal offense, and has been viewed as the gravest breach
of matrimonial duties. Debates surrounding the degree of proof required to establish adultery, how-
ever, have little to do with the divorcing spouses' personal dilemma or even their legal rights with
respect to common assets and liabilities, child support and custody, or spousal support and mainte-
nance. The courts merely afford the parties another opportunity to disagree and to do so at length.
For a discussion and illustration of these points, see Grappe v. Grappe, 315 So. 2d 866 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1975); Arbour v. Murray, 222 La. 684, 63 So. 2d 425 (1953); Hermes v. Deacon, 275 So. 2d 416
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1973); Adams v. Adams, 357 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1978).
Closely related to the problems of proof are problems of definition. For example, does adultery
include both homo- and heterosexual acts with a non-spouse during marriage? What if a spouse
during marriage engages in a close relationship going beyond conventional friendship, or a courtship
excluding all but sexual intercourse with a third party of the opposite sex? Does artificial insemina-
tion, unconsented to by the other spouse, amount to adultery? See Orford v. Orford, 49 Ont. L.R. 15
(1921); Maclennan v. Maclennan, Session Cases 105 (1958).
In some fault jurisdictions, a divorce granted on the basis of fault disqualifies the culpable
spouse from receiving post-divorce alimony. The rationale for this result is that a spouse whose
conduct has contributed to the breakdown of the marriage should be punished, and not be entitled to
receive compensation. Such results, however, might be challenged as contrary to economic justice.
The rules regarding legal cause in a divorce setting, like the standards applying to the definition of
proof of fault, are often artificial. An incidence of physical abuse or infidelity, for example, years
before the filing for divorce, may have provoked the breakdown. The doctrine of reconciliation,
however, prevents that event from being considered in the calculus of causative culpability. More
importantly, the "proximate" cause of the breakdown may have nothing to do with the grounds for
divorce (adultery, abandonment, physical or mental cruelty) recognized in fault jurisdictions. From
an emotional perspective, legal blameworthiness is an irrelevant consideration in the breakdown of
personal relationships. For a discussion of causation in matrimonial breakdown, see, e.g., Hermes v.
Deacon, 287 So. 2d 789, 791 (La. 1974) (Barham, J., dissenting). See also infra note 66 and accom-
panying text.
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other through legal arguments and the formality of judicial proceedings
civilizes their disagreement, and allows them to focus upon the financial
and practical implications of their breakup. The judicial pronouncement
of divorce is a forceful symbol of final termination. As to the emotional
predicament of the spouses, the court cannot undo whatever damage has
been done, nor force the couple to develop more positive attitudes about
their marriage. Thus, while providing some protection to the essential
social interest in marriage and the family, a court proceeding provides
the divorcing couple with an official point of reference by which to arrive
at some sort of resolution and perhaps initiate a healing process.6
Without compromising its essential ordering and stabilizing mission,
the legal process for divorce could be supplemented by alternative mech-
anisms.7 The human complexity of divorce disputes calls for a choice of
6. It should be noted, however, that recent psychological research indicates that merely ex-
pressing anger (releasing steam) provides minimal relief and impedes the resolution process:
Recent research has shown the popular concept of anger as a "steam kettle" to be false.
Many people have believed that by expressing one's anger, the anger would go away and prevent
the problems associated with "building up inside." We now know that anger expression is only
the beginning.
It has been discovered recently that emotional relieffrom anger comes only when expression
is accompanied by some resolution of the problem which caused the anger. Getting the feelings
out-even in appropriately assertive ways-only "sets the stage." Working out the conflict
with the other person, or sometimes within oneself, is the all-important, follow-up step which
makes the difference.
The evidence also shows us that the lack of such coping or resolution action may actually
increase anger whether it has been expressed or not ....
R. ALBERTI & M. EMMONS, supra note 4, at 112 (emphasis in the original). Inasmuch as divorcing
spouses avoid "resolution action" when they leave it to a judge to resolve their disputes, it may be
that a healing process following divorce occurs despite-and not as a result of-the court system.
7. While criticism of the judicial process may be appropriate, a myopic examination-dis-
cerning only drawbacks of the institution, accompanied by a critical view of the lawyerly art and a
hyperbolic touting of alternative processes-is as useless as it is intellectually suspect. Touting alter-
nate remedies as panaceas proffers little guidance on essential matters-namely, gauging the expecta-
tions and needs of society and of individuals, and demarcating the boundaries of the public interest
and individual accountability. One should premise all prophecies as to the utility of alternative
mechanisms in any area of human controversy upon a dispassionate and disinterested analysis.
Initially, one must examine the very utility of alternative mechanisms. Does society want to
abandon litigation as its principal dispute resolution process-especially where family concerns are
involved? What are the real shortcomings of the judicial adjudication of divorce disputes? Why do
these deficiencies exist? By what standards and according to what values should the court process be
evaluated? Should speed, efficiency, alleged expertise, and financial economy be the key factors of
analysis? What about considerations of fairness? Can the troublesome aspect of the adversarial
process be readily identified? Does it amount to a significant obstacle to effective dispute resolution?
Will the alternative mechanisms respond appropriately to these deficiencies or merely act as barriers
to litigation-either deterring or postponing recourse to the judicial process?
For example, with compulsory, non-binding arbitration, the award cannot be enforced unless
both parties acquiesce to it. Such an alternative mechanism is meant to act as a deterrent to judicial
adjudication; its objective is to reduce recourse to courts and to free court dockets. With compul-
sory, binding arbitration, the award can be challenged only on narrow grounds. Both types of alter-
native mechanisms, where successful, can abridge normally-applicable rights to judicial recourse.
Although alternative mechanisms have fared well in specialized fields, generally they have suc-
ceeded where applied to well-defined, basically singular disputes. See generally G. WILNER, DOMKE
ON COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1984). See also F. KELLOR, AMERICAN ARBITRATION (1972);
Mentschikoff, Commercial Arbitration, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 846 (1961).
On labor arbitration, see THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN AMERICA (J. Cortege, V.
Hughes & M. Stone eds. 1976); F. ELKOURI & E. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed.
[Vol. 1986
ALTERNATIVES TO DIVORCE LITIGATION
remedies. The exclusive focus upon a single process often makes divorce
synonymous with a quest for emotional retribution, transforming mar-
riage dissolution into a bittersweet means of prolonging a painful rela-
tionship. Socio-psychological advantages will result if divorcing parties
are given a choice of remedies and some incentive to pursue them.
Rather than obliging spouses to deal with the breakdown of their rela-
tionship through adversarial contentiousness, alternate processes would
permit the parties to face their emotional and practical dilemma
squarely, allowing them to assume responsibility for, and a measure of
control over, the termination of their matrimonial relationship. The par-
ties should gain a sense of achievement, acceptance, and a more lucid
understanding of their former relationship from such an experience.
Self-determination in divorce might also enhance the parties' capacity to
engage in parenting after divorce, and provide them with insights valua-
ble in future relationships. In addition, non-adversarial proceedings
would lessen state intrusion into the private life of each party.8
This article argues for the need to inform divorce procedures with a
sense of the human reality of matrimonial breakdown. In this area of
1985); 0. FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983); M.
HILL & A. SINICROPI, REMEDIES IN ARBITRATION (1981); S. KAGEL, ANATOMY OF A LABOR
ARBITRATION (1st ed. 1978); C. UPDEGRAFF, ARBITRATION AND LABOR RELATIONS (3d ed. 1972);
A. ZACK & R. BLOCH, LABOR AGREEMENT IN NEGOTIATION AND ARBITRATION (1983).
The evident limitations of this prior experience generate some rather gnawing questions about
how comprehensively alternate processes can be administered. Will established alternative mecha-
nisms respond to divorce disputes with similar effectiveness? If not, can the usual mechanisms be
modified to create an appropriate remedial structure?
Contemplating alternative dispute resolution processes also touches on larger systemic con-
cerns. For example, when applied to new areas such as divorce, can traditional or adapted mecha-
nisms properly safeguard the public interest and protect individual legal rights? What influences will
public policy considerations have in discussions of alternate dispute procedures? Should alternate
processes be binding or non-binding, compulsory or consensual? Would a mandatory and binding
alternative mechanism raise due process and equal protection problems? What specific relationship
should apply between the alternative mechanisms and the judicial system-should the courts be
empowered to supervise the procedure, intervene on matters of substance, or review the outcome in
de novo fashion?
Pragmatically identifying the failings of the judicial process in divorce can provide useful insight
as to needed reforms or alternatives. Constructive proposals for change must appraise societal needs
accurately, and consider matters of basic justice. Such proposals should reflect a studied view of
divorce disputes (their origin and genesis, anatomy and content), consider the feasibility of alterna-
tive mechanisms, and be mindful of the possible need to modify existing alternative mechanisms.
8. Family mediation furthers the policy of minimum state intervention. The arguments for
minimum state intervention in determinations of child care and custody have been widely de-
bated, and they are now quite familiar. Parents should be presumed to have the capacity, au-
thority, and responsibility both to determine and to do what is best for their children as well as
what is best for their entire family constellation, regardless of how that constellation might be
rearranged by divorce. Psychological theory as well as constitutional considerations argue for
parental autonomy and family privacy when there is no direct evidence that the interests of
children are jeopardized in the process. Parents, whether married or divorced, should have the
opportunity to meet the needs of their children and to maintain family ties without state
interference.
Folberg, A Mediation Overview: History and Dimensions of Practice, 1 MEDIATION Q. 3, 10 (1983).
Given the public interest in marriage and the family, some form of court supervision would be
necessary. The benefits of such coordinate organization should yield systemic cooperation rather
than competition.
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human controversy, the adversarial ethic is antithetical to the effective
brokering of disputes and ought to be abandoned. Legislatures should
modify existing statutory schemes, curtailing the traditional emphasis
upon fixed rules of law. Statutes should either compel or encourage re-
course to procedural alternatives, such as arbitration or mediation. Re-
course to court proceedings should only be allowed when substitute
mechanisms are clearly unworkable in the particular case. Finally,
where coercive authority is necessary, judges should sit as arbitrators,
thereby minimizing the impact of adversarialism in the divorce dispute
resolution process.
Part one assesses the adequacy of the existing adjudicatory approach
to divorce by focusing upon the hiatus between the legal approach to
divorce and the emotional content of divorce disputes. Divorce cases
characteristically involve intense emotions to which legal standards and
procedures do not adequately respond; the adversarial ethic only height-
ens the lack of comprehension and the negative demeanor of the process.
Legislatures should enact procedures that recognize the actual causes of
divorce and respond to its emotional substratum.
Part two lays the foundation for constructive change, providing a
statistical portrait of divorce in contemporary America. The rate of di-
vorce, which until recently rose by continuous yearly increments, ap-
pears to be influenced primarily by sociological trends and individual
psychological factors. Marriages of relatively brief duration entered into
during early adulthood appear to be most vulnerable to divorce. The
studies reveal that the decision to terminate a marriage is a profoundly
personal choice. The liberalization of the grounds for divorce did not
persuade individuals to divorce, nor do adversarial procedures deter
them from doing so. Accordingly, the procedures dealing with divorce
should respond to the personal needs of individuals, not abstract legal
concepts and vague policy concerns.
Although alternative dispute resolution merits considerable interest
and study, parts three and four of the article assert that substitute di-
vorce processes should not be espoused uncritically. Alternative resolu-
tion mechanisms are not panaceas. These mechanisms may not have
universal application and, in divorce matters, may yield only moderate,
possibly negligible, improvement. Part three assesses specifically the via-
bility of divorce arbitration as a remedy. A number of commentators
and professional associations have recommended recourse to this alterna-
tive mechanism. Initial difficulty arises with this alternative because
spousal agreement usually would be necessary to trigger the process.
Additionally, the fact that divorce actions are fundamentally different
from commercial or labor disputes, where arbitration has achieved con-
siderable success, requires at least some modification of the traditional
arbitral framework. The proposed system of divorce arbitration, provid-
ing a flexible, private, and non-adversarial dispute resolution setting, il-
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lustrates that the traditional techniques of arbitral adjudication would be
of only limited utility in the divorce context.
Part four discusses mediation, and suggests that it is a more viable
alternative mechanism to divorce litigation. The non-adjudicatory char-
acter of mediation calls for a redistribution of decision-making authority,
and emphasizes individual rationality and responsibility in matrimonial
dispute resolution. Despite its numerous advantages, divorce mediation
also has a number of significant drawbacks. As with arbitration, some
divorcing couples may resist mediation simply because they are not prc
pared or suited to resolve their marital disputes in a self-determined man-
ner. Mediation appears to apply with particular effectiveness to marital
disputes involving middle and upper-middle class couples who are skilled
at verbal communication and who are in roughly equal bargaining posi-
tions. Ultimately, mediation places a necessary but precarious reliance
upon the willingness of disputing individuals to adopt a rational course of
conduct amidst conflict.
Part five discusses the implementation of a judicial arbitration struc-
ture. Divorcing couples who are unable to arbitrate or mediate, or un-
willing even to reach an attorney-negotiated settlement, should not be
deprived of their right to a judicial remedy. The available court proce-
dure, however, should be non-adversarial in character. Legislation
should mandate that contested divorce cases be brought before domestic
relations judges who sit as arbitrators. Having judicial arbitration as the
final remedy may cure many of the problems associated with privately-
instituted divorce arbitration. Judicial arbitration should also create an
incentive for couples to pursue other options. Although such a process
would not necessarily remedy the psychological damage inherent in mar-
ital breakups, flexible adjudicatory procedures and substantive standards
should limit the extent to which divorcing spouses can petition courts
and prolong matrimonial unhappiness at the expense of society.
II. DISCORDANT PERCEPTIONS OF MATRIMONIAL PATHOLOGY
A. The Legal View
From a legal perspective, the marriage relationship represents a
bundle of rights and duties, akin in many respects to a partnership or
joint venture association.9 The fabric of marriage, however, consists of
9. See, e.g., LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 119 (West 1952). Articles 119 and 120 of the Louisiana
Civil Code articulate the respective rights and duties of married persons. The parties to the marriage
owe each other fidelity, support, assistance, and the obligation of conjugal cohabitation. Id. The
specific content of these duties has been defined by the courts in the context of particular cases. See,
e.g., Smith v. Smith, 382 So. 2d 972 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980); Hingle v. Hingle, 369 So. 2d 271 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1979); Favrot v. Barnes, 332 So. 2d 873 (La. App. 4th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds,
339 So. 2d 843 (La.), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 966 (1977). Article 120 was repealed by Acts 1985, No.
271, § 1, leaving the duty of conjugal cohabitation to be implied from the content of article 119.
LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 86 (West 1952) provides that the "law considers marriage in no other
view than as a civil contract." The express definition of marriage is secular and devoid of religious
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more than just disparate strands of contract law interwoven by the
thread of party autonomy. Marriage implicates larger social interests,
and transcends purely individual concerns." ° Indeed, the law, through
statutes and judicial rulings, defines the nature and content of the essen-
tial matrimonial duties that apply to the relationship, and ordinarily pro-
vides for the governing of marital property." Society expects, during the
existence of the marriage, that the spouses will each cooperate to main-
tain their association, and allocate responsibilities in the furtherance of
common tasks and goals. Society thus defines the emotional and mate-
rial development and well-being of the family unit and its individual
members. 12
Marriage involves a merger of the individual's contractual preroga-
tives with social imperatives relating to the family. The grouping of two
persons in a matrimonial association, therefore, simultaneously excludes
and includes an impersonal state interest. The dynamics of this curious
triangular association are particularly evident when the parties are termi-
nating the personal relationship. In the name of public policy, a court of
law usually intervenes at this stage to deal with disputes that ensue from
the dismantling of the matrimonial association.' 3
The disputes involved in the breakdown of a marriage resist facile
legal description, making governing standards as to substance and proce-
overtones. It functions within a conceptual framework of individual freedom of contract. See
Carbonneau, Analytical and Comparative Variations on Selected Provisions of Book One of the Louisi-
ana Civil Code with Special Consideration of the Role of Fault in the Determination of Marital Dis-
putes, 27 Loy. L. REV. 999, 1013, 1014 (1981); Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing
Family-Mediation Not Litigation, 29 Loy. L. REv. 55, 58 (1983) (Lousiana law). Similarly, com-
mon law jurisdictions define marriage as a civil contract by statute. See H. CLARK, THE LAW OF
DOMESTIc RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 32-118 (1968).
10. Because marriage implicates both personal rights and social policy, it is more than a mere
contract. Therefore, the state may nullify provisions of a prenuptial agreement as void against public
policy. See, e.g., Holliday v. Holliday, 358 So. 2d 619 (La. 1978) (provision of prenuptial agreement
waiving right to temporary alimony declared invalid). Accord Monk v. Monk, 376 So. 2d 552 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1979) (post-separation agreement waiving right to permanent alimony in consideration
of community property settlement upheld). According to Professor Clark, the position in common
law jurisdictions on this issue is virtually identical. "Broadly speaking these agreements are valid
and enforceable, and in fact favored by the law, if they meet certain requirements." H. CLARK,
supra note 9, at 27. Accord UNIF. MARITAL PROP. ACT [U.M.P.A.] § 10(g), 9A U.L.A. 35 (Supp.
1983).
11. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 119 (West 1987) (stating that the duties of marriage are fidelity,
support, and assistance; this is interpreted to include conjugal cohabitation). For an illustration of
the court construction of these duties, see cases cited in supra note 9. For a statement of the position
that applies on this matter in other state jurisdictions, see H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 181-87. As to
the financial regime that applies to marriage, see LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2336 & 2346 (West 1987); H.
CLARK, supra note 9, at 449-52.
12. The Lousiana Civil Code provides that "[m]arriage is a contract intended in its origin to
endure until the death of one of the contracting parties." LA. CIV. CODE art. 89 (West 1987).
According to Professor Clark, the interest of the state "lies in the direction of preserving marriages
and ensuring that divorces are only granted where the law, both of statute and case, authorizes
them." H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 395 (footnote omitted).
13. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 140 (1987) (providing that "[s]eparation ... can not be made the
subject of arbitration"). For the position in common law jurisdictions, see H. CLARK, supra note 9,
at 395.
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dure difficult to define. Conflicts between divorcing spouses, in addition
to implicating a more general public interest, involve issues in both tort
and contract law.' 4 For instance, a divorce may involve questions bear-
ing upon marital conduct, the division of property, financial mainte-
nance, and the custody of children-issues governed by distinct areas of
substantive law.'" Moreover, differences that arise between divorcing
spouses are often accompanied by volatile emotions, personal antago-
nisms, and feelings of retribution, making the procedural adjudication of
legal issues potentially strident. 6 To achieve effective results, then, judi-
cial rules and procedures should reflect the sui generis aspects of matri-
monial disputes as well as the unique and varied features of divorce.
B. The Personal View
From the perspective of individual human ideals, marriage consists
at its core of an intimate and pleasurable relationship which, despite the
vicissitudes of life, holds physical and emotional benefits for both par-
ties.' 7 The sharing marriage contemplates generates not only a sense of
mutual commitment, but also a bond of trust between the spouses, mak-
ing them dependent upon and vulnerable to one another. The marriage
relationship can also involve innocent, non-contracting third parties: the
children, whose rights and welfare are automatically implicated by the
relationship.'" In the case of divorce, the parties relinquish the ideal as-
pirations of marriage; the spouses focus instead upon their disappoint-
ment, and are often prone to fix personal blame on each other. Children
frequently become spousal weapons in the marital struggle. Moreover,
the spouses may disagree as to whether the relationship should cease.
One spouse, for instance, may decide unilaterally to abandon the other
after a period of constant and worsening difficulties."'
The factors that give rise to such marriage difficulties are as multifa-
rious as are the human psyche and the variegated mores of contemporary
14. A breach of matrimonial duty, on the one hand, violates the civil agreement between the
spouses and, on the other hand, may invade a corporeal or emotional personality interest protected
by the law of tort. For a more detailed discussion of this point, see H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 327-
49.
15. For instance, the concept of matrimonial fault is usually relevant in some jurisdictions to
the grounds for divorce, but does not factor in the custody question or the division of property. For
a description of the role of fault in divorce matters in the various state jurisdictions, see infra notes
47, 51, and 54 and accompanying text. See also Comment, The Best Interest of the Divorcing Fam-
ily-Mediation Not Litigation, supra note 2, at 58-68 (describing the role of fault in the Lousiana law
of separation and divorce); H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 327-78, 420-520, 572-601.
16. For a humorous illustration of this point, see, e.g., Gilberti v. Gilberti, 338 So. 2d 971 (La.
App. 4th Cir. 1976). See also Trosclair v. Trosclair, 337 So. 2d 1216 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1976);
O'Neill v. O'Neill, 196 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
17. See, e.g., M. GREEN, MARRIAGE (1984).
18. Children are subject to the authority of their parents. In Lousiana, their biological rela-
tionship gives them inheritance rights, known as forced heirship. For a detailed discussion of the
legal status of children in the family, see, e.g., H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 155-80, 572-601.
19. See, e.g., Adams v. Adams, 408 So. 2d 1322 (La. 1982). For a discussion of unilateral
divorce as it applies in American jurisdictions generally, see H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 352-53.
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society. 2° The couple may have married at an early age and developed
emotional maturity at different paces, inducing persistent and increasing
tensions. Latent psychological conflicts may have precipitated episodes
of domestic violence, infidelity, or abuse of stimulants in response to per-
ceived inattention or a lack of affection. 2' Spouses may have expressed
anger in destructive ways. Continuous misunderstanding resulting from
unrecognized depression over a period of years may have eroded the in-
terest and will of the spouses to salvage the relationship. In all these
circumstances, there may be transference from a psychologically
debilitating childhood:22 negative feelings encountered in one's early
family life are expressed against the spouse, and destroy the healthy adult
dimension of the marriage relationship.
C. The Lack of Accommodation by the Legal System
The legal system does not openly respond to the emotions exper-
ienced by both divorcing spouses. These emotions range from disap-
pointment and anxiety to depression, sadness, grief, and anger-
sometimes to the point of rage.23 In terms of substance and procedure,
the legal process attributes only minimal recognition to the emotional
trauma that underlies the severance of the marriage relationship.24 Legal
rules and procedures fail to reflect the dichotomous interests in and views
of marriage. These rules do not attempt to coalesce the law's objective
emphasis on rights with an individual's subjective emotional perception
20. See generally The Revolution in Family Law, 5 FAMILY ADVOCATE 1 (1982).
21. See L. BARUTH & C. HUBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO MARITAL THEORY AND THERAPY
(1984). See also Kaslow, Divorce and Divorce Therapy, in HANDBOOK OF FAMILY THERAPY (A.
Gurman & D. Kriskern eds. 1981). Accord Whitaker & Miller, A Reevaluation of "Psychiatric Help"
When Divorce Impends, 126 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 57 (1969).
22. According to Hinsie and Campbell, transference
[i]n psychoanalytic therapy, [is] the phenomenon of projection of feelings, thoughts, and
wishes onto the analyst, who has come to represent an object from the patient's past. The
analyst is reacted to as though he were someone from the patient's past; such reactions, while
they may have been appropriate to the conditions that prevailed in the patient's previous life,
are inappropriate and anachronistic when applied to an object (the analyst) in the present.
L. HINSIE & R. CAMPBELL, PSYCHIATRIC DICTIONARY 751 (4th ed. 1976). See also C. JUNG,
CONTRIBUTIONS TO ANALYTICAL PSYCHOLOGY (H. Baynes & C. Kegan trans. 1928); H.
NUNBERG, PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS (1955); Winnicott, Clinical Varieties of Transference,
in D.W. WINNICOrr: COLLECTED PAPERS 295 (1958). Psychological experts claim that transfer-
ence also takes place in ordinary life situations-between spouses, in professional relationships, in
friendships, and in daily impersonal encounters. According to popular psychological literature,
transferring childhood feelings and behavior into the present "is fairly common in life, and there are
elements of it present in any contact with authority...." T. HARRIS, I'M O.K.-YOU'RE O.K. 229
(1973).
23. For a discussion of the emotional effects of divorce, see 0. COOGLER, supra note 2, at 11-
12.
24. For example, the law in punishing adultery focuses primarily on establishing the fact of
intercourse and the possibility of introducing illegitimate offspring into the family line. It does not
concentrate upon the tortious nature of the offensive conduct, nor does it attempt to evaluate the
motivation underlying such conduct or the emotional impact upon the other spouse. Generally,
such determinations are outside the purview of legally cognizable claims.
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of the failed relationship.25 The law practices a policy of simple
containment.
In attempting to deal with marital conflict in manageable practical
terms, the legal process of divorce focuses primarily on objective spousal
conduct and the disposition of financial matters.26 In some jurisdictions,
the law still affords the spouses the additional, though questionable, boon
of assessing their respective behavior according to an external standard
of fault and legal causation.27 In most jurisdictions, a spouse has the
right to dissolve the marriage either on grounds of the other spouse's
specific conduct (matrimonial fault as expressed, for example, through
the concepts of infidelity, cruelty, and constructive or actual abandon-
ment); for reasons of incompatibility (a non-fault premise); or on a sim-
ple uncontested basis (default).2" The courts in these jurisdictions are
not meant nor equipped to provide relief in the form of therapy or coun-
seling. The courts merely proffer remedies for resolving so-called objec-
tivizable conflicts, and avoid the more fundamental personal grievances
of the individuals.
The legal process of divorce is inadequate precisely because the
courts focus primarily on objective issues.29 Courts are basically unable,
and perhaps unwilling, to deal with the spouses' personal conflict. Ag-
gravating this problem, the divorcing couple often misunderstands the
legal system's assessment of and approach to their problems. The
spouses infuse their underlying personal conflicts into the legally-cogni-
zable claims.3" In the classical unilateral divorce, the abandoned spouse
25. See generally 0. COOGLER, supra note 2.
26. Namely, the grounds for divorce, child custody and support, alimony, and property
division.
27. See infra note 47 and accompanying text.
28. See infra note 47.
29. See generally infra note 47 and accompanying text.
30. Dr. Coogler gives an especially vivid and critical account of the misunderstandings that
exist between divorcing couples and the legal system. Coogler argues that in choosing the adver-
sarial system for divorce, parties
often do not realize they have made the choice until they find themselves caught up in it
with apparently no way out. There is little or no explanation in advance of commitment. There
is no offer of a choice between it and anything else.
Without their awareness, the choice is made for most couples when either one or both
parties decide to consult an attorney. Often their purpose in seeking the consultation was to
find an answer to the question, What are my legal rights? This would seem to be a rational
beginning for dealing with a matter in which one is without prior experience. Most people do
not have information in advance when they are confronted with death or divorce.
Lawyers, like undertakers, are presumed to have the answer to questions in their field, but
unlike undertakers, lawyers never answer the questions. They are not answered because there
are no answers to what the client wants to know.
There is no other field of law in which the court is given such complete and, for all practi-
cal purposes, uncontrolled discretion as in divorce cases. To answer the client's question, the
lawyer would have to guess what the judge might do, except that one can never be sure which
judge will hear the case. Studies have shown, and observers of the legal process confirm, that
different judges may make quite different decisions upon substantially the same factual situa-
tion.
This uncertainty does not stop most lawyers from giving what sounds like an answer while
qualifying each statement made. The one thing the client is very sure of from the consultation is
that it is all very hard to understand. From this follows a decision to leave it up to the lawyer
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is embittered and often prone to vindictive retaliation. The abandoning
spouse, anxious to conclude and forget the relationship, will resent legal
tactics meant to frustrate a smooth and orderly disposition of the divorce
proceedings. This spouse may also find in litigation a means of reprisal-
a vehicle for communicating disapproval and defensive anger. In actions
involving issues of adultery, alimony, or sole custody, the couple may use
the litigation as a vehicle for expressing rage and recrimination. The
courts, then, confront an emotional tug-of-war, and deal with the strug-
gle only as a set of practical concerns.
The adversarial process does not adequately deal with hostilities
that accompany divorce. 31  The courtroom "battleground" devalues ra-
tionality, and invites the spouses to adopt a distorted view of their situa-
tion and to engage in single-minded advocacy. Legal proceedings, in
fact, invite couples to extend their conflictual relationship, and to engage
in exercises of personal vindication. Spouses see adversarial proceedings
as a means by which to portray conflicts, dramatize their victimization,
and unravel personal dilemmas arising out of marriage. A spouse may
actually encourage protracted court actions in the hope that a court will
approve of past conduct, and require the culprit to admit past insensitiv-
ity, beseech forgiveness, and accept punishment. The usual result is fur-
ther acrimony--eliminating all but a forcible determination of disputes
by a court of law. 32 Judicial procedures for divorce, then, appear to op-
who then compliments the client for having made a very wise choice as a check for the retainer
fee is written.
What they do not know about the adversarial system is that the lawyer, as an advocate, is
required to represent, or advocate, solely the interest of his client. He cannot represent both
parties, as is commonly supposed. The lawyer represents his client within the "light of his
professional judgment." But the client's interest is always perceived as being in opposition to
the interests of the other party. The lawyer cannot and does not regard the parties as having a
common problem which he or she will help resolve.
The represented party, feeling that there is a knowledgeable person "on my side," exper-
iences considerable relief after all the feelings of fear and helplessness that have gone before. At
this point there is little awareness of being postured against the other party-"What should
he/she have to fear from me?" The heightened feelings of fear and helplessness the other party
experiences by not having anybody on his/her side are not anticipated.
It is rare that the employment of one attorney does not lead to the employment of a second,
unless the parties simply do not have the financial resources. The need for a second attorney
usually comes into focus when the parties realize that many areas of agreement are needed
which they had not previously considered. The possible implications of an attorney's routine
demands for financial disclosure can be so threatening as to send an unrepresented party to
another attorney in a near panic.
Once a second attorney is employed, the only factor limiting escalation of the competitive
struggle between husband and wife is the financial resources of the family. In some cases, the
struggle may continue not just through the divorce, but for the lifetime of the parties.
0. COOGLER, supra note 2, at 6-8 (emphasis in the original). This criticism may indicate nothing
more than clients' dissatisfaction with the lack of predictability of outcome. Arguably, if more an-
swers were available in the form of fixed substantive rules, clients would be more satisfied with the
legal process of divorce. For more discussion of this point, see infra note 186 and accompanying
text.
31. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
32. Indeed, while the couple may not anticipate this situation, they may gradually enmesh
themselves in it. See 0. COOGLER, supra note 2, at 11-12.
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erate on the basis of fundamental incomprehension among the parties,
the adjudicatory mechanism, and the subject matter of the proceeding.
Despite the practical ordering function of such a structure for marital
dispute resolution, the system is unresponsive to humanistic priorities.
III. A PORTRAIT OF CONTEMPORARY DIVORCE
IN AMERICAN SOCIETY
A. Prolegomena
One cannot appraise existing judicial procedures for divorce nor
elaborate proposals for change without referring to statistics which pro-
vide a quantifiable perspective of divorce in American society. Surpris-
ingly, comprehensive statistical portraits are not readily available. The
statistics that are available from general sources 33 and more specific stud-
ies of limited scope34 yield only vague descriptions of the reality to which
current regulatory schemes and adjudicatory processes are meant to ap-
ply. The limitations in the methodology and content of the available
compilations provide only a very general view of divorce in the United
States. The studies do not shed much, if any, light on the intricate com-
posites that underlie the phenomenon. Because divorce is such a com-
plex phenomenon, one should view statistical compilations carefully.
Although researchers might isolate patterns and types, the particular dis-
positions of individual spouses are so central to the reality of divorce that
statistical quantifications and generalizations should be used with great
caution.
B. Etching an Outline
Recent media reports35 that the national divorce rate declined
briefly during this decade are difficult to gauge-at least when compared
to the latest information from the National Center for Health Statistics
(NCHS). NCHS figures reveal that the absolute number of divorces per
33. Other than media reports, see infra note 35, the statistics in this section were taken from
the National Center for Health Statistics: Advance Report of Final Divorce Statistics (1981), in 32
MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT Table 2 (No. 9, Supp. 2) [hereinafter cited as NCHS 1981];
National Center for Health Statistics: Annual Summary of Births, Deaths, Marriages, and Divorces:
US. 1983, in 32 MONTHLY VITAL STATISTICS REPORT Table 3 (No. 13) [hereinafter cited as NCHS
1983]; National Center for Health Statistics: Births, Marriages, Divorces, and Deaths for 1984, in 33
MONTHLY VITAL STATIsTICS REPORT Table 3 (No. 12) [hereinafter cited as NCHS 1984]. The
statistical analyses (Analyses of Variance, Chi-Square) were performed by Marjorie Esman (Ph.D.,
Anthropology, Tulane University; J.D., Tulane University) and Michael D. Chafetz (Ph.D., Psy-
chology, Texas Christian University; Statistical Consultant, New Orleans).
34. See, e.g., Booth & White, Thinking About Divorce, 42 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 605 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as Nebraska Study]; Levinger, A Social Psychological Perspective on Marital Disso-
lution, 32 J. Soc. ISSUEs 21 (1976).
35. According to reports issued on CBS Morning News (Jan. 13, 1984 & Mar. 6, 1985), the
national divorce rate has declined (transcripts of the reports were obtained from the CBS/Broadcast
Group and are on file with the author). On March 27, 1986, the CBS Evening News indicated that
the rate of divorce increased 2% in 1985. More recent reports, published in 1987, now indicate a
slight decline.
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year did indeed decrease nationwide in the first four years of this dec-
ade.16 This numerical decline, however, was so slight as to be statisti-
cally inconclusive; and, indeed, the trend reversed in 1985. 3" On the one
hand, these figures may indicate a permanent leveling off of the divorce
rate. The brief decline, on the other hand, may simply reflect a tempo-
rary downward swing of a trend that has redressed itself and continues
relatively unabated.
According to 1981 NCHS statistics, divorce affects primarily
younger couples, and often ends marriages of brief duration that were
entered into at an early age. The median age of divorcing persons in
1981 was 32.1 for men and 30.6 for women; the median length of a mar-
riage ending in divorce was seven years, with 65% of the divorces occur-
ring within nine years of marriage.38 Of the divorces granted in 1981,
most went to persons who had married at a relatively young age: 61% of
the 1981 divorces were granted to men who had married before the age
of twenty-five, and 74.2% to women who had married before reaching
that age.39 These figures do not indicate how many persons in the per-
centage group experienced multiple short marriages-a factor that may
be indispensable to arriving at an accurate assessment of the stability of
youthful marriages. Also, the fact that a large majority of divorces were
granted to persons who were married before the age of twenty-five may
simply point to a predominance of youthful marriages in the United
36. The absolute number of divorces decreased from 1,189,000 in 1980 to 975,000 in 1984. See
NCHS 1981 and NCHS 1984, supra note 33. The rate per thousand population also appears to be
decreasing, from 5.2% in 1980 to 5.0% in 1983. See NCHS 1981 and NCHS 1983, supra note 33.
Although the overall nationwide picture indicates no statistically significant change since 1980,
regional differences do emerge. These differences may indicate shifts in divorce patterns in some
parts of the country. Of the four regions defined by the National Center for Health Statistics, signifi-
cant changes have occurred in two. In the North Central region, there was a significant decrease
from 1980-83 (F (1, 10) = 5.85, p < .05). A similar decrease occurred in the West (F (1, 12) =
6.59, p < .05). These differences suggest greater changes in some areas than in others. They may
herald a future decline in the other two regions, though such speculation is premature.
The four NCHS regions consist in the following breakdown of states:
Northeast: Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New
York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania.
North Central: Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Missouri, North
Dakota, South Dakota, Nebraska, Kansas.
South: Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia,
Florida, Kentucky, Tennessee, Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, Lousiana, Oklahoma, Texas.
West: Montana, Idaho, Wyoming, Colorado, New Mexico, Arizona, Utah, Nevada, Washing-
ton, Oregon, California, Alaska, Hawaii.
37. NCHS 1981, supra note 33.
38. Id. at Table 7.
39. Id. at Table 9. The four NCHS regions differ significantly in duration of marriage (F (3,
27) = 13.83, p < .01). Marriages in the Northeast are of considerably longer duration than those in
the nation as a whole (8.3 years to 7.0 years nationwide in 1981). Marriages in the West are of
shortest duration: 5.5 years. Corollary to this is the difference in divorce rates for marriages nine
years old or younger. The Northeast has the fewest such divorces (58.4% to 65% nationwide) while
the West has the most (73.2%) (F (3, 27) = 13.88, p < .01). In NCHS's 31-state divorce registra-
tion area, Wyoming had both the shortest marriages (5.0 years) and the most divorces under 9 years
(75.1%). Pennsylvania, at 8.5 years, had the highest duration to divorce; and Missouri, at 51.9%,
had the fewest divorces before 9 years. See id. at Tables 6 & 7.
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States rather than to a disproportionately high incidence of divorce
among younger couples.
As to the effect of divorce on children, the average 1981 divorce
involved .97 children under age eighteen.' That is, although most 1981
divorces did implicate minor children, almost half of them (45%) did
not; and another 46% involved two or fewer minor children.41  Data re-
40. Id. at Table 5. Although conventional wisdom holds that children from a divorced family
fare better than children from an unhappy, but intact, family, the data are unclear and contradic-
tory. Many children do not anticipate their parents' divorce and have a difficult time adjusting to it.
Less than 10% of the children in the Wallerstein-Kelly Children of Divorce study were relieved by
the parents' divorce. Children fear abandonment by both parents and possible rejection; they are
often torn by conflicting loyalties. Five years after the divorce, the psychological health of the chil-
dren in this study had not substantially improved. In fact, one-third of them remained unhappy and
unresolved with their divorced family. This does not necessarily mean that the children were psy-
chologically maladjusted, but simply that they had lingering and unresolved conflicts. See J. WAL-
LERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 10, 35, 306 (1980). The Wallerstein-Kelly study,
although insightful and well-designed, is limited to 60 California families of which 88% were white,
3% black, and 9% white/Asian interracial marriages. The study examined a range of social class
and educational levels, although only five husbands and two wives had less than high school educa-
tions. Participants volunteered for research and therapy related to their divorces. The sample is not,
therefore, representative of the divorcing population in the United States. The extent to which this
bias may have influenced the findings is not clear.
Children's responses to divorce depend heavily on such factors as the child's age, the nature of
the parents' relationship both before and after the separation, and the way both parents treat the
child. Longfellow, Divorce in Context, in G. LEVINGER & 0. MOLES, DIVORCE AND SEPARATION
287-306 (1979). In a review of the literature, Longfellow notes that children from single-parent
homes may be emotionally healthier than children from conflict-ridden, intact homes, especially if
the parents do not continue their battles after they separate. Id. at 294. Younger children suffer
more than older children, often blaming themselves and fearing subsequent rejection by the custodial
parent. Older children blame themselves less and tend more towards anger than fear. Not surpris-
ingly, adolescents adjust best to divorce, and remain better adjusted a few years later. Id. at 303-04.
41. NCHS 1981, supra note 33, at Table 4. The presence of children under 18 in divorcing
families varies regionally (F (3, 27) = 3.63, p < .05). Significantly more divorces in the North
Central region involve children than in the nation as a whole (58.2%). In the South, significantly
fewer divorces involve children under 18 (53.9%). The Northeast has the fewest children per thou-
sand under 18 affected by divorce (16.11 compared to 18.14 nationwide, F (3, 27) = 4.13, p < .01).
Divorcing couples in Georgia are the least likely to have children under 18 involved (49.5% of
divorces did not affect children), while Nebraska the most likely (36.2% did not involve children).
Utah divorces affected the most children per decree (1.21); while Georgia, at .84, had the fewest
children affected per decree, The highest ratio of children under 18 affected by divorce is found in
the West (21.14 per thousand)-despite the fact that the West has the shortest marriages in the
nation. Wyoming, at 27.7 per thousand, had the most children affected by divorce; at 12.0, Penn-
sylvania had the fewest. Id. at Tables 4 & 5.
There are no significant regional differences in numbers of children per divorce decree. Large
families (3 or more children under 18), however, are significantly less likely to divorce in the South
than elsewhere (F (3, 27) = 5.99, p < .01). In the South, 7.6% of divorces occur in large families as
compared with 9.7% nationwide. Divorces in large families are most common in the North Central
region (10.7%). For families with one or two children, the divorce rates are statistically equivalent
across the four regions. Id. at Table 4.
That fewer large families are touched by divorce nationwide may not indicate that these mar-
riages are more stable than others. Such families are less common in the United States today than
are smaller families; fewer divorces among large families may merely reflect their numerical infre-
quency. In the South, where large families experience fewer divorces, these marriages may indeed be
more stable--or at least, less prone to break up. However, it is important to note that the figures
available represent the proportion of large families to all divorcing families, and do not indicate the
likelihood of divorce within any given family size. Data are not available to support general conclu-
sions with respect to the relative stability of different size families.
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garding other significant factors, such as race, income, and education, are
either unavailable or inadequate to support any meaningful conclusion.
For example, 1983 figures indicate that, proportionately, more blacks
than whites are currently divorced; the rate of divorce for persons of
Spanish origin (who may be of any race) falls between that for whites and
blacks.42 These differences according to race may reveal nothing more
than that divorced whites are more likely to remarry than divorced
blacks, or that the rate of divorce is higher among the poor. In short, the
superficiality of the data prevents a true accounting of the "typical" di-
vorce in the United States today.43
42. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU POPULATION REPORT Table C (Mar. 1983). The actual figures are
as follows: 230 per 1000 married blacks, 106 per 1000 married whites, and 114 per 1000 for persons
of Spanish origin. These numbers represent persons already divorced in 1983; and, therefore, do not
reflect any changes that may be occurring in the divorce rates of the separate racial groups. The
ratios are computed by comparing currently divorced with currently married persons-discounting
the divorces of persons currently in subsequent marriages. Because there is no information on the
incomes of divorcing couples, it is impossible to determine the extent to which race differences may
reflect larger class differences. Some studies suggest an inverse relation between income and divorce.
See Levinger, supra note 34, at 21-29. Others suggest the opposite. See Nebraska Study, supra note
34, at 605-16. Because of the inadequacy of the data and the conflicting results of other studies,
conclusions based on the relative divorce rates of the different races are unwarranted.
43. Lacking detailed information on race, income, or education, and with only partial informa-
tion on family size, any portrait will be superficial.
A family living in the Northeast is the least likely to divorce, will have the fewest children
affected by a divorce decree, and the marriage will have lasted longer than marriages in other regions
of the country. In the North Central region, more divorces involve large families, but there has been
a significant decline in the divorce rate from 1980 to 1983. In the West, the divorce rate is the
highest; the most divorces occur for very young marriages (under 1 year) and generally the shortest
marriages. Also, proportionately more children are affected by divorce in the West than in the
United States as a whole. Although there has been a significant decline in the West's divorce rate in
the 1980's, a divorcing couple in 1983 was still most likely to live in that region (F (3, 44) = 9.42, p
< .01). Even excluding Nevada, with its inflated divorce statistics, the rate in the West remains
significantly higher than in the other regions (F (3, 43) = 12.97, p < .01). Fewer divorces involve
large families in the South than elsewhere.
Divorcing parties in the United States most probably married young. They have one or two
children under the age of 18 or, just as likely, they have no children at all. The marriage is from one
to nine years old, with both spouses under 35. The family is probably white; if black, the family may
be more likely to divorce. Little scientific investigation has focused on the psychological profile of
divorcing adults. Given the current divorce rates in the United States, such a profile would reflect
virtually the entire population and, by explaining everything, would explain nothing. Apart from
the suggestion that those whose parents were divorced are themselves more likely to divorce, see
infra note 64, there is little valid psychological information.
At least one transactional analyst suggests that persons who marry for reasons of fantasy are
likely to divorce when they discover that reality does not conform to their expectations. See I.
TANNER, LONELINESS: THE FEAR OF LOVE (1973). Tanner implies that people who deliberately
choose spouses who resemble (or who differ from) parents are likely to divorce upon realizing that a
spouse cannot cure unresolved conflicts with parents. "Our fantasies, based upon what we have been
taught and observed since childhood, are sometimes so much a part of us that rather than give them
up or modify them, we will end a relationship." Id. at 93. This observation derives from an anecdo-
tal account of one individual's therapy practice, with no attempt at scientific generalization. It re-
flects the view of a single advocate of a particular brand of psychotherapy. Although there might be
a high incidence of divorce among persons who marry for fantasy, this cannot explain more than a
small number of divorce cases.
In sum, there is no adequate psychological profile of divorping adults in the United States.
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C. The Effect on and Influence of the Legal System
As to the impact of divorce on the legal system, one recent study
estimates that nearly 60% of the litigation undertaken in the United
States relates to non-status divorce disputes-alimony, child custody and
support, visitation, and division of property.' While some of this litiga-
tion may simply have involved court action to ratify an agreement
reached by the parties,45 the estimate indicates that non-status divorce
disputes may not be as susceptible to settlement as other types of contro-
versies. The study also suggests that courts expend a disproportionate
amount of adjudicatory resources to resolve these disputes.
By contrast, the nature of the legal system appears to have little
effect on divorce. Over the last fifteen years, states have substantially
liberalized the grounds for divorce. Current divorce statutes range from
hybrid regimes based on fault, physical separation, or irretrievable break-
down, to schemes recognizing irretrievable breakdown4 6 as the sole
ground for divorce.47 In effect, forty states (or 80% of all jurisdictions in
the United States) recognize irretrievable breakdown of marriage, the
premier no-fault concept, as a basis for terminating matrimonial status.
Statistical analyses of NCHS data concerning the rate of divorce and the
Certain personality disorders and personality types may be more prone to divorce than others. How-
ever, some shared psychology that leads those who possess it to the divorce courts does not exist.
Most of the research on psychological issues involved in divorce deals with the effects on chil-
dren and the aftereffects on the spouses. See generally J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, supra note 40;
Bohannan, The Six Stations of Divorce, in DIVORCE AND AFTER (P. Bohannan ed. 1970). See also
Kaslow, Stages of Divorce, 25 PA. FAM. L. 718 (1980).
44. Litigation in America, supra note 3, at 87 (stated with the caveat that "It]his rate in part
reflects the fact that many times even consensual arrangements must be ratified by the court"). In a
similar vein, Lieberman states that "[i]n virtually every state, more than half the incoming civil cases
are divorce actions or concern child custody or other family matters." J. LIEBERMAN, supra note 2,
at ix.
Although these and other statements are difficult to decipher, the various statistical statements
indicate that more than half of the cases filed before state trial courts are divorce cases. Of those,
very few (one out of ten) are contested and involve protracted litigation. Given the congestion of
court dockets, even uncontested divorce actions take nearly a year to process; contested cases must
wait a year or two to be scheduled for trial. See Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating
Custody Disputes: A Longtudinal Evaluation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497, 497 (1984). An uncontested
change in status, however, does not necessarily imply agreement as to the financial and other inci-
dents of the status change. The statement that "[e]ven before no-fault divorce became the norm,
over ninety percent of all American divorces were uncontested" says little as to the litigious potential
of alimony, custody, and division of property matters. See Winks, Divorce Mediation: A Nonadver-
sary Procedure for the No-Fault Divorce, 19 J. FAM. L. 615, 620 (1980-81). See also Kaslow, Stages
of Divorce: A Psychological Perspective, 25 VILL. L. REV. 718, 723 n.27 (1980) (stating that "divorce
litigation is itself infrequent").
While a great number of divorce suits are filed every year, few requests for a change of status are
contested. There is a greater likelihood of conflict as to the practical implications of a divorce; the
litigation can become extremely hostile and protracted. The real problem with the current system
may be that a mere handful of divorce cases can use up a vastly disproportionate amount of judicial
dispute-resolution resources.
45. See Litigation in America, supra note 3, at 87.
46. For purposes of this article, irreconcilable differences and irretrievable breakdown are not
distinguished.
47. The following table shows, for each of the 50 states, the grounds upon which a divorce may
be obtained.
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duration of marriage reveal, however, that the substantive state divorce
laws have no significant effect upon the rate of divorce or duration of
marriage. These findings are consistent with studies establishing that en-
actment of no-fault divorce legislation has had no measurable impact on
GROUNDS FOR DIVORCE IN THE 50 STATES
IRRETRIEVABLE PE
STATE BREAKDOWN SEP
Alabama X
Alaska X
Arizona X
Arkansas
California X
Colorado X
Connecticut X
Delaware X
Florida X
Georgia X
Hawaii X
Idaho X
Illinois X
Indiana X
Iowa X
Kansas X
Kentucky X
Louisiana X
Maine X
Maryland
Mass. X
Michigan X
Minnesota X
Missouri X
Mississippi X
Montana X
Nebraska X
Nevada X
New Hamp. X
New Jersey
New Mexico X
New York
N. Carolina
N. Dakota X
Ohio
Oklahoma X
Oregon X
Pennsylvania X
Rhode Island X
S. Carolina
S. Dakota X
Tennessee X
Texas X
Utah
Vermont
Virginia
Washington X
W. Virginia X
Wisconsin X
Wyoming X
For an explanation of the statistical analyses, see supra note 33.
YSICAL
ARATION
X
FAULT
X
X
X
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the rate of divorce or the duration of marriage.48
The adoption of no-fault divorce statutes, however, has prompted
corresponding changes in state statutes providing for the attribution of
post-divorce alimony. Most states have disassociated eligibility for ali-
mony, formerly grounded in a punitive rationale,49 from considerations
of matrimonial fault. States now determine issues of alimony according
to spousal need, ability to pay, and several other objective factors such as
duration of the marriage, age of the parties and their earning capacity,
services contributed to the marriage, and presence of young children.50
48. See Sepler, Measuring The Effects of No-Fault Divorce Laws Across Fifty States: Quanti-
fying A Zeitgeist, 15 FAM. L.Q. 65, 89 (1982). See also McGraw, Sterlin & Davis, Case Study In
Divorce Law Reform and Its Aftermath, 20 J. FAM. L. 443 (1982).
49. Under the traditional fault-based divorce system, alimony was allowed only to innocent
wives. The purpose was not simply to provide an innocent (and presumptively unemployed) wife
with financial support, but also to punish her guilty husband. The punishment aspect was most
important; even a needy wife was ineligible for alimony if her conduct had caused the divorce. This
may be part of the reason why, under fault-based divorce systems, wives are usually the plaintiffs.
See Weitzman & Dixon, The Alimony Myth: Does No-Fault Divorce Make A Difference?, 14 FAM.
L.Q. 141, 146 (1980). See also Note, Does No-Fault Divorce Portend No-Fault Alimony?, 34 U. Prr.
L. REV. 486 (1973). The shift from a fault-based to a need-based standard for alimony coincides
with the increased participation of women in the workforce; this has diminished the need and the
societal expectation for a woman to be supported by her ex-husband's earnings.
50. See, e.g., Note, supra 49. In the best empirical study of alimony awards and attitudes,
Weitzman and Dixon found that both men and women view no-fault alimony as fairer than fault-
based alimony. Weitzman & Dixon, supra note 49. Popular opinion supports the idea of rehabilita-
tive alimony, as well as alimony for older housewives who may not be retrainable. In both cases, a
majority of respondents supported alimony with significantly greater support from women than from
men. Both sexes rejected the notions that a wife deserves alimony because her husband owed her
support or repayment for years of work as a homemaker.
It is often assumed that alimony is awarded to most divorcing wives. Id. In fact, this is not the
case. Under no-fault alimony systems, only a small proportion of divorcing spouses receive alimony
awards. In the few years after California's adoption of no-fault alimony, fewer than 20% of divorc-
ing wives received alimony; only a third of these were granted permanent, as opposed to short-term,
rehabilitative awards. Women with marriages of 15 years or longer were three times more likely to
receive alimony than those with marriages of less than five years--confirming the notion that ali-
mony is security for long-term housewives with few job skills. However, even long-term housewives
could not count on guaranteed alimony unless their husbands had high incomes: 80% of those with
18-year marriages and husbands with 1978 incomes of $30,000 or more received alimony; those
whose husbands earned less had only a 50% chance. This indicates that, even with the emphasis on
retraining and self-sufficiency, long-term housewives might not be provided for unless they are
viewed as untrainable, and their husbands can afford it. Id.
Unfortunately, there are no studies of alimony in states other than California. The conse-
quences of the fixed-term awards are particularly important in light of the employment problems
older women may face; but no data exist on this subject. Studies of the speed with which divorced
women actually become self-sufficient, or approach their pre-divorce household incomes, would also
be useful.
The evidence from California indicates that women bear a much heavier economic burden after
divorce than do men. Id. No-fault alimony may be a partial consequence of women's increased
participation in the workforce. The ideal of the self-supporting ex-wife, however, does not match the
reality of women's relatively low incomes. Women with independent pre-divorce incomes of more
than $10,000 in 1978 were half as likely to receive alimony as those with lesser incomes. The award
also depends on the husband's income which, if under $20,000, may totally preclude alimony.
Although a decree of financial independence may make it easier for a woman to divorce, her income
may not be enough to support her beyond a subsistence level. If she has any job skills or employ-
ment potential, she may have to support herself at a modest level regardless of her ex-husband's
higher income. The consequences are worst for young women with short marriages, few job skills,
and non-wealthy husbands. In 1977, only 8% of California housewives in marriages of less than 10
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In twenty-four states,5 a finding of matrimonial fault will not necessarily
preclude entitlement to post-divorce alimony, but the court may limit the
amount of alimony. In these jurisdictions, judicial discretion determines
the impact of fault on alimony awards. While eight states still disqualify
a spouse at fault from receiving alimony, fourteen other states completely
years were awarded alimony. Housewives with no independent earning power may have to retrain
themselves for jobs unless they have been married for a long time. Because of the time pressures put
on them to complete job training (2-3 years is considered a reasonable time for rehabilitative ali-
mony), their subsequent incomes are likely to be low. Id.
In fact, the relative standards of living of ex-spouses after the divorce markedly differ, with ex-
husbands living at much higher levels than ex-wives. Weitzman and Dixon noted that "when the
total post-divorce resources are divided between the two new households of the former spouses, the
husband's post-divorce household retains two-thirds to three-quarters of the total, while the wife is
left with no more than one-third." Id. at 178. This occurs regardless of the amount of the alimony
award and child support payments. This result, of course, is due to the husband's higher earning
power, and his greater likelihood of remarrying (acquiring another wage-earner in his household).
The fairness of this arrangement is a matter of opinion: whether an ex-wife should retain access
to the higher earnings of her former spouse depends on whether she contributed to his earning power
and has a right to share it. Although men often emerge the financial victors in divorce, one can
argue that their incomes, especially post-divorce, are their own and need not be shared. However, in
states that deny alimony to a guilty party, a long-time housewife at fault will receive no support-
even though she may have minimal job skills and will have a difficult time supporting herself in the
absence of alimony. The question of fairness may be supplanted by one of financial reality: a suffi-
cient means of support must be found for such a woman; in the absence of alimony she may have no
alternative but welfare. See Hauserman, Homemakers and Divorce: Problems of the Invisible Occu-
pation, 17 FAM. L.Q. 41 (1983). In any case, the financial disparity existing between ex-husbands
and ex-wives indicates that the ideal of rehabilitative alimony may not be fully equitable at the
present time.
See also L. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECO-
NOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985), reviewed in 20 FAM.
L.Q. 129 (1986) (M. Inker) & 84 MICH. L. REV. 900 (1986) (M. Minow).
51. The following table shows alimony regimes for each of the 50 states.
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discard the factor of fault in alimony determinations.52 Texas is cur-
ALIMONY STATUTES
REHAB., FAULT NEED BASED, REHAB.,
WITH TIME PRECLUDES FAULT MAY BE FAULT NOT
LIMIT ALIMONY CONSIDERED CONSIDERED
Alabama X
Alaska X
Arizona X
Arkansas X
California X
Colorado X
Connecticut X
Delaware 2 years'
Florida X
Georgia X
Hawaii X
Idaho X
Illinois X
Indiana Xb
Iowa X
Kansas 121 mos.
Kentucky X
Louisiana X
Maine X
Maryland X
Mass. X
Michigan X
Minnesota X
Mississippi X
Missouri X
Montana X
Nebraska X
Nevada X
New Hamp. 3 years'
New Jersey X
New Mexico X
New York X
N. Carolina X
N. Dakota X
Ohio X
Oklahoma X
Oregon X
Pennsylvania X
Rhode Island X
S. Carolina X
S. Dakota X
Tennessee X
Utah X
Vermont X
Virginia X
Washington X
W. Virginia X
Wisconsin X
Wyoming X
a = unless marriage is older than 20 years
b = only for cases of incapacity
c = longer if small children involved
For an explanation of the statistical analyses, see supra note 33.
52. Chi-square analysis reveals significant regional differences in alimony statutes (x2 = 19.86,
p < .05). The South is by far the most likely to prohibit alimony based on fault: seven of the eight
states which do so are in the South, comprising almost half (7 out of 15 alimony-awarding states) of
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rently the only jurisdiction that does not have alimony. In Texas, the
financial position of the spouses following divorce is regulated by the di-
vision of both the separate assets and the common marital assets and
liabilities. Finally, the three states (Delaware, Kansas, and New Hamp-
shire) that award post-divorce alimony based on considerations of need
have established statutory time limits. The objective of alimony in these
schemes is to foster rehabilitation-to allow the recipient spouse to
achieve economic self-sufficiency within a reasonable period of time.
One study suggests that the availability of alimony may influence
women's decisions to marry.13 Other statistical analyses, however, indi-
cate that the financial implications of divorce-the type of alimony and
property division provisions-have had little impact on the rate of di-
vorce or the duration of marriage.54 Moreover, comparisons of the 1983
the states in the region. The Northeast is most likely to permit fault to be considered at the court's
discretion (7 of 9 states). The West also has a high concentration of states prohibiting the considera-
tion of fault (6 of 14 states which prohibit fault consideration are in the West). Id.
53. Landes, Economics ofAlimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUDIEs 35 (1978). In a purely economic view
of marriage and divorce, Landes has found that states which do not provide alimony (at the time of
her study these were Texas, Delaware, and Pennsylvania) have significantly fewer ever-married wo-
men between the ages of 25 and 34-as well as fewer children per married woman in that age range.
By means of complicated mathematical equations, she hypothesizes that wives will invest in their
husbands' careers only because the wives expect to be compensated. In the absence of alimony
provisions, a wife's risk is considerably greater. However, the causal relation between these variables
may not be as clear as Landes suggests. Women may invest in their husbands' careers (by not
working themselves) out of social pressure, or for reasons unrelated to a calculated economic gain.
Nonetheless, the statistical correlations are real and provocative.
54. See Sepler, supra note 48. With respect to property division, 43 states currently require
"equitable" distribution of property after divorce. See infra Table on Property Allocation Statutes.
Some states provide statutory guidelines for a fair distribution (derived largely from the Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act) which reflect considerations for alimony determinations: duration of
marriage, age and work history of both parties, incomes and contributions to the marriage (some-
times including homemaker services). Other states provide no framework, and rely instead on the
judiciary's concept of fairness in each case. In practice, judges often construe "equitable" property
division to mean "equal." In most equitable division states, however, an equal distribution is neither
necessary nor presumed.
The seven states stipulating equal property division are concentrated in the South. Equal divi-
sion does not have to be applied strictly-four equal division states reserve the right to alter this
arrangement in the interest of fairness. While it is not clear under what circumstances fairness might
dictate other than equal division, in two of these states marital conduct may be considered. Id.
In all of the equal division states, only joint property-that acquired during the marriage-may
be divided. More than half of the equitable distribution states (24) restrict divisible property to joint
property; the other states may also divide separate property in the interest of a just settlement. In
all, 31 states divide only joint property, and 19 also reserve the right to allocate separate property.
Southern states are the most unlikely to include separate property in the distribution (x2 = 10.69, p
< .05), with 14 of 16 southern states restricting division to joint property.
There is not total congruence between states that consider fault for alimony and those that
consider it for property settlements. Seventeen states consider fault for both purposes; six, just for
property; and thirteen, only for alimony. For purposes of property distribution, there are two kinds
of fault which may be considered: marital fault and economic fault (dissipation of funds). Twelve
states expressly provide for consideration of economic fault when dividing marital property. Unlike
alimony awards, which in eight states are explicitly prohibited to a spouse at fault, no states deny
marital property to a spouse at fault. Fault is merely a discretionary factor considered when com-
puting the allocations.
A recent trend towards considering homemaker contributions as assets to the marriage has
resulted in larger property awards to housewives-which in some instances may help reduce alimony
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divorce rate among the various state jurisdictions do not reveal any sig-
nificant differences between states that do not consider fault for purposes
of alimony and those in which fault cuts off a spouse's opportunity for
payments to older housewives with few job skills. It is not clear which of the two types of distribu-
tion, "equal" or "equitable," is better for the older housewife. An equal split, especially if there is
not much property to divide, may not provide an adequate source of support in the absence of
alimony. An equitable division, which calculates homemaker contributions, may yield a better
source of support; but because equitable distributions are by nature subjective, homemaker contribu-
tions may be given such little value that the wife is left with practically nothing. See Hauserman,
supra note 50, at 48 n.43. As with alimony, the literature has not addressed the question of fairness
to the husband-whose income may have permitted accumulation of property.
In addition to her suggestion that a lack of alimony decreases marriage rates, Landes suggests
that the elimination of fault as a consideration in property settlements has a similar effect. Landes,
supra note 53, at 36. According to Landes, a fault system reduces the emotional cost to the parties of
enforcing the marriage; society enforces it for them. When fault is no longer considered, the parties
must enforce their own marriages at higher costs to themselves; marriage rates decline. As with
alimony, consideration of fault in property distribution has no effect on either duration of marriage
or divorce rate. Because considerably less attention has been paid to property distribution than to
alimony, other generalizations are currently not possible.
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PROPERTY ALLOCATION STATUTES
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TYPE OF PROPERTY TYPE OF DISTRIBUTION
MARITAL FINANCIAL
JOINT JOINT & FAULT AT FAULT AT
ONLY SEPARATE EQUAL EQUITABLE DISC. DISC.
Alabama X X X
Alaska X. X
Arizona X X
Arkansas X a  X
b
California X xd X
Colorado X X
Connecticut X X X
Delaware X X
Florida X X X X
Georgia X X X
Hawaii X X X
Idaho X X b  X
Illinois X X
Indiana X X
Iowa X X
Kansas X X X X
Kentucky X X
Louisiana X X
Maine X X
Maryland X X X X
Mass. X X X
Michigan X X X
Minnesota Xa X
Mississippi X XC
Missouri X X X
Montana X X
Nebraska X X
Nevada X X X
New Hamp. X X X
New Jersey X X
New Mexico X X
New York X X X X
N. Carolina X X b  X X
N. Dakota X X
Ohio X X
Oklahoma X X
Oregon X X X X
Pennsylvania X X X
Rhode Island X X X
S. Carolina X X
S. Dakota X X
Tennessee X X X
Texas X X
Utah X X
Vermont X X X X
Virginia X X X
Washington X X
W. Virginia X X X
Wisconsin X X
Wyoming X X X X
a = separate property may be reallocated as fairness requires
b = equal division preferred but may be altered as fairness requires
c = by court decision, not by statute
d = California is a specific exception to the equal division of community property
For an explanation of the statistical analyses, see supra note 33.
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alimony.5"
D. The Influence of Social Ethics
More than the change in divorce laws, contemporary social ethics
may explain more plausibly the current rate of divorce and the duration
of marriage. In addition, social mores may provide some understanding
of the legal system's lack of influence on these matters. The debate sur-
rounding gender equality, for instance, has already had a visible impact
upon substantive domestic relations law. Joint custody statutes reflect a
legislative reassessment of the man's role in parenthood-a re-evaluation
advocated by an emerging fathers' rights movement. 6 The economic in-
tegration of women into the work force, and their increasing financial
self-sufficiency, have contributed to the transformation of alimony stat-
utes from fault-based provisions (allegedly protective of helpless, inno-
cent wives and punitive as to overbearing, culpable husbands) to a
gender-neutral and need-determined standard that facilitates economic
rehabilitation. 7 Such changes in social thinking about men and women
will likely affect one's decision to enter into or terminate a marriage.
Another gender-related factor which may influence the current rate
of divorce is the contrasting attitudes of men and women toward inter-
personal relationships. Because of different cultural, sociological, and
psychological assumptions that underlie individuals' upbringing and inte-
gration into society, men and women traditionally bring disparate expec-
tations and dispositions into the marriage relationship. By social custom,
men characteristically restrict the expression of their emotions and gain
identity from external accomplishments. Consequently, men tend to in-
terpret marriage in terms of, and perhaps subordinate it to, attainment of
more objective career goals. Although useful and productive in business
and professional relationships, male "tunnel" vision-implying a clear
and unswerving focus upon objectives and the means for achieving
them-reduces the importance and complexity of personal relationships.
For men, conflicts between job objectives and a marital life-style may
well compromise the stability of marriage. By contrast, society teaches
women to have a larger view and appreciation of personal relationships.
Their "global" vision implies a willingness to deviate from a goal, either
temporarily or permanently, in order to preserve relationships.58 Unless
spouses understand their respective perceptions of intimate relationships,
55. These conclusions were reached through a chi-square analysis of the table appearing at
supra note 51.
56. See, e.g., Krebs, Joint Custody. Is It Really In The Best Interest?, in T. CARBONNEAU, THE
FAMILY AND THE CIVIL CODE 499 (1983). See also C. VET-rER, CHILD CUSTODY: A NEW DIREC-
TION (1982); M. WHEELER, DIVIDED CHILDREN (1980). For a critical judicial assessment of the
concept of joint custody, see Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374 (La. 1984).
57. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text.
58. For a general discussion of these concepts, see, e.g., R. BARNHOUSE, IDENTITY (1984); C.
GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE (1984); A. ULANOV, THE FEMININE IN JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY
AND IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY (1971).
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
the inevitable misunderstandings and frustrations may become over-
whelming and prove fatal to the marriage.
While comprehensive empirical studies are lacking, existing stud-
ies5 9 corroborate the influence of social ethics and socially-induced atti-
tudes in the divorce context. Not unexpectedly, one of the primary
findings relates to the changing social and economic position of women,
and the corresponding influence upon both male and female perceptions
of marriage. For example, the financial autonomy that many women
have attained reduces their financial dependance upon husbands and les-
sens their feeling of immobility in the face of marital difficulties.' At the
same time, some men find this revamping of traditional roles insupporta-
ble. 61 These feelings lead to hostility, and can eventually cause a breakup
of the marriage. Also, the sheer volume of divorces 62 has effectively
destigmatized divorce. The resulting peer acceptance facilitates the deci-
59. See S. ALBRECHT, H. BAHR & K. GOODMAN, DIVORCE AND REMARRIAGE (1983) [here-
inafter cited as Intermountain Study]; Cleek & Pearson, Perceived Causes of Divorce, 47 J. MAR-
RIAGE & FAM. 179 (1985) [hereinafter cited as Wisconsin County Study]; Thurnher, Fenn, Melichar
& Chiriboga, Sociodemographic Perspectives on Reasons for Divorce, 6 J. DIVORCE 25 (1983) [herein-
after cited as the San Francisco Study].
The Intermountain Study asked respondents to list the causes of their divorces. Spouse's infi-
delity and "loss of love" emerged as the two most important reasons. The Wisconsin County Study
reports that communication problems, basic unhappiness, and incompatibility were the top three
causes for separation. The San Francisco Study treated motives for separation among a sample of
persons who had filed for (but not necessarily received) divorces. In an open-ended questionnaire,
respondents listed as many reasons as they wanted to explain the cause of their separation. The most
common reasons for separating were: conflicting life-styles, 19.8% of respondents; spouse involved
with another, 12.3%; and money problems, 12.4%. All of these factors are highly general, and
provide little insight into ultimate causes for the decay of the marriage.
The San Francisco Study analyzed causes by the characteristics of the respondents, and re-
vealed a few significant differences. Highly educated (more than high school) respondents were
more likely than lower educated respondents to list conflicting life-styles--especially highly educated
women. Women were generally more likely than men to state that the spouse had another person;
lower educated women were more likely to list that as a cause. Women were also more likely than
men to cite money problems-and lower income people (under $10,000 annual income) more likely
than higher income people. Men were statistically more likely to cite "spouse wants freedom;" and
women more likely to report such causes as "spouse domineering," "spouse violent," "spouse runs
around," "spouse drinking," and "sexual problems." These results resemble responses in the Wis-
consin County Study, where women were more likely to cite unhappiness, incompatibility, abuse,
and spouse's infidelity, and men more likely to cite alcohol abuse and "women's lib."
With the exception of variables reflecting traditional male "macho" behavior (domination, vio-
lence, promiscuity, drinking), men and women tend to share stated causes for divorce. However,
when men say their marriages broke up because their wives wanted "freedom," and women cite their
husbands' "running around," are these different phenomena? They may simply be two sides of the
same coin: the "liberated" wife and the promiscuous husband may simply be trying to escape their
respective spouses' unpleasant behavior.
The San Francisco and Wisconsin Studies are limited by problems with their samples. Both
studies involved people separated, but not yet divorced; both were heavily biased towards women;
and each was drawn from a single county. Since the studies examined stated motives of persons
already separated, rather than the differences between persons who separate and those who do not,
one cannot generalize about actual reasons for marital breakdown. If a significant number of
couples with similar problems remain together, the predictive value of the marital traits cited would
be quite limited.
60. See, e.g., San Francisco Study, supra note 59, at 26.
61. Id. at 27; Wisconsin County Study, supra note 59, at 180.
62. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 1986
ALTERNATIVES TO DIVORCE LITIGATION
sion to terminate marriage.63 In addition, spouses with divorced parents
are more likely to divorce than peers raised in stable marriages.' 4 While
these social circumstances would tend to lead to divorces, such factors as
the presence of children, strong religious affiliation, and financial stability
tend to retard divorce.65
63. Social pressure from divorced peers, or at least approval from others, appears to influence
decisions to divorce. The Intermountain Study found that 59% of divorcees had the approval of
75% or more of their friends or family-with women having more outside support than men. Inter-
mountain Study, supra note 59, at 109. In addition, most respondents had at least a few friends who
were divorced. See J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 21-22 (1980). Social
psychological views of divorce admit that, when social pressure encourages it, divorce will increase.
See Levinger, supra note 34, at 39. As friends divorce, individuals who may have married young find
themselves left out of their old social circles, and see friends enjoying freedoms they never had.
Simple envy of the new lives of old friends can be a powerful impetus to divorce when a marriage is
less than ideal. See id.
64. This holds more for whites than for blacks-although the results for blacks are inconclu-
sive. See Pope & Miller, The Intergenerational Transmission of Marital Instability, 32 J. Soc. IssuEs
49, 52 (1976). It is not clear why this occurs. Children raised in one-parent families, in which the
other parent died, for example, are less prone to divorce than are those from families broken by
divorce. These results suggest that marital breakdown is not due simply to the absence of one par-
ent. A classic "role model" hypothesis, that children of divorced parents fail to learn adequate
marital roles, and hence are unable to perform appropriately in their own marriages, is not fully
supported by the data. Id. at 57. The answer may be that children of divorced parents are less likely
to view marriage as permanent; no study appears to have tested this hypothesis. In any event, a full
assessment of the reasons for the breakdown of a marriage involving a spouse with divorced parents
must account for the confluence of factors (including upbringing) that make up that person's psyche.
65. See Nebraska Study, supra note 34, at 609-11. In this study, married respondents were
asked questions pertaining to thoughts about divorce. Results indicate that those persons in longer
marriages are less likely to contemplate divorce-as are those who perceive their family incomes as
above average (this is independent of the actual dollar amount of the income). For men, the pres-
ence of pre-school children increases thoughts of divorce; full-time employment increases thoughts
of divorce among women. Strong religious affiliation with any denomination tends to reduce think-
ing about divorce-especially among women. This study also revealed that "respondents with un-
happy marriages are more apt to consider divorce than those with happy marriages." Id. at 614.
Although 4% of respondents who rated their marriages as "very happy" had considered divorce,
only 21% of those who rated their marriages lower on the happiness scale were considering it. Id. at
613. This suggests that some persons in less than happy marriages might be otherwise prevented
from divorcing.
The study concludes with a discussion of religious and economic barriers to divorce, suggesting
that "[r]eligious values on the one hand tend to keep people in marriages; financial independence and
financial dissatisfaction, on the other, tend to encourage thinking about divorce." Id. at 614.
Although religious and economic factors may deter divorce in some cases, it is not clear whether
they actually prevent it. It may be that persons with strong religious affiliations and economic diffi-
culties merely take longer than others to make the final break; thoughts of divorce may reflect their
deliberations.
Like the San Francisco Study, the Nebraska Study examined demographic variables with re-
spect to thoughts of divorce, and not the ultimate causes leading up to those thoughts. The study
fails to compare persons thinking of divorce with those actually divorced as a way to discern possible
differences between those who contemplate, but do not actually divorce, and those who follow
through on their thoughts. Lacking information on the average time a person contemplates divorce
before taking action, it is impossible to tell from the Nebraska Study how many respondents will
eventually file for divorce and how many will not. For all of these reasons, the predictive value of
this study is very limited.
Because the Nebraska, San Francisco, Wisconsin, and Intermountain Studies used separate sur-
vey instruments and sampling techniques, they are not directly comparable. It does appear that low
incomes and financial dissatisfaction (which may or may not be correlated with one another) en-
courage thinking about divorce and separation. Independence among women also appears to be a
factor: employed women in Nebraska are more likely than non-employed women to contemplate
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In some of the studies, separating and divorcing couples gave per-
sonalized evaluations of the reasons for their marital problems. Couples
cited general factors such as communication problems, basic unhappi-
ness, and incompatibility; and more particularized factors such as infidel-
ity, loss of love, conflicting life-styles, and financial difficulties. These
personal evaluations neither confirm nor deny the relevance of sociologi-
cal factors; they simply add another dimension to the growing number of
explanations for marital difficulties.
Conjecturally, one might further claim that the redefinition of social
morality (seen in the prevalence of spouse-equivalent relationships, the
availability and use of birth control, and the legalization of abortion)
should have some bearing on how people perceive marriage and divorce.
Also, the decline or resurgence of religious beliefs, the popularity of psy-
chological counseling, and purely economic pressures all provide insight
into the underlying motives for divorce in contemporary American
society.66
In the final analysis, however, the social factors and personal rea-
sons that disrupt matrimonial relationships are virtually indistinguish-
able. For example, disagreement between spouses as to gender roles in
the family and society not only exemplifies the influence of contemporary
mores on the marriage relationship, but also indicates that the couple is
experiencing communication difficulties. Spousal disagreement may well
divorce. Independence of one kind or another also emerged as an important cause for separation
among the women in the San Francisco Study. This is confirmed by the Intermountain Study, which
found that financial problems were the major barrier to divorce, especially for women. Nonetheless,
it remains difficult to generalize about explicit reasons for divorce because of the varied methods
employed by researchers.
66. Two types of models have been developed to explain marital success and failure: a social
psychological model focusing on barriers and attractions, and an economic model emphasizing costs
and benefits. The social psychological model predicts marital success as a function of the interplay
between attractions (factors encouraging marriage) and barriers (factors discouraging divorce).
When attractions and barriers are both strong, divorce is unlikely; as both decline, so does the stabil-
ity of the marriage. See Levinger, supra note 34. Economic models predict marital success accord-
ing to the costs and benefits, emotional as well as financial, of maintaining the marriage. Variables
include financial success, attachment to the spouse, attachment to another, presence of children,
education, church membership, expectations of the marital relationship, and attitudes of the sur-
rounding community regarding divorce. If these variables combine in a way to make it more costly
to sustain than to terminate the marriage, the marriage is more likely to fail. See Becker, A Theory of
Marriage Pt. 1, 81 J. POL. EcON. 813 (1973); Becker, A Theory of Marriage Pt. 2, 82 J. POL. EcON. S
11 (1974).
Economic and social psychological models generally produce similar conclusions that one can
also predict by demographic trends. Women are more likely to divorce when they are financially
independent: possibly due to economic benefits or to the removal of a psychological barrier. Pres-
ence of children contributes to marital stress but inhibits divorce. This may be due to the added
financial and emotional costs of children, or it may be explained by a sense of duty towards children.
The explanary and predictive values of the two approaches are roughly comparable.
Social and demographic trends, together with psychological and economic analyses, may ex-
plain part of the increase in the divorce; but they are not sufficient. Not all independent women
divorce; even women with less than happy marriages may not choose divorce. Nebraska Study,
supra note 34. Strong religious affiliation and divorced parents may explain some of the variance,
but certainly not all of it. These approaches analyze trends, but not the ultimate causes behind those
trends. Truly explanatory models do not yet exist.
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reflect an inability to achieve a basic consensus on so-called life-styles.
Such conflicts eventually erode marital bonds and engender feelings of
"loss of love" and incompatibility-perhaps leading the spouses to find
needed affection with someone else. Infidelity during times of marital
dissatisfaction is also a particularly poignant, albeit brutal, way to com-
municate basic unhappiness about the marriage relationship.
Despite ascertainable characteristics in the pool of divorcing
couples, the decision to enter into or terminate a marriage emerges as a
profoundly personal choice. The view that marriage has significant so-
cial policy implications, and therefore warrants the assertion of a strong
state regulatory interest, becomes more of a rhetorical pronouncement
than a meaningful statement as to the authority of the state over married
individuals. Even the prospect of lengthy, distasteful, and hurtful di-
vorce proceedings will do little to bring about a reparation of shattered
matrimonial expectations, or undo the conviction that the emotional in-
vestment in a marriage has culminated in irremediable loss. In fact,
rather than deterring the parties, the occasion for legal haggling may
satisfy the spouses' need to make the pain of their matrimonial failure
felt. The law, in effect, is powerless to abrogate or amend spousal disaf-
fection. There is an irreducible human element to marriage and divorce
that the legal system must take into account and which it cannot abridge
by its abstract concept of matrimony.
E. Factoring in Common Perceptions and Expectations
Before recommending alternatives to the current system of divorce
adjudication, one must account for popular perceptions of the judicial
process for divorce. Again, few statistical studies exist; those that do
exist6 7 reflect the attitudes and perceptions of geographically-isolated
populations. These studies generally concentrate on attorneys rather
than divorcing spouses. Despite these limitations, the available data indi-
cate that divorce lawyers expect, and are expected by their clients, to do
more than simply process a divorce petition through the legal system and
obtain a favorable financial settlement. Surveys of divorce lawyers illus-
trate that both parties in the attorney-client relationship anticipate that
the client will receive interpersonal assistance-including basic counsel-
ing and assistance in understanding the complexity of the legal system.68
67. See Herrman, McKenry & Weber, Attorneys' Perception of Their Role in Divorce, 25 J.
DIVORCE 313 (1979) [hereinafter cited as the Georgia Study]; Felner, Primavera, Farber & Bishop,
Attorneys as Caregivers During Divorce, 52 AM. J. ORTHOSPY 323 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the
Connecticut Study]; W. Pachter, An Investigation of Variables Related to Client Evaluation of the
Lawyer-Client Relationship in Divorce Cases (1984) (Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Vermont) [here-
inafter cited as the Vermont Study].
68. Georgia Study, supra note 67, at 319-20; Connecticut Study, supra note 67, at 330, 335;
Vermont Study, supra note 67, at 30, 48, 50, 65. In light of these results, some might advocate a
change in the code of ethics for domestic relations attorneys, and require them to tell clients that
they are in the wrong when that applies-rather than just doing battle for clients. This, combined
with changes in the substantive law that would allow judges less discretion, might reduce litigation
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While some attorneys expressed misgivings about their ability to respond
to their clients' personal problems, nearly all of the attorneys in these
samples voiced an interest in having some formal training in counsel-
ing-viewing it as a necessary part of the process. Of those clients seek-
ing additional assistance, significantly more were women. Spouses
leaving marriages of long duration also tended to expect more than
purely legal services from their attorneys. 69
The latter findings may indicate that women, especially those who
have participated in a longstanding marriage, simply transfer their sense
of learned helplessness from their husbands to their typically male attor-
neys. The findings also may further illustrate the difference in perspec-
tive associated with gender. Women take a more global view of the legal
process of divorce, asking it to address the multifarious aspects of the
problem. Men, on the other hand, are more focused, interested primarily
in the likely result that the process will yield.7"
The results in the studies also indicate that a fairly high number of
clients are dissatisfied with the legal process of divorce. Georgia attor-
neys, for example, report that 45% of their divorce clients are dissatisfied
with their legal services; Vermont clients report only "moderate satisfac-
tion" with their attorneys.71 Although these results do not support a
definite conclusion as to client dissatisfaction, it appears that divorce law-
yers and the judicial process for divorce do not satisfy some of the basic
needs of divorcing couples. To some extent, these results may reflect
client unhappiness with their personal situation, and the essentially "no-
win" circumstances of divorce. It is equally likely, however, that the
relative dissatisfaction expressed by divorce clients makes a statement
about the adversarial character of divorce. Ordinarily, the divorce pro-
cess demands the assumption of a litigious posture in order to protect
basic rights; contentious attitudes tend to make for difficult dispute reso-
lution. The current state of client dissatisfaction with divorce, then, at
least supports the view that process alternatives should be entertained.
F Some Observations
Despite the paucity of comprehensive and rigorous scientific data
regarding divorce in America, one can draw some conclusions about the
emerging composite. The current rate of divorce is quite high, with esti-
mates ranging from 45% to 60% of marriages per year. Although the
and make the process more workable. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 186 and
accompanying text.
69. Georgia Study, supra note 67, at 315-16; Connecticut Study, supra note 67, at 332-35;
Vermont Study, supra note 67, at 56, 58, 62, 67.
70. See supra note 58 and accompanying text. To some extent the results may also indicate
that more men than women initiate or want divorce. In addition, the results show that mediation
would be more responsive to women's needs. The movement toward alternate dispute resolution
mechanisms may reflect the growing influence of women in the law.
71. Georgia Study, supra note 67, at 319-20; Connecticut Study, supra note 67, at 326; Ver-
mont Study, supra note 67, at 71-78.
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vast majority of divorce actions are uncontested, state courts are literally
bombarded by divorce petitions. Even the isolated, protracted proceed-
ings over post-divorce disputes weigh down a system already struggling
with many abbreviated court battles and pro forma proceedings. Unde-
niably, divorcing couples are undergoing an emotional trauma. The ad-
versarial process, once invoked, heightens emotions and further distorts
the conflicts which separate the spouses. Legal combat affirms the unfor-
tunate truth of marital failure. Any wrongs committed are personal and
not legal in nature-non-justiciable grievances inherent in personal rela-
tionships. In procedural, personal, and financial terms, adversarial litiga-
tion in the divorce process can be wasteful, inappropriate, and counter-
productive.
An alternative framework should attempt to respond to the human
element in divorce disputes and balance the various competing interests
implicated in divorce: -the somewhat questionable state interest in the
permanency of marriage-perhaps more accurately described as an inter-
est in a well-established and defined personal status for all citizens; the
spouses' individual interest in their marriage and the corresponding
rights; the welfare of the children; and the financial and property consid-
erations usually associated with divorce. Such a framework should also
be neutral as to considerations of legal culpability. Judicial determina-
tion of spousal guilt or innocence in marriage breakdown is impossible in
most cases; legal standards do not really reflect the root causes of marital
failure. Finally, given the inevitable variety of individual circumstances
in divorce, the alternative framework should provide for a great number
of remedial options.
IV. REPLACING JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS WITH
AN ARBITRAL ALTERNATIVE
A number of commentators7 2 advocate the recourse to arbitration as
a remedy in the area of divorce. The commentators emphasize the dis-
patch, economy, and non-adversarial attributes of arbitration. Specifi-
cally, commentators recommend including arbitral clauses in separation
agreements as a means of restoring consensus among couples who ini-
tially reached an accommodation. 73 The Philadelphia Bar Association
recently endorsed recourse to divorce arbitration, and elaborated a set of
rules to initiate and implement the procedure. 74 Additionally, the Amer-
ican Arbitration Association has devised a model framework for submit-
ting divorce disputes to arbitration.75 In light of its success as an
alternative mechanism to court litigation in the context of labor and
72. See sources cited on arbitration in family law matters, supra note 2.
73. See id.
74. PHILA. BAR Ass'N, DIVORCE ARBITRATION: A NEW ALTERNATIVE (1982).
75. AM. ARB. ASS'N, FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROCEDURE (1982).
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commercial dispute resolution, 76 arbitration certainly deserves considera-
tion as a possible alternative to traditional divorce proceedings. The his-
tory of arbitration, however, reveals that its adjudicatory characteristics
are particularly well-suited to the specific features of labor and commer-
cial controversies. 7
Proposals for divorce arbitration usually are part of a wider consid-
eration of alternative mechanisms. While these proposals focus primarily
on the need to replace.the adversarial process with non-contentious pro-
ceedings, they fail to pay sufficient attention to the sui generis nature of
arbitral adjudication. Recommendations that arbitral techniques be ap-
plied to issues of marital dissolution should be anchored in thorough
analyses of the specific character of the arbitral remedy. Such analysis
will facilitate efforts to evaluate whether arbitration can adequately re-
spond to the intensely personal issues in divorce disputes and eliminate
the deficiencies of the present process. Since arbitration traditionally re-
quires consensus and is an adjudicatory (rather than conciliatory) mech-
anism, it may have limited applicability as an extra-judicial means of
resolving divorce disputes.
A. Arbitral Adjudication Generally Defined
A private consensual agreement between contracting parties as to
dispute resolution is the hallmark of arbitral adjudication.78 Parties to a
transaction, at the time they enter into an agreement or when an actual
dispute materializes in their dealings,79 agree to submit their differences
to a privately-appointed third party. A valid arbitral clause or agree-
ment, once entered into, is binding on the contracting parties."0 Subject
to public policy concerns, the parties have the right not only to engage in
arbitration, but also to define the basic content of the private adjudica-
tory process they have established. The parties may stipulate the means
of designating the arbitrators, the procedures to be followed in the pro-
ceedings, and the law governing the merits of the dispute.8 Provided the
parties deem it appropriate, or if institutional rules apply and so state,
the arbitral tribunal has wide discretion in the conduct of the proceed-
ing. 2 The tribunal renders a binding award8 3 (customarily without giv-
76. See supra note 7.
77. See id.
78. For a general list of sources on arbitration, see supra note 7 and accompanying text. The
most distinguished treatment of the subject is Professor Wilner's work, supra note 7.
79. For a discussion of the distinction between the submission and the arbitral clause or agree-
ment, see, e.g., G. WILNER, supra note 7, §§ 5:00-:05.
80. See, e.g., Associated Metals & Minerals Corp. v. The S.S. Mihalis Angelos, 234 F. Supp.
236 (S.D.N.Y. 1964); United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. v. Bangor Area Joint School Auth., 355
F. Supp. 913 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Tennessee River Pulp & Paper Co. v. Eichleay, 637 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn.
1982). See also G. WILNER, supra note 7, § 4:03.
81. For a discussion of the contractual character of arbitration, see G. WILNER, supra note 7,
§ 1:01.
82. Id. §§ 20:00-21:04.
83. Id. §§ 28:00-29:06.
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ing reasons to substantiate the determination) 4 which a party can
challenge in court, but only on such narrow and circumscribed grounds
as excess of arbitral authority or fundamental procedural unfairness.',
Arbitration provides adjudicatory flexibility as to both procedure and
substance, expertly-qualified adjudicators, and arguably a more rapid
and economical disposition of the case. 6
Despite early judicial hostility toward arbitration, 87 most legal sys-
tems now recognize arbitration as a fully autonomous adjudicatory pro-
cess-paralleling and no longer rivaling the court system. In light of
increases in the volume and complexity of litigation and statutory direc-
tives recognizing arbitration as a valid process of adjudication, courts
have reconsidered their prior positions that the privately-conferred adju-
dicatory mandate of arbitrators violated public policy guarantees and in-
fringed upon their public jurisdictional authority.88 Under the terms of
the Federal Arbitration Act, an agreement to arbitrate is "valid, enforce-
able, and irrevocable,"8 9 and divests the courts' authority to entertain an
action involving an arbitrable dispute.
The arbitral resolution of disputes achieved its preeminence in
the commercial field; commercial considerations, in effect, dictated the
coming-of-age of arbitral adjudication.9" The characteristics of arbitral
adjudication mesh with the basic philosophy of a cohesive and interde-
pendent commercial community. Merchants do not share lawyerly con-
cerns with the litigation process. Adversarial wrestling for truth weakens
the commercial ideals of good faith and arms' length dealings, and might
undermine the present or future basis for commercial relationships. The
legal resolution of disputes involves disruptive proceedings that are in-
sensitive to commercial concerns of transactional costs, time, the value of
opportunities, and the need to reach expedient accommodations. Also,
the possibility always exists that, despite laws favorable toward commer-
cial interests, judges might misconstrue the guiding commercial norms
that should govern the outcome of the dispute. Moreover, the expertise,
flexibility, and efficiency of arbitral adjudication can clearly favor the
special interests of commerce.
84. Id. § 29:06.
85. Id. § 33:02.
86. For discussions of the advantages traditionally associated with arbitration, see, e.g., Ment-
schikoff, supra note 7. See also de Vries, International Commercial Arbitration: A Contractual Sub-
stitutefor National Courts, 57 TUL. L. REV. 42 (1982); Kerr, InternationalArbitration v. Litigation,
1980 J. Bus. L. 164.
87. See, e.g., Carbonneau, Arbitral Adjudication: A Comparative Assessment of Its Remedial
and Substantive Status in Transnational Commerce, 19 TEX. INT'L L.J. 33, 39-56 (1984).
88. Id.
89. United States Arbitration Act, ch. 213, § 2, 43 Stat. 883-86 (codified at 9 U.S.C. § 2
(1982)).
90. See Carbonneau, Rendering Arbitral Awards with Reasons, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
579, 581-86 (1985).
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B. The Contrast Between Commercial and Divorce Disputes
In light of arbitration's applicability to commercial disputes, the
present inquiry focuses on whether arbitration could be an adjudicatory
alternative in divorce matters.91 Does the viability of arbitration in com-
mercial disputes have any paradigmatic significance? To a considerable
degree, one can attribute the success of arbitration in the commercial
field to the special setting in which commercial disputes arise, and to the
unique character and level of integration of the commercial community.
Indeed, the special circumstances and content of commercial disputes are
indispensable to the implementation and operation of the process.
Despite some superficial similarities, the context and content of do-
mestic relations disputes stand in stark contrast to their commercial ana-
logues. In the commercial setting, parties engage in transactions for
profit; society's interests are served by the pursuit and acquisition of
wealth. When a dispute disrupts the commercial venture, the resulting
damage can be measured and the object of the dispute defined in terms of
money-the initial and principal aim of the transaction. The conflict is
predominantly, if not exclusively, pecuniary in character, and the ulti-
mate consideration is financial in nature. The question becomes which
party will absorb the cost of the economically ill-fated venture. However
aggressively merchants pursue their self-interest, they realize that they
must continue to operate in the commercial community and pay alle-
giance to its pragmatic code of conduct.92
In the circumstances of divorce, there is no such code of conduct,
and little possibility of continued conjugal association. Moreover, mar-
riage is not usually a venture entered into for profit; the losses that ac-
company divorce are emotional, not monetary. Marriage and divorce
entail significant financial consequences. Society has a legitimate interest
in seeking to protect the welfare of a divorcing couple's offspring, to ef-
fect an equitable division of the common marital assets and liabilities,
and to provide a disadvantaged spouse with the means to attain eco-
nomic viability or provide maintenance where economic rehabilitation is
no longer feasible. Society's treatment of the divorcing couple as a busi-
ness entity, however, is merely an artificial way of measuring emotional
loss in financial terms.9 3 Whereas money is the real object of disputes
between merchants, it is a mistaken symbol for divorcing spouses, mani-
festing their pain, humiliation, anger, and latent psychological conflicts.9 4
91. See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
92. See Carbonneau, supra note 90, at 581-86.
93. See Bezou v. Bezou, No. 81-11606 (CDC-Orleans June 3, 1983) (illustrating the type of
frustration that can arise in attempts to apply legal rules and concepts to divorce litigation).
94. In personal injury cases, money also stands as a symbol for the victim's loss--corporeal
and emotional. In the case of tortious injury, however, there is usually an identifiable aggrieved
party and a tortfeasor; damages can also be identified fairly clearly. The law of tort, despite its
recognized mission of providing compensation, still hesitates to provide recovery for purely emo-
tional loss. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 436A (1976). In marriage, the loss is
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Even in parenting circumstances, divorcing couples are a deteriorating
partnership no longer inspired by a consensus view born of mutual self-
interest. Finally, commercial arbitrators are usually merchant peers
whose expertise comes from experience. In a divorce situation, it would
be difficult to find such peers for adjudicatory purposes. One questions,
then, whether arbitration can provide a viable adjudicatory alternative in
these circumstances.
C. Structuring an Arbitral Mechanism for Divorce
As an alternative mechanism for resolving domestic relations dis-
putes,a" arbitration would comprise an adjudicatory structure with most
of the advantages of court adjudication, while lacking the principal dis-
advantages. A viable substitute process should, therefore, provide proce-
dures that meet basic standards of fairness, including predictability of
result, and promote finality in determinations. By reducing the parties'
potential contentiousness, the arbitration alternative may be more eco-
nomical and expeditious than its judicial counterpart while still allowing
for a fair and equitable resolution of differences.
Using the traditional stages of commercial arbitration as a model, 96
a divorcing couple seeking to arbitrate their divorce disputes would, with
the assistance of legal counsel, first enter into an arbitration agreement,
known as a submission. Given the novelty of arbitration in divorce pro-
ceedings and the relative infrequency of marriage contracts, it is unlikely
that couples would typically incorporate an arbitral clause (providing for
the arbitral adjudication of future disputes) in a pre-nuptial agreement.
Presumably, the spouses would either be participating in or have acqui-
esced to the initiation of an uncontested judicial action for divorce. By
invoking arbitration, the spouses evince their intent to resolve expedi-
tiously any practical matters that accompany the formal dissolution of
their marriage. The submission should expressly provide that the parties
agree to arbitration in order to determine specifically-enumerated non-
status differences. This part of the agreement is critical since it both es-
tablishes and defines the jurisdictional authority of the arbitrators (usu-
ally referred to as their terms of reference).
The submission should also state whether the spouses intend to en-
gage in ad hoc arbitration, in which case they must devise a procedural
system for conducting the arbitration, or refer to and be governed by the
rules of an arbitral institution. Additionally, the arbitration agreement
should provide for the anticipated costs of the proceeding (deposits, fees,
and incidental expenses). Moreover, in light of the importance of the
usually purely one of a personal relationship; money should only factor in the adjustment of the
respective economic positions of the parties following dissolution.
95. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
96. For a thorough discussion of the various stages of the commercial arbitration process, see
G. WILNER, supra note 7.
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matter, the parties may wish to provide for the number and selection of
the arbitrators: whether a single arbitrator or a panel of three arbitrators
should sit on the case; who is to be nominated and in what manner; and
what qualifications should be required (mental health, legal training, reli-
gious affiliation, and/or community involvement). Finally, the submis-
sion may contain stipulations as to the governing law.
Pursuant to the applicable rules, the spouses-with or without the
assistance of legal counsel-would appear before the arbitral tribunal,
and present their arguments and positions. A time limit (ordinarily mod-
ifiable if circumstances dictate) for rendering the award should toll from
the date of the arbitrators' investiture-the time at which the arbitrators
accepted their terms of reference. Although it is the customary practice,
the tribunal does not need to hold hearings. The parties could choose to
have a completely written procedure, submit documents in support of
their allegations, and respond in writing to requests from the tribunal for
further development of the record. After reviewing the pleadings and
evidence, the tribunal would convene to deliberate and render an award.
If hearings are held, they would be conducted informally, and according
to a flexible and liberal procedure. In accordance with the parties' or the
tribunal's discretion, witnesses and experts could testify. The principles
governing the arbitral procedure should conform to essential fairness
(give each party a fair and equal opportunity to present its case), and
should promote the objective of reaching an efficient and equitable
resolution.
After hearing the parties and examining the evidence, the tribunal
would deliberate and render an award. Ordinarily, the award would con-
sist of rulings that resolve the disputes defined in the terms of reference.
Although the parties could so provide, it is not standard practice to have
reasons for the ruling or dissenting opinions accompany the award. The
parties can comply with the terms of the award and introduce it in the
divorce action for purposes of judicial approval and integration into the
divorce decree. Upon a motion to quash or deny enforcement, a party
could also oppose the award before the same court.
Despite its rudimentary character, this outline of a possible divorce
arbitration structure, based upon party agreement and cooperation, sug-
gests that the success of an arbitral remedy in divorce is largely, if not
entirely, dependent upon the disposition and motivation of the couple.
On the one hand, an agreement to arbitrate non-status disputes is not
likely to be forthcoming from spouses whose relationship remains emo-
tionally tense and dominated by disagreement. On the other hand,
spouses who are capable of collaborating on the selection of such an adju-
dicatory mechanism probably do not need it; they could probably reach
an agreeable out-of-court settlement through pre-trial negotiations.
Thus, an initial consideration suggests that arbitration, at least in its con-
sensual form, might be a token remedy, and might not respond to any
actual needs of divorcing couples.
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Skepticism as to ultimate utility aside, implementing a divorce arbi-
tration process will likely generate a number of problems. The salient
difficulties that might arise include determining: (1) whether the arbitral
mechanism should be compulsory or consensual; (2) whether domestic
relations disputes are arbitrable; (3) whether or to what extent the arbi-
tral tribunal should rule according to substantive legal rules; and (4)
what role the courts should play regarding the supervision of the divorce
arbitration process and its determinations.
1. Compulsory or Consensual Arbitration
Although conceived primarily as a consensual form of adjudication,
arbitration can become mandatory through legislative fiat. In labor law,
for example, statutes concerning public employees usually contain com-
pulsory arbitration provisions as to the terms of the contract and some-
times regarding the rights under the contract.97 Also, the idea of
compulsory arbitration is now a popular legislative response to the
would-be medical malpractice crisis.98
Legislative adoption of compulsory divorce arbitration, presumably
for non-status disputes, would necessitate a determination in the enabling
statute as to whether resulting awards are binding or non-binding. An
award that contains a non-binding determination should not need to un-
dergo rigorous judicial scrutiny for purposes of enforcement; in order to
achieve any sort of adjudicatory effect, both parties must concur in the
result. As a matter of practicality, this compulsory alternate remedy
would act as a disincentive to court litigation-testing the parties' mettle
against a first barrier.
Compulsory binding arbitration would constitute a more efficient
and effective remedial process for divorce dispute resolution. Under this
system, courts would scrutinize awards at the enforcement stage simply
because the awards contain a final disposition of the parties' rights and
obligations. The critical question centers upon the magnitude of judicial
scrutiny courts would exercise. Excessive review would jeopardize the
viability and autonomy of the arbitral process, making its determinations
completely vulnerable to judicial second-guessing. Laxity of review,
however, may well trigger constitutional challenges on due process
grounds.99 In drafting a standard of review, legislatures must accommo-
97. See, e.g., Koretz & Rabin, Arbitration and Individual Rights, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR
ARBITRATION IN AMERICA 113 (B. Aaron ed. 1976); Aaron, The Impact of Public Employment
Grievance Settlement on the Labor Arbitration Process, in THE FUTURE OF LABOR ARBITRATION IN
AMERICA I (B. Aaron ed. 1976).
98. See generally Berkman, Alternatives to Medical Malpractice Litigation, 12 FORUM 479
(1977).
99. In the area of medical malpractice, for example, an increasing number of state legislatures
have imposed alternative dispute resolution mechanisms-largely to avoid huge jury awards for per-
sonal injury. For a critical discussion of arbitration in this context, see Terry, The Technical and
Conceptual Flaws of Medical Malpractice Arbitration, 30 ST. Louis U.L.J. 571 (1986). Such legisla-
tion has been attacked as unconstitutional, essentially on the ground that it denies a plaintiff the
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date these competing considerations. Currently, choices as to the form of
judicial scrutiny include de novo review, review limited to manifest er-
rors of law, and a form of review based on technical excesses of arbitral
authority and procedural due process violations.1 °" The latter standard
applies to commercial arbitral awards, and is most commonly espoused
in statutes regulating arbitration."l' This standard would be workable in
non-status divorce matters except child custody, where third-party inter-
ests may warrant an intermediate (and perhaps higher) level of judicial
scrutiny.
Because of the difficulty in determining the proper degree of judicial
review, compulsory arbitration may not be functional in the context of
domestic relations disputes. Moreover, compulsory arbitration does not
adequately respond to the driving force behind the alternative dispute
resolution movement in divorce matters: a general humanitarian con-
cern for the plight of divorcing parties. Society, acting through the legis-
lative will, cannot dictate rationality and order through compulsory
arbitration where parties are determined and have a right to act irration-
ally.'0 2 The experience in other areas of dispute resolution illustrates
right to have judicial recourse for compensation. This denial, it is claimed, abridges the plaintiff's
right to enjoy the equal protection of the law, amounts to a deprivation without due process of law,
and constitutes an improper delegation of judicial authority. It is also alleged that the denial of the
usual judicial remedy violates the individual's right-where conferred by the federal or state consti-
tutions-to have a trial by jury. For the most part, these constitutional attacks have not succeeded.
See Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978); State ex rel Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d
491, 261 N.W.2d 434 (1978); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 570 P.2d 744 (1977); Prendergast
v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977). Some alternate mechanisms, however, have been
struck down as unconstitutional. See Boucher v. Sayeed, 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983); American Bank &
Trust Co. v. Community Hosp. of Los Gatos-Saratoga, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371, 660 P.2d 829 (1983);
Graley v. Satayatham, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (1976); Johnson v. St. Vincent Hosp.,
404 N.E.2d 585 (Ind. 1980); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978); Carson v. Maurer, 120
N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
For discussions of these constitutional issues, see generally Redish, Legislative Responses to the
Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis: Constitutional Implications, 55 TEX. L. REV. 759 (1975);
Saunders, The Quest for Balance: Public Policy and Due Process in Medical Malpractice Arbitration
Agreements, 23 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 267 (1986); Sayakan, Arbitration and Screening Panels: Recent
Experience and Trends, 17 FORUM 682 (1981-82); Comment, Legislative Response to the Medical
Malpractice Crisis, 39 OHIo ST. L.J. 855 (1978); Comment, Testing the Constitutionality of Medical
Malpractice Legislation: The Wisconsin Medical Malpractice Act of 1975, 1977 Wis. L. REV. 838;
Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL. L. REV. 655 (1976);
Comment, An Analysis of State Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE
L.J. 1417; Comment, The Medical Malpractice Reform Act of 1985: Legislative Surgery Prescribed to
Save Illinois Review Panels, 19 J. MAR. L. REV. 637 (1986); Comment, The Illinois Medical Mal-
practice Reform Act of 1985: Illinois Operates Unconstitutionally on Medical Malpractice Victims, 19
J. MAR. L. REV. 677 (1986); Note, Constitutional Law-Lousiana Medical Malpractice Review Panel
Upheld Under Equal Protection Scrutiny, 53 TUL. L. REV. 640 (1979); Note, Comparative Ap-
proaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141 (1975).
100. For a discussion of the standard of review that usually applies to arbitral awards, see G.
WILNER, supra note 7, §§ 34:00-:02.
101. Id.
102. In contradistinction to medical malpractice where compulsory arbitration does sometimes
apply, lobby groups supporting professional interests are absent in domestic relations. In this regard,
the American Bar Association reported that the medical community actively lobbied for and was
perceived to be the beneficiary of medical malpractice panels. Physicians were also reported to be
the one group generally satisfied with the panels. See Thomas, Practicing Before Medical Malprac-
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that the successful arbitration of conflicts can be achieved when recourse
to the alternate remedial framework is voluntary, agreed-upon, and
founded upon a group consensus that supports the process. The tradi-
tionally consensual form of arbitration, therefore, is a more appropriate
remedial framework for divorce. It at least avoids the complications that
may arise from public policy considerations and references to constitu-
tional due process rights.
2. Arbitrability
According to the classical concept of arbitration, an arbitrator re-
ceives adjudicatory authority from the parties' voluntary agreement to
engage in arbitration. These circumstances give both the dispute and the
process a truly ad hoc character, and may place arbitral determinations
outside the reach of otherwise applicable non-public policy provisions."0 3
The parties' contractual prerogatives and the arbitrator's jurisdictional
authority are circumscribed, in part, by the doctrine of arbitrability: t°4 if
the subject matter of the dispute implicates matters of public policy, it is
not pliant to the contractual will of the parties and, therefore, cannot be
submitted to arbitration. Consequently, a couple seeking a divorce could
not empower an arbitrator to render an award declaring that they are
divorced; matters of status and capacity have always been deemed to be
within the ambit of public policy.' Arbitration, however, could resolve
the incidental disputes that arise and over which the parties retain con-
tractual control" 6-namely, financial claims relating to alimony, and the
division of the spouses' common assets and liabilities.
Delimiting the impact of arbitrability even as to these so-called inci-
dental disputes is not entirely unambiguous. To illustrate this point, the
majority view among courts is that parties may waive by contract any
entitlement to post-divorce alimony."0 7 Accordingly, claims pertaining
lice Panels, 66 A.B.A. J. 980, 983 (1980). There is lively debate as to whether a medical malpractice
"crisis" exists. See, e.g., W. PABST, AN AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION PROFESSIONAL LIA-
BILITY INSURANCE SURVEY (1981); ASS'N TRIAL LAW. AM., THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIA-
TION IS WRONG-THERE IS No MEDICAL MALPRACTICE INSURANCE CRISIS (Pub. AfT. Dep't)
(1982). See also supra note 99 and accompanying text.
103. See G. WILNER, supra note 7, §§ 12:00-:02. For example, matters of status and capacity
are deemed to be "non-arbitrable" because they involve the state's public policy, and are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of law. For an extensive discussion of the term, see G. WILNER,
supra note 7, ch. 12, at 151-59; J. ROBERT & T. CARBONNEAU, THE FRENCH LAW OF ARBITRA-
TION Pt. I, § 1:03, at 1-13 to -22.
104. See supra notes 78-86 and accompanying text.
105. See G. WILNER, supra note 7, § 12:02. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 140 (1987); J. ROBERT
& T. CARBONNEAU, supra note 103, § 1:03.
106. The Tardits case, Feb. 15, 1966, Cour d'appel, Orleans, 1966 Dalloz-Sirey, Jurisprudence
[D.S. Jur.] 340, is an illustration of this distinction between non-arbitrable public policy disputes and
arbitrable incidental disputes attaching to a larger controversy implicating public policy. See
Carbonneau, The Elaboration of a French Court Doctrine on International Commercial Arbitration:
A Study in Liberal Civilian Judicial Creativity, 55 TUL. L. REV. i, 36-38 (1980).
107. See, e.g., Monk v. Monk, 376 So. 2d 552 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1979). Accord Holiday v.
Holiday, 358 So. 2d 618 (La. 1978); H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 28-30.
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to this right fall within the purview of contractual privilege and, there-
fore, can be the proper subject of arbitration. 10 8 As noted in the forego-
ing section, the legal system likely will limit considerably the authority of
arbitral tribunals in regard to child custody matters'0 9 because the wel-
fare of a minor third party is directly at issue. Assuming parental coop-
eration and rationality are preferable and more supportive of social
policy than the state's exercise of parens patriae authority through the
courts, mediation or conciliation would be a wise alternative.
Nonadjudicatory in character, these processes enable the divorcing
couple to discuss and agree on sensitive issues with only the assistance of
a third party." 0 In effect, then, the scope of a divorce arbitration pro-
cess-in terms of arbitrability-may be quite restricted, making it a rem-
edy with limited utility.
3. A Ruling in Accordance with Law?
The contractual character of the arbitral tribunal's jurisdictional
mandate and the scope of its authority leave unresolved the essential
question of whether divorce arbitration can or should achieve substantive
predictability as to results. "' The predictability associated with the stare
decisis rule of decisional law complicates the comparison of court pro-
ceedings with the arbitral alternative. Courts ruling on divorce matters
are required to apply applicable statutory and decisional law, covering
both status and non-status matters. Although bound by the same con-
trolling rules, judges sometimes arrive at results inconsistent with, if not
contradictory to, prior determinations. 1 2 Given the relaxed form of
scrutiny that usually applies to domestic relations cases"' at the appel-
late level, substantive predictability may be an illusory attribute of deci-
sional law. Principled and cohesive adjudication may well be the
exception, with subjective and ad hoc determinations more clearly re-
flecting the governing rule of law.
In fact, the predictability of results on the basis of law may not be
108. The settlement of community property matters may or may not be arbitrable when it in-
volves the inheritance rights of offspring and the rights of creditors. See W. REPPY, JR. & C. SA-
MUEL, COMMUNITY PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES (2d ed. 1982).
109. See, e.g., Rigby, supra note 2, at 1751. Contra Winks, supra note 44, at 631 n.76.
110. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
111. For an extensive discussion of this point, see Carbonneau, supra note 90, at 603-10.
112. The decisional law regarding whether common law marriages exist in Louisiana illustrates
this inconsistency in judicial adjudication. See Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Caesar, 345 So. 2d 64 (La.
App. 3d Cir.), cert. denied, 347 So. 2d 1118 (La. 1977); Henderson v. Travelers Ins. Co., 354 So. 2d
1031 (La. 1978). See also the provision for "open concubinage" in article 160 of the Louisiana Civil
Code (recognizing statutorily, as it were, the concept of common law marriage only for purposes of
terminating post-divorce alimony). LA. CIV. CODE art. 160 (West 1985). For a discussion of com-
mon law marriage in other state jurisdictions, see H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 45-58.
113. In Louisiana, the no-review-without-manifest-error standard does apply in domestic rela-
tions and other cases. See, e.g., Hardy, Forum Juridicum: The Manifest Error Rule, 21 LA. L. REV.
749 (1962); Tate, Forum Judicum "Manifest Error": Further Observations on Appellate Review of
Facts in Louisiana Civil Cases, 22 LA L. REV. 605 (1962). For a discussion of this topic in other
state jurisdictions, see H. CLARK, supra note 9, at 379-419.
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possible or even desirable in the context of divorce arbitration. Under
one possible variant, the divorcing couple could always require the arbi-
trator to reach a determination according to the usually applicable rules
of law. The couple would, in effect, place some restriction on the arbitra-
tor, guaranteeing to some extent that the resulting award would not be
completely whimsical. Such an approach, however, presents a number of
evident problems. First, it reduces the incentive to pursue arbitration; a
couple is unlikely to invoke arbitration instead of filing a court action if
the only advantage is procedural flexibility. If the couple seeks only this
advantage or wishes simply to have a traditional court proceeding in all
but name, then their motivation for engaging in arbitration is ill-con-
ceived. Second, divorce arbitrators may not be trained jurists. An effec-
tive arbitral process, for instance, would have mental health
professionals, as well as attorneys, serve as arbitrators. Obliging psychol-
ogists or family therapists to render an award according to law may rid-
dle the process with problems and eventually reveal itself to be
unrealistic and unsatisfactory. Third, a ruling on the basis of law would
compel the issuance of a written legal opinion to accompany the award.
Otherwise, no ascertainable basis would exist for the ruling; the attempt
to create a standard of accountability and substantive objectivity would
fail.
In all likelihood, such a variation in the arbitral approach would
invite court supervision of the merits. If arbitral tribunals ostensibly
were to apply the relevant state law in conformity with judicial stan-
dards, the courts of that jurisdiction might feel obligated, for reasons of
public policy, to supervise the arbitral determination. Judicially confirm-
ing reasoned awards might lead to a system of persuasive or binding
precedents for subsequent divorce arbitrations. In effect, divorce arbitra-
tion could become nearly equivalent to judicial adjudication-robbing
the arbitration alternative of its raison d'tre. Parties, then, still would
face the possibility that the law might command a result that conflicts
with an equitable appraisement of their circumstances.
Since arbitral tribunals receive their authority from private and not
public sources, they are not bound to apply the governing law unless the
parties so provide. In commercial arbitration, for example, arbitral
tribunals usually rule on the basis of a flexible substantive predicate-
taking commercial usage and trade practices into account. Rarely, if
ever, do the tribunals render legally reasoned opinions to support their
award.'t 4 In the context of domestic relations disputes, a more appropri-
ate substantive predicate for arbitral adjudication may be a basic respect
114. Ordinarily, in commercial and other forms of arbitration, arbitral awards are subject to
appeal on limited grounds for essentially procedural violations. See G. WILNER, supra note 7, at pt.
XI, §§ 32:00-35:03. Historically, judicial review of the merits of arbitral awards was allowed and
even required. This was especially true in England. See Carbonneau, supra note 87, at 39-61. Even-
tually, a review of the merits was precluded, attesting to the adjudicatory autonomy of arbitration.
See Carbonneau, supra note 90, at 581-86.
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
for law." 5 Under this general standard, arbitrators would seek basic gui-
dance from the law. In cases in which a conflict arises between the law
and basic interests of justice, arbitrators could, as appropriate, modify or
disregard the law."16
Undoubtedly, arbitrators would have a significant amount of au-
thority to decide disputes for divorcing parties seeking a malleable sub-
stantive adjudicatory predicate. Paradoxically, arbitrators ruling
according to a general substantive standard that merges legal and equita-
ble considerations might increase the necessity for rendering awards with
written reasons and for judicial supervision. Potential abuse, however,
could be avoided through the careful selection of the arbitrators. This
choice may be left to the parties or to the arbitral institution under which
the proceeding is organized.' If the parties choose the arbitrators, some
form of legislative regulation of the institution or certification of arbitra-
tors might be necessary. The need for court supervision, therefore, could
be eliminated or restricted to basic procedural concerns.
4. Other Problems
In the interest of efficient adjudication, the rules of traditional arbi-
tral institutions ordinarily give arbitral tribunals fairly wide discretion to
make procedural and substantive decisions during hearings." 8 Ameri-
can Arbitration Association (AAA) arbitrators, for example, have the
authority to select the time, date, and place of the hearing. The arbitra-
tors also determine which evidentiary or substantive standards apply,
and have subpoena powers over third parties possessing necessary evi-
dence." 9 The strong institutional rules that apply to these proceedings
represent a trade-off between equally important, albeit competing, views:
the general view that the parties' contractual discretion must be pre-
served, and the pragmatic view that unfettered party autonomy in the
midst of a dispute results in chaotic and protracted proceedings.' 2 ° An
efficient and effective alternative adjudicatory process must limit oppor-
tunities for the exercise of dilatory tactics.
In keeping with the experience of commercial arbitration, rules re-
lating to divorce arbitration should allow divorcing couples to benefit
115. See Carbonneau, supra note 90, at 608-10.
116. This equitable adjudicatory authority is expressed by the concept of amiable composition,
defined as allowing arbitrators to rule according to their basic sense of fairness and justice; and to
disregard, where they think appropriate, the rules of law. See Carbonneau, supra note 106, at 2 n.2.
117. For a detailed discussion of institutional arbitration, court supervision, and arbitral adjudi-
catory standards, see G. WILNER, supra note 7, § 5:03. As noted earlier, if arbitrators are allowed to
rule on child custody questions, the usually flexible standard of review may have to yield to a more
stringent form of judicial scrutiny-possibly in the form of de novo review. Arbitrators would also
be obliged to apply governing legal rules. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
118. See G. WILNER, supra note 7, §§ 24:00-25:06.
119. See AM. ARBITRATION ASS'N, COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION RULES (as amended and in
effect Feb. 1, 1984).
120. See W. CRAIG, W. PARK & J. PAULSSON, INTERNATIONAL CHAMBER OF COMMERCE
ARBITRATION (1984).
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from arbitrator guidance on procedural matters. The rules should also
place some restraints on parties' ability to undermine the proceeding,
such as limiting exceptions to such incidental issues as the time and place
of hearings. Otherwise, the benefits derived from the distinguishing fea-
tures of arbitral adjudication could be further reduced. To comply with
fairness requirements, parties should be allowed an initial opportunity to
decide these matters. If the parties are unable or unwilling to do so, the
arbitrator could then decide on their behalf. Actions for immediate in-
junctive relief or later judicial sanctions at the enforcement stage could
effectively thwart possible abuses of the process by arbitrators.
1 21
Integrating lawyers into the divorce arbitration process also could
present difficulties. An adjudicatory mechanism which excludes the
right to legal representation, however, may be inadequate to dispense
even a private form of justice, and could well be constitutionally suspect.
The participation of attorneys might increase the quality of the adjudica-
tion and better protect parties' rights. At the same time, attorneys might
resort to the customary tactics of adversarial litigation, transforming di-
vorce arbitration into a privately-instituted court proceeding. Lawyers
would need to modify their adversarial dispositions and pursue the issues
of divorce through equitable accommodation in order to facilitate arbi-
tral dispositions. In time, lawyers' inherent litigiousness might be tem-
pered by such an alternative mechanism. Eventually, a divorce
arbitration bar might emerge, lessening the tension between adversarial
doggedness and arbitral flexibility.
More pragmatic issues pertaining to the arbitrators, such as their
number, fees, qualifications, and immunity, must also be addressed. Em-
ploying the services of a sole arbitrator would be a particularly efficient
and inexpensive alternative in domestic relations disputes. The proposal,
however, would leave unlimited discretion in the hands of a single adju-
dicator. A two-member arbitration panel raises the possibility of dead-
lock. In such a case, the parties would then have to seek a judicial
resolution, institute a new arbitral proceeding, or appoint a tie-breaking
arbitrator. The three-member arbitral panel model avoids these difficul-
ties. Although less streamlined and more costly, the three-member panel
increases the quality of adjudication, and provides significant procedural
and substantive safeguards.
The quality of the designated arbitrators is critical to the viability of
the process. In cases in which the parties forego institutional arbitration,
agree to an ad hoc proceeding,122 and decide upon a three-member panel,
each party might name one arbitrator; the two designated arbitrators
would agree upon a third. The arbitrators could be selected from differ-
ent, but related, areas of professional expertise. A three-member arbitral
tribunal, for instance, might consist of a family law lawyer or judge, a
121. See G. WILNER, supra note 7, §§ 33:00-34:02.
122. For a discussion of ad hoc arbitration, see id. § 5:02.
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child psychiatrist or mental health professional specializing in family
therapy, and a lay third party who has the respect of the couple. In an
atmosphere of collegiality, the lawyer can structure the content of the
award, the family specialist can guide discussions on family issues, and
the non-specialist can maintain a general sense of fairness and, if neces-
sary, cast the tie-breaking vote. Because selecting qualified arbitrators
and devising appropriate rules of procedure requires time and informa-
tion, parties should agree to arbitrate under the rules of a well-recognized
and established arbitral institution such as the American Arbitration As-
sociation. Subject to party approval or modification, the institution
could nominate arbitrators from a list of experts and provide rules that
create an appropriate procedural format for the proceeding. Whichever
form of arbitration is adopted, steps should be taken to guarantee the
impartiality of the arbitrators. The rules, for example, might impose a
duty of full disclosure on each arbitrator prior to the commencement of
the proceeding.
Arbitrator fees and associated costs loom as significant disincentives
to divorce arbitration in its ad hoc or institutional form. In a court pro-
ceeding, parties are responsible only for the fees and expenses of their
attorneys, expert witnesses, and stenographer. Except for modest filing
fees, the state absorbs such basic expenses as the salaries of judicial per-
sonnel and courtroom maintenance. In arbitration, the parties are re-
sponsible for paying the fees of the arbitrators, building rental fees,
administrative costs, and an institutional fee. Although parties must
bear the costs of arbitration, these costs may, in fact, be less than a pub-
licly-funded court proceeding in circumstances in which the parties can
not only avoid a lengthy trial, but also resolve their disputes in a single
private proceeding with expert adjudicators.
Another practical concern surrounding arbitration involves whether
divorce arbitrators merit immunity from suit regarding their adjudica-
tory functions. In cases in which parties retain an arbitrator for a fee or
an arbitral institution appoints an arbitrator to a case as part of its ad-
ministration function, a contractual situation arises involving duties-
and possible breaches. As in any profession, the arbitrator's services
must conform to an acknowledged general standard. A divorcing party
who sues an arbitrator or arbitral institution for malpractice is merely
exercising a contractual right. However, unlike a lawyer or doctor, the
arbitrator renders adjudicatory services. As a matter of private employ-
ment, the arbitrator performs the task of a judge who is traditionally
immune from suit in the performance of adjudicatory duties.' 23 The
usual practice in commercial arbitration affords arbitrators the same ju-
risdictional immunity that applies to judges.' 24 Given the strength of
emotion that underlies domestic relations disputes, failing to confer im-
123. See id. § 23:01.
124. Id.
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munity on divorce arbitrators would make the arbitrators the ultimate
target of a losing party's dissatisfaction.
Attributing adjudicatory immunity to arbitrators would leave the
parties without a remedy in the event that a court deems an award unen-
forceable due to arbitrator abuse of authority, procedural unfairness in
the conduct of the proceeding, or violation of public policy. Especially in
circumstances in which a court invalidates a nonseverable award, arbitra-
tor incompetence can result in a substantial loss of time and money for
the parties, requiring the parties to reinstitute a new proceeding or en-
gage in a court action. Such a result, of course, is not what the parties
sought at the outset. Each party, however, accepted the risk of an unfa-
vorable outcome in the divorce arbitration. Although the absence of im-
munity would pose too great a threat to the adjudicatory autonomy of
the divorce arbitration process, the possibility of fundamental arbitrator
error or incompetence underscores the vital importance of the selection
of arbitrators.
D. Assessing Potential in Light of Problems
One primary misgiving about an alternate dispute mechanism in the
domestic relations area is that implementation requires, at threshold, a
minimum level of agreement between the divorcing couple. 25 The ques-
tion remains whether spouses experiencing a matrimonial breakdown can
cooperate sufficiently to agree upon an alternate adjudicatory process.
The temptation to act on emotions and simply to resort to what is known
and accepted, to trust the courts, may well be irresistible. Compulsory
divorce arbitration would not resolve the problem. Such a scheme would
be susceptible to substantial .constitutional objections. Additionally,
spouses coerced to arbitrate could undermine the process through dila-
tory tactics and other disruptive maneuvers. Thus, despite its inherent
fragility, consensual arbitration may be the only legitimate arbitral alter-
native to traditional divorce litigation.1 26
One must balance the strengths and weaknesses of divorce arbitra-
tion in order to gauge the suitability of the process as an alternative
mechanism. Divorcing couples might be attracted to arbitration for a
number of reasons. Procedural and substantive flexibility and privacy
should lessen overt animosity, allowing for a quicker and less costly reso-
125. See, e.g., supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text.
126. In order to implement a consensual arbitral process in divorce, domestic relations attor-
neys could perhaps be required to make their clients aware of the possibility that some of their
matrimonial disputes could be submitted to arbitration. Such information could be offered during
the initial interview as part of the usual description of what is available, or could be communicated
at the discretion of the attorney if he or she deems that the client's circumstances are appropriate.
The problems with such a suggestion, however, are clear and numerous. In order to be effective, this
procedure would mandate agreement and consensus not only between parties who have chosen to see
separate lawyers, but also among lawyers. Given their adversarial roles and ethical responsibilities,
attorneys are not disposed to the simultaneous representation of two distinct interests, or to sug-
gesting remedies in which they may not play a key role.
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lution of the disputes. Parties could also benefit from the psychological
training of certain arbitrators whose determinations would reflect sub-
stantial professional expertise.' 27 Nor would administrative imperatives
press the arbitral tribunal to hear other cases or haphazardly dispose of a
crowded docket.
The arbitral alternative does have real drawbacks. Depending on
the legislative definition of divorce, the doctrine of arbitrability may sub-
stantially restrict the scope of arbitral jurisdiction. The limited arbi-
trability of divorce disputes could then result in an inelaborate and
economical framework just to maintain the attractiveness of the alterna-
tive mechanism. These circumstances would increase the likelihood that
rights might be compromised, making the mechanism further suspect.
The modest utility of the mechanism would increase the pressure on arbi-
trators to simply accommodate both parties, rather than adjudicate the
dispute. 28 In this scenario, arbitral adjudication of a divorce dispute of-
fers little more than the prospect of achieving an out-of-court settlement.
If such a settlement is the initial objective, divorcing couples would be ill-
advised to agree to arbitration and subject themselves to the systemic and
procedural complications of a novel process.129
In the final analysis, the chief attribute of divorce arbitration would
be the flexible, private, non-adversarial setting for dispute resolution.
The complexity and difficulties inherent in such a remedial framework,
together with the problem of establishing a coordinate relationship with
the court system, may outweigh the principal advantages of divorce arbi-
tration. If the objectives are to promote rationality among divorcing
couples, avoid public proceedings, and limit the formalities of law, it
would be preferable to eliminate all adjudicatory characteristics from the
alternative process. Arguably, divorce arbitration should remain avail-
able as an option for couples who want to dispense with adversarial his-
trionics, but are unable or unwilling to communicate effectively enough
to reach a settlement. However, to engage in an all-or-nothing evalua-
tion of judicial and arbitral adjudication without giving some considera-
tion to merging the two remedies would be unwise. Transforming
127. Although domestic relations judges usually develop a substantial expertise in the legal pro-
cess of divorce, they presumably do not have a professional grounding in its emotional implications.
Moreover, dockets that include as many as 25 to 30 cases daily simply do not allow judges time for
considered comprehensive determinations.
128. This is a common criticism of arbitration by practicing attorneys.
129. Parties would need to introduce awards pertaining to arbitrable financial matters into the
judicial proceeding in order to achieve a uniform result and enforce the award. Presumably, parties
who agree to arbitrate part of their divorce controversies will seek to obtain a divorce on the basis of
uncontentious non-fault grounds. This might avoid possible conflicts, for example, between a finding
of fault for status matters and an award of alimony by an arbitral tribunal. A challenge to the
enforceability of the award would require the court to supervise the award either on the basis of the
limited traditional grounds, or grounds which are specially created to deal with arbitral awards
pertaining to divorce. The availability of divorce arbitration, therefore, would add some complexity
to the existing court procedures.
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existing divorce court procedures into a hybrid arbitral mechanism may,
in fact, achieve humanistic dispute resolution ends.
V. MEDIATION: A NON-ADJUDICATORY ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM
A. Its Potential and Basic Character
When the breakdown of a marriage is at issue, traditional adjudica-
tory processes, whether judicial or arbitral in character, generally fail to
address fully the emotional dimension of matrimonial dissolution. A
more appropriate remedial mechanism would be a non-adjudicatory pro-
cess that redistributes decision-making authority in divorce--emphasiz-
ing individual rationality and responsibility and reducing state
regulation.
Divorce mediation can function as an appendage to the legal system,
providing divorcing couples with a structured opportunity to reach a
consensual agreement on the financial and parenting consequences of
their divorce.13° Since matters of status and capacity fall in the domain
of public policy,131 the formal pronouncement of divorce remains in the
jurisdictional province of the courts. Mediation, however, provides a hu-
mane framework for resolving difficulties that attend the formal dissolu-
tion of marriage.
Mediation bears some resemblance to arbitration.132 For example,
sessions are conducted by a neutral third party in a private, non-adver-
sarial setting. Mediation, however, has a number of characteristics that
clearly distinguish it from arbitration and other forms of matrimonial
dispute resolution.
Mediation is neither an adjudicatory nor a therapeutic process.133
Evolving from an extensive, cross-cultural history as a dispute resolution
mechanism, 34 mediation endeavors to achieve the pragmatic end of ad-
judication-the finality of determinations-by simultaneously addressing
the practical and emotional dimensions of marital conflict. Whereas ar-
bitrators reach a binding disposition of disputes, and possess the author-
ity to do so from the inception of the proceeding, 35 mediation produces
130. For an extensive listing of the literature on divorce mediation, see supra note 2. See gener-
ally 0. COOGLER, STRUCTURED MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENT (1978); J. FOLBERG & A.
TAYLOR, MEDIATION: A COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO RESOLVING CONFLICTS WITHOUT LITIGA-
TION (1984); N. PEARSON & R. THOENNES, DIVORCE MEDIATION: STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
OF ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTES RESOLUTION (1982).
131. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
132. See, e.g., Herrman, McKenry & Weber, Mediation and Arbitration Applied to Family Con-
flict Resolution: The Divorce Settlement, 34 ARB. J. 17 (1979); Spencer & Zammit, Mediation-Arbi-
tration: A Proposal for Private Resolution of Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976
DUKE L.J. 911.
133. See Kelley, Mediation and Psychotherapy. Distinguishing the Differences, I MEDIATION Q.
33 (1983). See also Yahm, Divorce Mediation: A Psychoanalytic Perspective, 6 MEDIATION Q. 59
(1984).
134. See, e.g., J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 130, at 1-7; Rigby, supra note 2, at 1729-
33, 1740-43.
135. G. WILNER, supra note 7, §§ 24:00-:07.
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a binding result only when the spouses themselves have arrived at a writ-
ten agreement.
The various divorce mediation models 36 have a number of advan-
tages over judicial (or even arbitral) divorce proceedings. The time and
cost of the mediation process is reasonably predictable and quantifiable.
Mediators charge fees based on a fixed hourly rate, and the participants
usually can reach an agreement within seven to ten one-hour sessions
that take place over the course of two to three months.' 37 Since the pro-
136. Although there are many mediation styles, the literature suggests two fundamental models
of which the diverse styles are variations. Coogler's structured mediation model is formal and, true
to its name, highly structured. It requires the participants to sign agreements stipulating interim
settlements, and a commitment to mediation. All mediation sessions must be joint, and an advisory
attorney appointed as consultant. See 0. COOGLER, supra note 130. See also Coombs, Mediation
and Counselling In Child Disputes, 17 FAM. L.Q. 469, 471 (1984). Advocates of this approach main-
tain that the formalities lend a sense of predictability to the procedure, and help ensure that the
parties will cooperate. Disadvantages include a lack of flexibility, and the possibility of preventing
participants from consulting with private attorneys. See J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 130,
at 137. There is also the possibility that participants may not understand the full implications of the
agreements they sign at the outset of the process.
"Comprehensive mediation" contrasts with "structured mediation" in that it does not involve a
consulting attorney nor require the participants to sign agreements to participate, and permits indi-
vidual sessions. Each party may have private counsel. See Coombs, supra, at 472. Although more
flexible, comprehensive mediation can resemble the traditional adversarial system by permitting each
party to have legal counsel, and allowing individual mediation sessions.
Structured mediation has been criticized as potentially unfair to a weaker party in a relationship
who might feel pressured to agree in a joint session. See Rifkin, Mediation From a Feminist Perspec-
tive: Promises and Problems, 2 LAW & INEQUALITY 21 (1984). See also Lerman, Mediation of Wife
Abuse Cases: The Adverse Impact ofInformal Dispute, 7 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 57 (1984). For such
situations, comprehensive mediation might be the more appropriate approach.
Many mediation programs combine features of both structured and comprehensive mediation.
For example, one mediation program in New York provides advisory counsel at an intake session,
but permits each party to have private counsel who may attend mediation sessions. Moreover,
although both parties are invited to attend all sessions, joint attendance is not required, nor is an
interim agreement necessary. CENTER FOR DISPUTE SETTLEMENTS (Rochester, N.Y.), FAMILY
AND DIVORCE MEDIATION PROGRAM (n.d. brochure). This is only one of many varieties of media-
tion currently in effect. Ultimately, the ideal types of structured and comprehensive mediation may
be of greater interest to writers and advocates than to practitioners. See generally Blades, Mediation:
An Old Art Revitalized, 3 MEDIATION Q. 59 (1984). For a critical appraisal of mediation's potential,
see infra notes 180 & 194 and accompanying text.
137. Though proposed as a cost-efficient alternative to lengthy litigation, mediation may not
always be mnore economical. If each party must attend four to six mediation sessions that cost $100
per hour, and have private counsel to approve the mediated agreement, there may be little monetary
savings. If structured mediation is used (requiring only a single attorney as consultant to both par-
ties), the cost may be lower but the parties may not be adequately represented. See Crouch, The
Dark Side of Mediation, in ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF FAMILY DISPUTE RESOLUTION 339 (Am. Bar
Ass'n 1982). Although a complete response to the statement of these potential deficiencies can only
be gained from actual experience, conjectural reflection suggests that either these deficiencies can be
remedied or their impact minimized. For instance, when compared to adversarial litigation, team
mediation is unlikely to result in a greater expenditure of time and money. A single mediator ad-
vised by a consulting attorney may constitute the most economical format, but it has the possible
negative consequence of placing the participating couple at a real or perceived disadvantage in rela-
tion to the mediator who is advised. This contributes to feelings of helplessness and distrust that
might impinge strongly upon the viability of the process. While single, psychologically-oriented
mediation with ancillary legal services for the couple may, in theory, present the possibility of less
expense and fewer sessions, outside attorneys' disagreement with the procedure or outcome could
generate substantial additional costs, and might undermine the entire mediation. The latter prospect
clearly would be wasteful of resources culminating perhaps in a contested divorce action, and a
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cedure is non-adversarial, it eliminates such obtrusive legalistic consider-
ations as procedure, precedent, and choice of law. While limited, court
supervision of the mediated agreement requires the document to identify
relevant issues, track the basic contours of the forum's domestic relations
law, and conform with public policy imperatives; 3 8 the spouses' final
agreement as to what is fair and just in their particular situation is the
controlling standard.
Divorcing couples with minor children should be especially at-
tracted to mediation since it shields their offspring from the trauma of
litigation, and allows the parents-not the court-to determine what is
in the best interests of their children.' 39 Mediation can teach parents to
communicate on more business-like terms, and to compromise. Media-
tion also accommodates well the regime for joint custody of children-
the substantive standard that applies in an increasing number of jurisdic-
tions." ° Mediation also complements statutory provisions for no-fault
divorce that exist in a majority of states. 4 1 Divorce mediation has the
considerable advantage of addressing each case on an ad hoc basis ac-
cording to a private and structured format. In every case, the general
form and structure of the process are molded to the specificity of the
individual situation. Although the mediator provides pace and guidance,
the spouses retain ultimate control over the process. The fact that the
final result is the product of personal involvement, and largely self-deter-
mined, facilitates initial and continuing compliance with the mediated
agreement. These circumstances, in turn, lessen the possibility of recon-
sideration or litigation.
142
This humanistic design explains mediation's appeal, and its potential
breach of contract or malpractice suit between the couple and the mediator. In the interest of proce-
dural integrity, even the dual-mediator model should require the spouses to retain separate counsel
to review the mediated agreement prior to signature. However, the presence of an attorney on the
mediation team, together with the spouses' participation in the agreement process should minimize
the potentially disruptive effect of outside legal advice.
In Denver, the difference in average legal fees between those who successfully mediated and
those who chose not to mediate was minimal: $1630 for those who successfully mediated, $1800 for
those who refused mediation, and $2360 for a control group. See infra note 181 and accompanying
text. With a maximum saving of $730, and an estimated average saving of under $200, mediation
does not appear to represent a major cost advantage. Again reflecting mediation's upper and middle
class focus, it works best for people with significant amounts of property at stake for whom litigation
might be more costly. See Winks, supra note 44.
138. For an example of a mediated agreement, see Roskind, Divorce Mediation, in T. CARBON-
NEAU, supra note 56, at 805-11.
139. See, e.g., Rosanova, Mediation: Professional Dynamics, I MEDIATION Q. 63 (1983). See,
e.g., R. GARDNER, FAMILY EVALUATION IN CHILD CUSTODY LITIGATION (1982); D. SAPOSNEK,
MEDIATING CHILD CUSTODY DISPUTES (1983); Waldron, Roth, Fair, Mann & McDermott, A
Therapeutic Mediation Model for Child Custody Dispute Resolution, 3 MEDIATION Q. 5 (1984); Pa-
trician, Child Custody Terms. Potential Contributors to Custody Dissatisfaction and Conflict, 3 ME-
DIATION Q. 41 (1984).
140. See, e.g., Milne, Divorce Mediation: The State of the Art, I MEDIATION Q. 15 (1983). For
a discussion of joint custody, see Cox & Cease, Joint Custody, I FAM. ADVOCATE 10 (1978); Schul-
man, Whos Looking After the Children?, 5 FAM. ADVOCATE 31 (1982).
141. See Milne, supra note 140; supra note 47 and accompanying text.
142. See generally J. FOtBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 130, at 1-15.
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for achieving justice in divorce matters. Mediation's central attribute is
its comprehensive response to the dispute resolution needs of divorcing
couples. Rather than ignoring the emotional element in a marriage
breakdown, the mediation process addresses it head-on. In mediation,
the spouses have an opportunity to lessen their feelings of unbounded
emotional upheaval, and avoid a warring solution. Through mediation,
divorcing couples can gain control over the termination of their relation-
ships and become the architects of their own destiny.
B. Notes of Dissonance
1. Forsaking the Old Creed
The significant advantages of divorce mediation also represent its
principal frailties. The implementation of a non-judicial, non-adjudica-
tory mechanism for dealing with matrimonial breakdown would compel
a basic reassessment of society's conception of divorce.' 43 A dispute res-
olution process that operates almost exclusively on an ad hoc, personal
standard of justice and promotes the right of self-determination in family
matters significantly reduces the state's regulatory interest.'" The di-
vorce mediation process would require legislative approbation-in all
likelihood, conferred with some initial reluctance.' 45 Mediation would
also demand that potential participants demystify their thinking about
the meaning of the family, the function of the legal system, and the per-
sonal implications of marital disharmony. 46
Divorce mediation requires that society at large share a willingness
to learn, accept, and experience therapeutic methods. In the process of
mediation, the quest to express feelings of rage and vengeance would suc-
cumb to a more poised perception of personal loss. Mediation helps
couples through the harsh reality of marital breakup and enables them to
address rationally the necessary practical concerns that follow. Under
the mediation alternative, divorce need not become a dismantling of the
family under the aegis of legal principles and procedures. Rather, di-
vorce could lead to an effective restructuring of the family unit in light of
the new personal reality between the spouses.
2. Legislative Compulsion or Personal Volition
In theory, the social benefits of divorce mediation could be so con-
143. See generally Milne, supra note 140, at 28-31.
144. See, e.g., Lemmon, Divorce Mediation: Optimal Scope and Practice Issues, I MEDIATION
Q. 45, 52 (1983).
145. As noted earlier, some legislatures have already initiated such a process.
146. In other words, divorcing couples would need to defuse their irrational thinking about
marriage breakdown. The estranged spouse would not be viewed as a culprit for past emotional
wrongs. Nor would the legal system be viewed as a means of redressing parental shortcomings
during childhood. Termination should be perceived as a necessary reality in appropriate circum-
stances. The all-or-nothing, life-or-death interpretation of divorce can only add anxiety and diffi-
culty to an already perplexing and hurtful situation.
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siderable that mandatory recourse to it would be warranted in all cases,
at least at the outset of each case. In the interests of fairness, and to
avoid constitutional challenges, mandatory mediation should not be
binding, nor should it require the spouses to reach a mediated agree-
ment.'47 The provision for mandatory mediation would simply oblige
the couple to engage in a minimum number of mediation sessions, al-
lowing them to evaluate for themselves the viability of the remedy in
their circumstances.
Even with legislative approval, divorce mediation is nonetheless in-
extricably tied to the willingness of divorcing couples to forego the tradi-
tional pattern of litigation. No matter how skillful or resourceful,
mediators cannot supply spouses with the necessary motivation. A di-
vorcing spouse unwilling to accept the finality of divorce, who harbors
feelings of rage and bitterness, may need an external coercive process to
reach a disposition of practical issues. In these circumstances, compel-
ling participation in divorce mediation may well end in failure. 4 '
Couples may view mandatory divorce mediation as a perfunctory and
irksome delay to having their day in court. They may also misperceive
the mediator's role as an adjudicatory one and doubt the mediator's abil-
ity to deal with concrete legal and financial issues. Finally, regardless of
whether the mediation process is mandatory or voluntary, spouses may
still desire to have the procedural and substantive guarantees, as well as
the eventual finality, of judicial adjudication.
3. Choosing Mediators
Assuming that a social and individual re-evaluation of divorce could
be undertaken, and that divorcing couples would choose to become per-
sonally accountable for their lives, practical problems with mediation
still exist. The selection and certification of mediators, for instance, be-
comes a critical concern. Like the process they serve, divorce mediators
are still in the making. Ideally, their training should mirror the sui
generis approach and comprehensive objectives of divorce mediation.
Mediators must possess and combine a variety of skills: a thorough
awareness of the statutory and judicial disposition of substantive issues,
familiarity with brokering practical disputes, and a solid grounding in the
therapeutic techniques of communication. 4 9
Persons possessing the requisite skills are a rarity in contemporary
professional society.'"° Relatively few university students, for example,
take the opportunity to pursue interdisciplinary studies. Even fewer stu-
147. In those few states that have adopted a mandatory mediation scheme, constitutional chal-
lenges have not yet materialized. See infra note 176 and accompanying text. Presumably, such
challenges would be similar to the constitutional attacks levied against medical malpractice legisla-
tion involving arbitration. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
148. See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
149. See, e.g., J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 130, at 73-99, 233-43.
150. See generally Milne, supra note 140.
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dents undertake programs that combine areas with contrastive humanis-
tic orientations. Pending the creation of formal training programs,"'5 the
divorce mediation process would initially depend on makeshift accom-
modations and the initiative of interested groups and individuals.' Ex-
isting means for mediator training are largely experimental and merely a
function of an individual's professional interest and experience. Efforts
to establish a professional code of ethics for mediators remain
fledgling.' 53 Society must define a substantive and curricular standard of
wide application in order to ensure uniformity in quality and approach.
Currently, the corps of mediators154 is comprised principally of psy-
chiatric social workers, family therapists, psychologists, psychiatrists,
and a few attorneys who presumably specialize in domestic relations
law.' 5 Techniques of therapy that facilitate communication are central
to the divorce mediation process. Consequently, mental health profes-
sionals, already certified in that expertise, may be best prepared and dis-
posed to assume the role of mediator. The process, however, also
involves family and social interests, and relies on rational decision mak-
ing to resolve practical marital disputes. It is obvious, therefore, that
legal skills are equally vital. Ultimately, the mediation alternative must
develop a structure that is consistent with the legal system's ethic of basic
fairness as to procedure and substance.' 56 The deficiency created by hav-
ing the predominate group of existing mediators come from the mental
health professions might be remedied in a number of ways-most of
which call for more substantial attorney participation.
4. Combining Mental Health and the Law
Psychologically-oriented mediators could develop a knowledge of
the legal framework for addressing matrimonial disputes simply through
self-education or by attending the relevant lectures, courses, or seminars.
Although expedient, such a measure would not alleviate the imbalance.
An understanding of juridical thinking and reasoning cannot be obtained
without a systematic exposure to it. A more viable compensatory proce-
dure might be to have mediators retain an attorney for matters of proce-
dure and substance or encourage (perhaps require) participants to
employ counsel during or at the end of the sessions. Costs, in terms of
151. Id.
152. See, e.g., Moore, Training Mediators for Family Dispute Resolution, 2 MEDIATION Q. 79
(1983). Current training seems to consist of a series of lectures lasting up to five days. Id. at 87.
These campaigns are sometimes modelled on a format of itinerant, episodic, privately-confected blitz
programs of instruction. Such a brief training period (even for persons already professionally trained
in related areas like family law or social work) seems inadequate to produce a corps of rigorously
qualified professionals.
153. See J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 130, at 244, 249. See also Ethics, Standards, and
Professional Challenges, 4 MEDIATION Q. 1-93 (J. Lemmon ed. 1984).
154. See Milne, supra note 140, at 21.
155. Id. at 21-22.
156. The standard of review for arbitral awards presumably would also apply to mediated agree-
ments. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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time and money, are obvious drawbacks to the recommendation, but do
not alone constitute insurmountable hurdles to the procedure. The true
difficulties are systemic in character.
Attorneys interfacing with the divorce mediation process in their
usual adversarial capacity could compromise the viability of the process.
Unfamiliar with the dispute resolution values called for in divorce media-
tion, lawyers are likely to become a dysfunctional element in the pro-
cess-not only jealous of its intrusion into their domain of competence,
but also unable to adapt professionally to a situation of controlled and
defused, rather than polarized and contentious, conflict.
At the same time, important personal rights and the interests of so-
ciety demand some lawyerly presence and participation in the process." 7
Excluding lawyers from the process and expecting psychologically-ori-
ented mediators to deal inexpertly with the legal implications of divorce
disputes would place a greater onus upon the courts to supervise media-
tion procedures and results. Such judicial intervention or rejection, how-
ever, could undermine divorce mediation, clouding it in a haze of
indeterminacy and incompetency. A dual-mediator model that recog-
nizes mental health professionals and attorneys as mediators would be a
more sagacious response to these acknowledged difficulties.
The advantages of the dual-mediator model over the single, psycho-
logically-oriented mediator model are significant. Faithful to the in-
tended interdisciplinary approach of the process, the dual-mediator
model provides a greater guarantee of professional competence in both
the legal and psychological aspects of mediation. With a team of two
mediators, it also becomes possible to achieve a gender balance, thereby
eliminating the alienation one spouse might experience with a single me-
diator of the opposite sex. 58 Once the legal and psychological orienta-
tions coalesce directly in practice, one could expect a more rapid and less
tentative definition of mediation's professional stature and social pur-
pose. The process may also minimize inter-professional competition, and
promote the type of re-education indispensable for a proper integration
of the divorce mediation process into society. Finally, the dual-mediator
model should facilitate the necessary linkage and rapport with the judi-
cial process.
Team mediation presents its own set of disadvantages. For instance,
it may increase the cost of mediation and add to the number of mediation
sessions. Moreover, team mediation presumes that individuals collabo-
rating in a mediation can reconcile the tensions between different profes-
sional trainings and develop a healthy respect for each other's differing
157. For a discussion of the role of lawyers in divorce mediation, see Berg, The Attorney as
Divorce Mediator, 2 MEDIATION Q. 21 (1983); Samuels & Shawn, The Role of the Lawyer Outside
the Mediation Process, 2 MEDIATION Q. 13 (1983).
158. See Black & Joffee, A Lawyer/Therapist Team Approach to Divorce, 16 CONCILIATION CTs.
REV. 1 (1978); Gold, Interdisciplinary Team Mediation, 6 MEDIATION Q. 27 (1984). See also J.
FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 130, at 141, 143-44.
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professional concerns and approaches. Team mediation also assumes
that an essential lawyerly component in the process will not disrupt the
workability of the process. This may require that participating attorneys
gain some formal understanding of the mental health profession.' 59
Whether a suitable pairing of mental health and legal professionals
can be achieved depends on the personalities and circumstances of a
given case. Professionals in either field should receive the same training
in mediation. Fortunately, some legal practitioners believe that adver-
sarial litigation may be inappropriate in some divorce cases. Through
their practice, these attorneys have developed an awareness of and sensi-
tivity to the psychological dimension of their clients' disputes.' I Despite
confidence in a rational process of treating matrimonial discord, one can-
not ignore that emotional conflicts have serious practical implications af-
fecting legal rights and social interests. 6 ' Obviously, a competent
therapist should not fail to acknowledge and appreciate that aspect of
patients' problems. The application of lawyerly skills in a humanistic
dispute resolution framework combined with the advantages gained from
a therapeutic approach should have nearly universal appeal.
159. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 2.2 (1983) provides for lawyers
to act as intermediaries between clients. An intermediary role requires the attorney to inform each
client of the risks involved, to notify clients of decisions to be made, and to withdraw either at the
request of any client, or if the lawyer believes that the intermediary role is no longer in the best
interests of the clients. The comments to this rule stipulate that "a lawyer cannot undertake com-
mon representation of clients between whom contentious litigation is imminent or who contemplate
contentious negotiations." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Rule 2.2 (1983).
This would seem to preclude intermediating in all but the most amicable divorces. While mediation
is listed in the comments as an approved form of intermediation, "[t]he Rule does not apply to a
lawyer acting as ... mediator between or among parties who are not clients of the lawyer, even
where the lawyer has been appointed with the concurrence of the parties." This suggests that a
lawyer may serve as mediator in a consulting or advisory role without regard to ethical rules, but
must be much more careful if performing professional services as an attorney. Some of the potential
conflict could be alleviated by requiring each spouse to retain separate counsel to review the medi-
ated agreement prior to signature. In this situation, the mediating lawyer would be acting as con-
sultant rather than legal advisor, and not be affected by the Rule.
For a discussion of professional responsibility issues in divorce mediation, see J. FOLBERG & A.
TAYLOR, supra note 130, at 244-50. See also Bishop, The Standards of Practice for Family
Mediators: An Individual Interpretation and Comments, 17 FAM. L.Q. 461 (1984); Crouch, The
Dark Side is Still Unexplored, 4 FAM. ADVOCATE 27 (1982); Gaughan, Taking a Fresh Look at
Divorce Mediation, 17 TRIAL 39 (1981); Ethics, Standards and Professional Challenges, 4 MEDIA-
TION Q. 1-96 (J. Lemmon ed. 1984); Riskin, Toward New Standards for the Neutral Lawyer in Medi-
ation, 26 ARIz. L. REV. 329 (1984); Silberman, Professional Responsibility Problems of Divorce
Mediation, 16 FAM. L.Q. 107 (1982); Standards of Practice for Family Mediators, 17 FAM. L.Q. 455
(1984); Note, Family Law-Attorney Mediation of Marital Disputes and Conflict of Interest Consider-
ations, 60 N.C.L. REV. 171 (1981); Note, Protecting Confidentiality in Mediation, 98 HARV. L. REV.
441 (1984).
160. See Berg, supra note 157; see also Smart & Salts, Attorney Attitudes Toward Divorce Media-
tion, 6 MEDIATION Q. 65 (1984).
161. See Lemmon, supra note 144; Milne, supra note 140. See also Musty & Crago, Divorce
Counseling and Divorce Mediation: A Survey of Mental Health Professionals' Views, 6 MEDIATION
Q. 73 (1984).
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C. Making an Appraisal
Available documentation 62 demonstrates that divorce mediation re-
mains largely an experimental phenomenon. The mediation process is
still too novel for one to draw any telling statistical conclusions about
workability or effectiveness. However, potential systemic deficiencies of
team mediation specifically, and of divorce mediation generally, could be
cured by reference to a set of three factors: legislative approval, court
supervision, and party consent.
The ethical issues surrounding attorney participation in divorce me-
diation may present the most difficult problems. Until appropriate bod-
ies define special standards for mediation practice, full disclosure 63 to
participants as to the purpose, goal, and approach of the mediation pro-
cess 164 may be the most expedient and reasonable device by which to
accommodate such various competing interests as the ethical require-
ments of the legal profession, the rights and expectations of the consum-
ing public, the desirability of promoting alternative mechanisms for
resolving divorce disputes, and the developmental needs of the divorce
mediation process.
Proposals for divorce mediation do not suffer greatly from accusa-
tions of atavism. Despite their emphasis on the individual resolution of
personal disputes, proposals for divorce mediation will not entirely dis-
place the existing apparatus for justice in domestic relations controver-
sies. The challenge for those seeking to achieve more humanistic
priorities is to admit inadequacies where they exist, mold present profes-
sional abilities to suit the task, and devise processes more responsive to
the psychological and material realities of divorce. None of this can be
achieved without systemic consensus and agreement on the overriding
social goal. The sophistication of the current apparatus for handling di-
vorce actions needs to be refined differently, not transformed into a de-
centralized and rudimentary method of achieving justice.
The most formidable obstacle to divorce mediation, however, is
neither systemic, professional, nor conceptual in character. Lawyers and
psychologists can learn to live and work with one another; legislatures
will ultimately allow individuals to decide their own matrimonial
destiny; and courts would rather not deal with the unpleasantries of di-
vorce disputes. In short, the ideas underlying the mediation process will
soon become ingrained in the consciousness of the involved professions.
The greatest resistance, as with arbitration, will come from divorcing
couples unsuited to anything but a litigious resolution of their marital
disputes.
The theory and practice of mediation 65 show that it responds pri-
162. See infra notes 176-77.
163. See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
164. See id.
165. See MiMe, supra note 140, at 23-34.
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manly to individuals with particular characteristics and propensities:
younger, well-educated, usually professional and materially comfortable
couples who accept psychological analysis and thinking. As a result, me-
diation could become a remedial option reserved for middle and upper-
middle class divorce 166-considerably limiting its social utility. Any
wider application of mediation may be confined to child custody contro-
versies. 167 While mediation may be most appropriate for the upper and
middle classes, 61 it also works best for parties skilled at verbal confron-
tation. Mediation requires people to say what they feel. People unaccus-
tomed to discussing their problems are not likely to succeed in this
process. These people may simply defer to the mediator and ultimately
become dissatisfied with the outcome. In general, individuals with less
education are more likely to defer to authority, view the court system
with respect, and be less adept at talking out their problems. For them,
mediation is probably an alien process unlikely to succeed.
Commentators generally recognize that mediation requires that par-
ties enjoy roughly equal bargaining positions. If either party is signifi-
cantly intimidated by the other, the process cannot work. Many
mediation centers, for example, refuse to handle spouse abuse cases be-
cause they represent the extreme of unequal power situations. 169
Mediators may recommend counseling or psychotherapy in such cases,
but the divorce itself is sent back for traditional adversarial litigation.
Another situation unconducive to successful mediation occurs when one
spouse (usually the wife) assumes a martyr role in the hope of achieving a
reconciliation. In such a case, the conciliatory spouse is likely to accede
to all of the other spouse's demands, and end up with an unfavorable
settlement.' 7 ° Although accurate statistics are not available, the number
of cases in which a spouse is abused or otherwise in an unequal bargain-
ing position suggests that mediation may be far from a panacea."'
Even if the mediation process should enjoy comprehensive applica-
166. Id.
167. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
168. See Winks, supra note 44, at 650.
169. See, e.g., Lerman, supra note 136; Rifkin, supra note 136. See also R. GELLES, FAMILY
VIOLENCE (1979).
170. See Winks, supra note 44, at 643.
171. There are a number of other criticisms that one can levy at the mediation process. Some
have advanced mediation as a way to relieve some of the pressures on a heavily overburdened court
system-thereby speeding up the divorce process. Although courts are clogged with divorce-related
issues, not all divorces are contested. One estimate holds that 85% to 90% of divorce cases are
settled prior to trial, either by mutual agreement of the parties or through attorney negotiation. See
infra note 181 and accompanying text. The mediation services in Los Angeles, Denver, Minneapo-
lis, and Connecticut appear to do no better. See id. It may be that the people who mediate success-
fully would also successfully reach agreements without mediation. This question, however, has not
been formally investigated.
While successful mediation might relieve some of the pressures on the court, it does not save
very much time. In Denver, successful mediators receive final decrees in an average of 9.7 months
after initiation of proceedings. This contrasts with 11.9 and 11.1 months respectively for a control
group and for those who actively rejected offers to mediate. The difference is statistically significant
at the .05 level; but it concerns only two months at most, and does not indicate an overwhelming
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bility, the individual dispositions of spouses are still crucial elements.
What should mediators do with willing, but particularly obdurate, par-
ticipants who disagree on some or all matters? Who should decide when
mediation has failed?. Should the legal system require all divorcing
couples, especially those who are parents, to participate in a mandatory
number of sessions? Might a central court of mediation be established to
address the foregoing questions? What about conflicts that arise regard-
ing the implementation of the mediated agreement-is court action nec-
essary, or should the agreement contain an arbitration or mediation
clause to deal with such problems?172  Although ideally structured to
achieve qualitative dispute resolution in divorce matters, mediation
places a necessary but precarious reliance on the willingness of individu-
als to espouse a rational course of conduct in circumstances of
disagreement.
VI. PROPOSING AN ALTERNATIVE MECHANISM FOR ACHIEVING
JUSTICE IN THE SEVERANCE OF MATRIMONIAL TIES
Current experimentation with alternative divorce mechanisms does
not call for immediate and blind recourse to substitute remedies. Cer-
-tainly, there is mounting dissatisfaction with current divorce procedures.
In Georgia, for example, where almost half the clients in a divorce study
were dissatisfied, statutory provisions for such alternative remedies as
conciliation or mediation do not exist. 173 Operating within this system,
over 90% of the Georgia attorneys in the study agreed that divorce medi-
ation could be effective; some 73% favored both mediation and counsel-
ing. 174 The strong consensus in Georgia as to the probable effectiveness
acceleration of the divorce process. In sum, mediation may help unclog the courts and speed up the
process, but it does neither to any great extent. See id.
The small minority of cases that parties fight in the courtroom may be the ones most in need of
mediation, but they may involve couples who will never agree in any proceeding. Indeed, in Denver,
the difference in relitigation between successfully mediated settlements and those never referred to
mediation is quite small: 11% of the former and 15% of the latter had returned to court 15 months
after the settlement. While mediation may be a great improvement over endless litigation, it may not
be better than successful negotiation with private counsel. It is not at all certain that the parties who
engage in endless litigation are deterred by mediation.
One critic of mediation points out that mediators have a vested interest in settling controversies
that might be better solved outside the mediation forum. He notes that mediation's emphasis on
compromise might produce settlements that make no objective sense. See Crouch, supra note 137,
at 344-45. Child custody issues, a common subject for mediation, may provide illustrations of irra-
tional, compromised mediation settlements. One mediation text provides examples of ideal settle-
ments, including one in which the parents divide custody of the two children such that the siblings
are together in the same home only three days a week. See D. SAPOSNEK, supra note 139, at 306.
Such a settlement may please the parents and it may be a good compromise, but it is not necessarily
best for the children, for whom sibling relationships and a degree of continuity can be extremely
important.
172. See Herrman, McKenry & Weber, supra note 132, at 17; Meroney, Mediation and Arbitra-
tion of Separation and Divorce Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 467 (1979). See also Bernard,
The Neutral Mediator: Value Dilemmas in Divorce Mediation, 4 MEDIATION Q. 61 (1984); Dibble,
Bargaining in Family Mediation: Ethical Considerations, 4 MEDIATION Q. 75 (1984).
173. See Georgia Study, supra note 67, at 319-20.
174. See id.
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of alternative remedies, however, may be anchored in the fragile basis of
inexperience. Studies in other states indicate that alternative remedies
are not a cure-all. In Vermont, for example, where clients report "mod-
erate satisfaction" with the existing system, discretionary counseling is
available.' 75 Superficially at least, the availability of discretionary court-
ordered counseling has had little effect on client perceptions of the legal
process of divorce. The availability of other alternative remedies may or
may not have a similarly negligible impact.
Other data reveal ambivalence and report mixed results. 7 6 Concili-
175. See Vermont Study, supra note 67, at 71.
176. At present, 14 states provide for mediation of some or all divorce cases. In seven states,
mediation is discretionary at the choice of the parties or the court; in three, it is mandatory for all
disputed child custody issues or other issues where children are involved. In four states, mediation is
required on a county rather than a state basis. Several other states are now investigating mediation
and may enact enabling legislation in the near future. In addition, in many states, attorneys refer
clients to private mediation services even in the absence of permissive legislation or court orders.
Moreover, a count of states that have formalized the procedure is not necessarily an exhaustive list of
states in which it is practiced.
Because of the unevenness with which the laws are applied, it is impossible to ascertain the
effects of mediation and conciliation statutes on the divorce rates. Superficial observation suggests
that states in which the laws are partially enforced do not differ from the others in divorce rate or in
duration of marriage-but this is not conclusive.
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ation appears to be an ill-fated remedy in most cases. 177 As an illustra-
STATUTES PROVIDING FOR ALTERNATE DISPUTE RESOLUTION
MEDIATION CONCILIATION
MANDATORY, ONLY
CHILDREN COURT'S CERTAIN UNDER
INVOLVED DISC. COUNTIES INVESTIGATION* MANDATORY DISC.
Alaska b
Arizona a e
California a
Colorado af
Connecticut b f
Delaware a
Florida a e
Illinois f
Indiana x f
Iowa e
Kansas e
Kentucky f
Louisiana a
Maine b
Maryland c f
Michigan x e
Minnesota a
Montana f
New Hamp. x f
New York b
N. Dakota f
Ohio f
Oregon d
Pennsylvania b
S. Carolina f
Texas x f
Utah x f
Vermont x
Washington d
Wisconsin e
* not a comprehensive list
a child custody, support, visitation
b = all issues when children involved, including property
c = property only, no custody issues
d = county option, rules vary
e = statute generally observed
f = statute on books but largely ignored
For an explanation of the statistical analyses, see supra note 33.
177. See Elkin, Conciliation Counseling: A Moral and Ethical Responsibility, 19 CONCILIATION
Crs. REV. iii-vi (1981). As of 1985, 21 states have some statutory provisions for conciliation or
marriage counseling in divorce cases. See table supra note 176. These provisions presumably reflect
and uphold the state interest in having marriage unions continue for as long as possible. In all states
but South Carolina, conciliation is purely discretionary-at the option of the court or either party.
These statutes, however, are unevenly applied; in many cases, they are ignored. In South Carolina, a
representative of the State Bar Association declared that mandatory conciliation consists of a single
question from the judge in a divorce proceeding as to whether the couple thinks they can be recon-
ciled. Information obtained by the author through a telephone interview. In states where concilia-
tiot is discretionary, representatives state that it is infrequently invoked, generally only on the
recommendation of counsel. The general consensus appears to be that conciliation statutes, enacted
mostly in the 1960's, are obsolete. Spouses who have concluded that their marriage is irretrievably
flawed cannot be dissuaded from obtaining a dissolution of their union. Conciliation, therefore, is
probably not a workable alternative to judicial adjudication.
Although marriage counseling may seem indistinguishable from conciliation, some states pro-
vide for counseling instead of or in addition to conciliation. In a study of eight intermountain states
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
tion, of those couples referred to the Los Angeles Conciliation Court,
50% chose not to take advantage of the service. As to the other half,
one-third of them reconciled. Of these, 75% were still together a year
later. This means that, of all couples referred, 12.5% were reconciled
after a year. With a nationwide rate of one in three couples dismissing
divorce petitions after filing, the Los Angeles experience with concilia-
tion is less than remarkable if the goal is to salvage marriages.' 78
Mediation presents possibilities with greater promise. California is
in the forefront of the mediation experience, and now has mandatory
mediation for divorcing couples unable to agree on child custody mat-
ters. 179 Of the couples who have been referred to mandatory mediation,
75% reached a mediated agreement on the custody issues that divided
them at the outset. Some 54% of these couples stated that the agreement
was still effective one year after the mediation. Only one-third of the
mediating couples returned to court. Denver achieved similar results,
offering free mediation services to divorce litigants.' 8 Although 50% of
the couples refused to engage in mediation, 60% of those who did
reached a mediated agreement. A total of 80% of the couples eventually
reached an out-of-court settlement. In addition, 92% of the Denver
couples who successfully used mediation would recommend the process;
and 61% of those who were not successful would still recommend it.
(Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming), divorced respon-
dents were asked whether they had received marriage counseling and, if so, whether they thought it
had helped. Intermountain Study, supra note 59, at 113-14. The overwhelming majority (80%) of
those who had received counseling reported that it did not help. The others responded that counsel-
ing did not improve the marriage, but did make the divorce process easier. Id. It must be noted that
these respondents were already divorced and may represent failures of the counseling system; data
concerning marriages saved by counseling are not available. Also unclear is whether the respondents
(or the surveyors) distinguished among counseling, mediation, and conciliation. Nonetheless, this
indicates that counseling, whatever that meant to the respondents, is not perceived as beneficial.
Some confusion exists in the literature and in practice as to the differences between conciliation
and mediation. Wolff, in an article devoted to family conciliation, describes conciliation as a process
in which the parties create their own agreements with guidance. See Wolff, Family Conciliation:
Draft Rules for the Settlement of Family Disputes, 21 J. FAM. L. 213, 215 (1982). This is usually the
definition of mediation. Representatives from Florida, Maryland, and North Dakota stated explic-
itly that statutory conciliation is practiced as mediation. Information obtained by the author
through telephone interviews. This may be a recent development in states with old conciliation
statutes-an attempt to modernize the procedure without changing the laws. In other states, where
mediation and conciliation are invoked separately, it appears that mediation is supplanting concilia-
tion as the alternative of choice. Conciliation, in sum, is largely ignored in most states that provide
for it by statute.
178. Elkin, supra note 177, at v.
179. See Saposnek, How Has Mandatory Mediation Fared?, 22 CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 7
(1984); Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Custody Disputes, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating]; Pearson & Thoennes, A Prelim-
inary Portrait Of Client Reactions To Three Court Mediation Programs, 3 MEDIATION Q. 21 (1984)
[hereinafter cited as Pearson & Thoennes, Preliminary Portrait]. The mandatory mediation program
is free for the participants, "totally self-supporting through an increase in ... marriage license fee
and ... the divorce filing fee ... Mclsaac, Court-Connected Mediation, 21 CONCILIATION CTS.
REV. 49, 50 (1983).
180. Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating, supra note 179, at 504-05. The Denver
mediation program is not mandatory. Id. at 502.
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Couples in Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Connecticut shared the same
perceptions. '
8 1
These statistical fragments of popular opinion confirm what a grow-
ing number of family specialists are advocating. Although alternative
dispute resolution mechanisms will not preserve marriages, they are use-
ful in achieving other equally important goals. Alternative mechanisms
can eliminate litigious confrontations, reduce the costs of dispute resolu-
tion, encourage couples to reach their own agreements, foster better rela-
tions between ex-spouses, and lessen individual dissatisfaction with the
divorce process.
The realities of contemporary divorcet 82-the sheer number of mat-
rimonial breakups, the character of the disputes they generate, and the
physical burden they place upon the legal system-and the general dis-
satisfaction with the adversarial system of divorce adjudication 8 3 should
prompt legislative bodies to make alternative mechanisms available to
divorcing couples on a discretionary basis. 84 As noted previously, 18
however, mediation is not for everyone; an appropriate social framework
for divorce must address problems at all levels of society. Divorcing
couples who are unable to mediate should be guided to other, less adver-
sarial fora.
Certainly, parties should be encouraged to conduct negotiations
through party representatives and to reach settlement agreements. Es-
tranged spouses unable to resolve their differences through their respec-
tive attorneys should not be thrown into the traditional litigious fray.
Although mediation would be the preferred extra-judicial means of
resolving divorce disputes in an ideal rational world, a specialized form
of judicial adjudication might be useful when the truculent reality of di-
vorce prevails. These specialized divorce courts would merge the coer-
cive element of judicial authority with the procedural and substantive
flexibility of arbitral dispute resolution-dispute resolution through "ju-
dicial arbitration." In short, even when coercive judicial authority is
needed, rationality must predominate. Dissolving a marriage through a
non-adversarial judicial procedure better serves the couple, their chil-
dren, overloaded courts, and society.
Some might argue that the proposed system of judicial arbitration is
no different from what an enlightened judge might do under the present
process. The proposed scheme merely asks legal players to act as com-
passionate counselors-not as hired guns and impartial decision makers.
Judicial arbitration, therefore, does not represent systemic change; it
181. In Los Angeles, Minneapolis, and Connecticut, 85%, 91%, and 91%, respectively of the
successful participants, and 79%. 68%, and 62%, respectively of the unsuccessful participants rec-
ommended mediation. Pearson & Thoennes, Preliminary Portrait, supra note 179, at 34.
182. See supra notes 33-45 and accompanying text.
183. See supra notes 1, 67-71 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 176-77.
185. See supra notes 165-71 and accompanying text.
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merely adds another layer to the already complex social mechanism for
addressing divorce disputes.
However, although the present adversarial system may well have
enlightened participants, the spirit of adversarialism impedes the full in-
tegration of their rational attitude into the dispute resolution process.
There are no guarantees that they will share or even apply their enlight-
ened perceptions. Moreover, it is unfair to have the parties' fate depend
on whether they fortuitously hire the appropriate attorneys and draw the
right judge. The proposed system argues for a clear and unmistakable
statement of policy: adversarial litigation is an inapposite means of
resolving divorce disputes. The proposed system calls for the adoption of
a new dispute resolution ethic in divorce, requiring representatives and
participants to assume a new, more humanistic attitude toward divorce.
Arguably, changes in the applicable substantive law might achieve
similar results. 86 Fixed rules of law, such as the primary caretaker con-
cept in custody matters, t87 might eliminate such pitfalls as uncertainty of
determination and contentious argument. The epistemology of legal
training, however, promotes semantic ambiguity as a fundamental truth.
Ironclad predicates are, in fact, antithetical to lawyerly dispositions and
adversarial adjudication. The irreducible insufficiencies of the current
process and the private, emotional character of the conflicts compel re-
course to self-determination. Society must advance alternative mecha-
nisms as the primary remedy, and view an arbitral judicial process as a
last resort.
A. Non-adjudicatory Options
The first stage of the recommended framework would be triggered
when one of the spouses or the couple files a petition with the state trial
court, stating an intent to terminate the marriage. After the tolling of a
186. See Glendon, Fixed Rules and Discretion in Contemporary Family Law and Succession
Law, 60 TUL. L. REV. 1165 (1986); Glendon, Family Law Reform in the 1980's, 44 LA. L. REV.
1553 (1984). According to Professor Glendon, "[t]he most serious problem with the law currently
governing the child-related and economic effects of divorce is not its broad grants of discretion, but
its incoherence at the level of principle." Glendon, supra, at 1171. See also Chambers, Rethinking
the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV. 477 (1984); Schepard,
Taking Children Seriously: Promoting Cooperative Custody After Divorce, 64 TEx. L. REV. 687
(1985).
187. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 363 (W. Va. 1981).
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statutorily-prescribed time limit (six or twelve months),' either spouse
could obtain a divorce decree merely by filing a motion to that effect. In
the interval, the divorcing spouses could simply wait out the required
time for obtaining a divorce. The couples might also pursue counseling
in order to reconcile or merely to settle the loose ends of their dissolving
union. Although it is unlikely, some jurisdictions might oblige the di-
vorcing spouses to attend a few counseling or conciliation sessions.
States could either establish a publicly-funded marriage counseling and
conciliation process, designate approved private counselors and concilia-
tors, or have the couple undertake the initiative completely on their own.
If the divorcing spouses are in agreement regarding their matrimo-
nial fate and can cooperate enough to agree on an alternative dispute
resolution mechanism, the proposed framework of remedial options
should allow them to engage in mediation during the statutorily-imposed
waiting period. Some legislative regulation of the mediation process may
be in order. The legislature might, for example, establish rules relating to
the qualification of court- or privately-appointed mediators in each juris-
diction, define the basic procedural and substantive standards that gov-
ern in mediation, and identify whether single or team mediation models
188. Mandatory Time of Separation Before Divorce Granted*
Only for unilateral
Mandatory separation no-fault divorce'
Alabama x
Arkansas 3 years
Connecticut x
Delaware 6 months
Hawaii 2 years
Idaho x
Illinois 6 monthsb
Louisiana 1 year
Maryland I yearb
Mass. 6 monthsb
Missouri 1 yearb
Montana 180 days
Nevada x
N. J. 18 months
N.Y. I year
N. C. x
Ohio I year
Penn. x
R. I. x
S.C. x
Texas x
Utah x
Vermont 6 months
Virginia 1 year
W. Va.
Wisconsin 1 year
* - includes only those states with provisions for mandatory separation times
a - see table on unilateral divorce for details (note 198 infra)
b - with mutual consent. Different times apply for unilateral divorces (see table, note 198
infra).
For an explanation of the statistical analyses, see supra note 33.
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apply. Under general legislative guidance, however, party-generated and
mediator-assisted determinations should control in most phases of the
process. Because party attitudes are so important in mediation, parties
should submit all disputes to mediation only in circumstances where
there is clear spousal willingness to explore and experiment with the rem-
edy. Coerced participation is essentially antithetical to the principles un-
derlying mediation. 8 9 Once the spouses choose mediation, the court's
role should be limited to the formal granting of the divorce decree and
approval of the mediated agreement.
If one spouse or the couple rejects conciliation, fails to achieve a
reconciliation under a mandatory conciliation scheme, and is unwilling
to engage in mediation, the divorcing couple could authorize their re-
spective attorneys to negotiate a settlement. To achieve maximum effi-
ciency, attorneys who engage in such divorce negotiations should operate
within the time limit established for obtaining a divorce. The use of ne-
gotiation through legal representation might be especially beneficial since
it allows attorneys to function in their usual capacities, and makes few
demands on the court system. Under this approach, a court would sim-
ply issue the requested decree, and assure the fairness of the negotiated
agreement.
B. Judicial Arbitration
Assuming that conciliation, mediation, and negotiation are unavail-
ing, the couple still needs to resolve practical issues in some forum.
Rather than have arbitration function as a consensual and private form
of justice initiated by party agreement, legislatures could impose judicial
arbitration in all divorce cases that cannot be resolved by other means.
Under the requirements, the judge-arbitrator would apply flexible proce-
dural rules, allowing each side an equal and fair opportunity to present
its case. Ordinarily, a time limit (three months from the date the divorce
is granted) should apply to such arbitral court proceedings. The court, at
its own discretion, could extend the time limit to a maximum of six
months in cases involving truly exceptional circumstances. In some re-
spects, the judge would still function as a referee between the parties.
The flexible procedure, however, should enable judges to control the
quantum of discovery and the procedural delaying tactics.
To expedite and simplify dispute resolution and also limit the expen-
diture of judicial resources, the spouses could be obliged to reach agree-
ment on financial and property issues before a divorce decree is granted.
The obligatory resolution of such matters would act as a condition prece-
dent to the granting of a divorce. 19° The divorcing couple by this stage
189. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
190. Currently, seven states require the settlement of child support, custody, alimony, and prop-
erty issues before any divorce is granted; three more states require such a settlement prior to the
issuance of no-fault divorces. Seven more states require courts to rule on these issues in divorce
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has had the time and a number of opportunities to achieve consensual
agreement. Postponing the resolution of such matters, at the very least,
could give rise to problems of proof. The immediate clarification of the
estranged spouses' financial and property rights could prevent the unwit-
ting or intentional duping of third-party interests, and stem the litigious
morass that usually follows. Moreover, the spouse upon whom a divorce
is imposed would probably retaliate by immediately initiating a suit for
property division, alimony, and child support and custody. Although
consolidation of the actions would delay the possibility of remarriage, the
intervening period would only be three or six months. Even in circum-
stances of truly contentious disagreement, the judge-arbitrator might in-
terpret a spouse's failure to agree as vindictive and dilatory. Rather than
determine that exceptional circumstances exist and prolong the proceed-
ing, the court could find a breach of the duty to adjudicate in good faith,
and take the party's lack of cooperation into account in its judgment.
Joining the actions, however, may prove to be unduly coercive, ex-
cessively compromising rights, and unfairly impairing dispute resolution
strategies. In addition to creating an incentive for the abandoned spouse
to delay the other spouse's remarriage, consolidation may associate the
granting of a divorce so closely with financial issues as to inflame the
debate surrounding practical concerns., It would also eliminate the possi-
bility that time and attrition might defuse the situation-a type of default
remedy. A better rule should allow courts to grant a divorce once the
cases, but do not stipulate that this be done prior to granting the decree. The remaining 33 states
either have no requirement for settlements in connection with divorce or provide that the court may,
at its discretion, make such orders.
States Requiring Completed Settlements with Divorce Decrees
(Custody, Support, Maintenance, Property)
Prior to all Prior to At some time,
divorces no-fault only unspecified
Arizona x
California x.
Colorado x
Connecticut x
Illinois x
Indiana xb
Iowa x
Kentucky x
Mass. x
Miss. x
Missouri x
Montana x
N.H. x
Texas xc
Washington xb
W. Va. x
Wisconsin x
a - for summary dissolution only, with fixed limit on amount of property involved
b - property only
c - child support and custody only
For an explanation of the statistical analyses, see supra note 33.
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statutory period has tolled, but require the court at the same proceeding
to rule provisionally, setting a hearing date for the judicial arbitral adju-
dication of outstanding practical differences.
The rules of procedure and evidence for a judicial arbitral proceed-
ing should be general and flexible in character. For example, each party
would have a right to representation by legal counsel; a right to call wit-
nesses and engage in cross-examination; an opportunity to present
whatever evidence they deem necessary to establish their case; after an
initial hearing, the judge could reach a determination exclusively on the
basis of a written record (if both parties agree); procedures should also
allow the judge to call any witnesses deemed necessary or refer to experts
for advice on technical determinations. A judge could also determine
that a party's intransigence amounts to a breach of the duty to adjudicate
in good faith, and take this into account in the final ruling. The gov-
erning rule would be a rather diffuse sense of procedural fairness.
Because the substantive provisions of family law are general in na-
ture, a judicial arbitral tribunal could equitably apply these rules and
reach decisions consistent with regular divorce courts. In a child custody
dispute, for example, a domestic relations judge sitting as a judicial arbi-
trator would rule as an ordinary court of law-seeking to determine the
best interests of the child. The judge-arbitrator, however, could proce-
durally minimize the parties' disputatious positions.
Similar reasoning applies to alimony and division of property deter-
minations. In most jurisdictions, alimony is now exclusively or nearly
exclusively a purely financial matter-involving considerations of need,
ability to pay, and economic rehabilitation. A judge-arbitrator could re-
solve alimony disputes under the general guidelines of the currently ap-
plicable statutes. Allocating and distributing common marital assets and
liabilities might present more of a problem. In some jurisdictions, the
governing law is quite elaborate regarding marital property division. The
most acceptable substantive standards for adjudication by a court sitting
in an arbitral capacity would be equity and fairness. Such standards
would be consistent with the arbitral adjudicatory standard that applies
in most domestic and international arbitrations-a basic respect for law.
In other words, domestic relations courts sitting as arbitral tribunals
would, in effect, be equivalent to traditional courts of equity.
Given the public jurisdictional authority of courts of law, a court
exercising arbitral authority would render a judgment, and not an arbi-
tral award. Although proscribed in ordinary arbitral proceedings, a mer-
its review would apply to the arbitral court judgment. The possibility of
appellate review would force the judge-arbitrator to render a reasoned
award-unless both parties waive that requirement. A reasoned award
should state the judge's conclusions on the merits and briefly articulate
the basic reasoning that underlies those conclusions. Appellate courts,
also applying arbitral adjudicatory standards, would not disturb the
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judgment unless there is a finding of manifest error or basic disregard of
law.' 9 ' While it limits considerably the right of appeal, the no-review-
without-manifest-error standard promotes the efficient administration of
justice. As many jurisdictions, in fact, currently use this standard in do-
mestic relations matters, it is evident that trial courts have the best per-
spective on the witnesses, the parties, and the overall dispute. Should
judicial arbitral courts apply such a standard, they would not compro-
mise the basic rights of the parties.
Concern for substantive rights might dictate that arbitral courts sit
as a panel of three judges and reach determinations by majority vote.
While dissenting or concurring opinions could be allowed under this
model, the precedential value of any such opinion would generally be
minimal. 92 Arbitral courts would resolve most substantive issues on an
ad hoc basis, according to the particular circumstances of the individual
case. Legislatures may also require judges or other professionals sitting
on such panels to possess special qualifications. 93 A typical panel of
three members might consist of the domestic relations judge in the juris-
diction (sitting as president of the tribunal), an attorney, and a mental
health professional. Such procedural complication, however, may prove
counter-productive in terms of time and adjudicatory efficiency. Given
that the present system functions with a single judge, a three-member
panel may be unnecessary. 94
Integrating legal representation into the judicial arbitral model
could be the most difficult obstacle to successful implementation of the
recommended framework. The presence of litigators might transform
the arbitral proceeding into the usual combative contest. The time limit
rule, however, would oblige all parties, including legal representatives, to
follow the stated arbitral intent of the proceeding. Some consideration
might be given to re-educating the domestic relations bar. Elaborating a
new code of ethics for domestic relations practice-emphasizing the ac-
ceptability and utility of neutral lawyering and requiring mental health
training for lawyers-might be in order.' 95 The judge-arbitrator may
also need additional professional training to become acquainted with ar-
bitral procedures and principles. Such additional training, however,
should not prove unduly burdensome, especially in light of the similarity
between arbitration and equitable adjudication. 196
191. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
193. See, e.g., Milne, supra note 140, at 21-22; Gold, supra note 158, at 27.
194. See G. WILNER, supra note 7, §§ 20:00-:01.
195. See J. FOLBERG & A. TAYLOR, supra note 130, at 349. See also Bishop, Mediation Stan-
dards: An Ethical Safety Net, 4 MEDIATION Q. 5 (1984). California has a rather vague provision
requiring attorneys in the domestic relations area to have some mental health training. See Winks,
supra note 44, at 645.
196. See G. WILNER, supra note 7, §§ 25:00-:06.
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C. Enabling Legislation
A statutory framework attempting to implement the foregoing rec-
ommendations must be compatible with a jurisdiction's general policy on
matrimonial matters, especially as reflected in divorce and alimony laws.
Ideally, state statutes would provide exclusively for no-fault divorce and
alimony, or at least contain a clear no-fault preference. Reference to
legal fault is unnecessarily inflammatory, focusing on marital wrongs and
damage awards rather than achieving a fair and reasonable resolution of
disputes.
The flexible character of current state statutes on divorce and ali-
mony should be compatible with the recommended procedure. Many
state jurisdictions already have hybrid divorce regimes that combine fault
and no-fault, as well as provisions for alimony entitlement that operate
primarily on considerations of need. 197 In fact, many state jurisdictions
now allow the unilateral termination of marriage after a relatively mod-
est period of physical separation. 198 Even in circumstances in which a
spouse in a "mixed" (fault and no-fault) jurisdiction seeks a fault-based
divorce, adversarial litigation could still be avoided in the interest of jus-
tice. The difficult task remains, however, of integrating the recom-
mended procedural framework into existing statutory schemes for fault-
based alimony determinations. The adjudication of financial entitlements
and responsibilities according to an all-or-nothing, fault-based statutory
provision may require the application of existing court procedures.
Assuming that coordination could be presently or eventually
achieved in most state jurisdictions, the following proposal contains the
general guidelines for the statutory implementation of the recommended
procedural framework:
A Statute Establishing a Procedural Framework for
Resolving Divorce Disputes
Preamble
This statute defines the procedures that apply to the granting of di-
vorces and the resolution of divorce disputes. It is not intended to en-
courage divorce, but rather--once a decision to terminate marriage has
been reached-to establish a process that enables divorcing couples and
the judicial organs of the state to deal effectively and efficiently with an
increasingly commonplace reality. To that end, the present legislation
eliminates recourse to adversarial litigation in divorce. The emotional
volatility of divorce makes adversarial proceedings, despite their utility in
other areas of controversy, inappropriate in the circumstances of matri-
197. See supra notes 46-49 and accompanying text.
198. Thirty-nine states have statutory provisions guaranteeing unilateral no-fault divorce. Of
the remaining eleven, two (Mississippi and Tennessee) explicitly prohibit this type of divorce; nine
states permit it at the court's discretion.
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monial dissolution. The statute provides for the judicial arbitration of
divorce disputes and makes other dispute resolution mechanisms avail-
able to divorcing couples, thereby allowing them whenever possible to
resolve their differences through private agreements.
Unilateral No-Fault Divorce Provisions, By State*
Sep. leads to Unilateral Unilateral divorce
divorce breakdown at court's discretion
Alabama 2 yrs.
Alaska x
Arizona x
Arkansas 3 yrs.
California x
Colorado x
Connecticut 18 mos.
Delaware 6 mos.
Florida x
Georgia x
Hawaii 2 yrs.
Idaho 5 yrs. x
Illinois 2 yrs.
Indiana x
Iowa x
Kansas x
Kentucky x
Louisiana 1 year
Maine x
Maryland 2 yrs.
Mass. 1 year
Michigan x
Minnesota x
Missouri 2 yrs.
Montana 180 days x
Nebraska x
Nevada 1 year
N. H. x
N. J. 18 mos.
N.M. x
N. Y. 1 year
N.C. I year
N.D. x
Ohio 1 year
Oklahoma x
Oregon x
Penn. 3 yrs.
R.I. 3yrs.
S. C. I year
S. D. no time specified x
Texas 3 yrs. X
Utah 3 yrs.
Vermont 6 months
Virginia I year
Washington x
W. Va. 1 year
Wisconsin I year
Wyoming x
* Does not include the 2 states that prohibit unilateral divorce.
For an explanation of the statistical analyses, see supra note 33.
No. 4]
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW
L The Stages of the Process
Once parties file a petition for divorce, the court-in a preliminary
hearing held in chambers-shall urge the parties to seek counseling,
either on an individual basis or as a couple, and/or to participate in con-
ciliation with a view to saving their marriage. In doing so, the court shall
direct the clerk of court to give the parties information regarding the
private resources that are available for counseling and conciliation.
The court shall also instruct the parties that, in the event they
choose not to avail themselves of either counseling or conciliation or find
these remedies to be ineffectual, they can engage in mediation or direct
their respective attorneys to negotiate a settlement on their behalf. The
court shall again provide the parties with the necessary information to
evaluate the feasibility of these alternative remedies in their circum-
stances, emphasizing (when applicable) that mediation is especially use-
ful in child custody matters.
Prior to (or during or immediately following) this preliminary hear-
ing in judicial chambers, the parties must reach a temporary agreement
regarding maintenance arrangements and, if applicable, on child support
and custody. If they are unable to do so, the court shall issue an injunc-
tive order on these matters in light of its understanding of the circum-
stances of the case. This order shall not be binding upon subsequent
determinations and can be modified by the common written agreement of
the parties at their discretion. The parties will have six (or twelve)
months from the date of the preliminary hearing to avail themselves of
alternative remedies to adjudication.
Once the six (or twelve) month period has elapsed and no reconcilia-
tion has been achieved, either party may sue for and obtain a judgment of
divorce. Matters of child custody and spousal maintenance following di-
vorce must be at least provisionally resolved at the time the judgment of
divorce is entered. If the parties have mediated their differences on these
matters or otherwise agreed, the court shall review their agreement and
determine whether it satisfies basic fairness and considerations of equity.
In its discretion, the court may require the parties to modify or recon-
sider their agreement. The will of the parties, however, shall be pre-
sumed to be controlling. Once approved, the agreement shall be
incorporated into the divorce judgment.
If the parties have been unable to agree privately on custody and
maintenance matters, the court shall grant a divorce and review its initial
injunctive order issued at the preliminary hearing to determine whether
existing circumstances warrant modification of the order. The court
shall also set a date for a subsequent hearing to adjudicate these out-
-standing matters, including disputes pertaining to the division of marital
property. At that hearing, the court shall exercise arbitral adjudicatory
authority, enabling it to conduct the proceeding and to rule on the issues
with flexibility in the interest of the efficient administration of justice.
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II. Procedures For Fault-Based Divorce
When the petition for divorce alleges marital fault, the divorce pro-
cedures contained in the preceding section will apply, except that the
divorce decree will not be granted until the fault issue has been adjudi-
cated by the court seized of the action and exercising arbitral adjudica-
tory authority.
IL Rules Regulating The Procedure And Other Matters
When the court exercises arbitral adjudicatory authority, it shall re-
tain its public jurisdictional authority to render binding judgments. It
shall, however, apply a flexible procedure; its discretion in this regard
shall be limited solely by the principle of allowing the parties a fair and
equal opportunity to present their case. The governing provisions of law
shall be construed in conformity with equitable considerations.
In all- cases, judicial arbitral proceedings shall be subject to a three-
month time limit from the date the divorce is rendered. The court may
extend the time limit to six months if, in its discretion, it finds truly ex-
ceptional circumstances that warrant such an extension. To avoid pro-
longing such cases, the court, in its discretion or upon the request of the
parties, may reconstitute itself as a panel of three judges or other family
specialists to hear and rule upon the case. Otherwise, the court may find
that one or both parties have breached the duty to participate in the pro-
ceeding in good faith, and take that lack of cooperation in the conduct of
the proceeding into account in its judgment. Furthermore, the court
may appoint, in its discretion and at the expense of the parties, mental
health and other experts to assist it in making evaluations and factual
determinations. The court shall render brief reasons with its judgments.
Appeal shall be allowed to appellate courts only when the judgment con-
tains a manifest error or a basic disregard of law. In exercising its review
powers, the higher court shall also apply arbitral adjudicatory standards.
When an alleged change of circumstances requires the modification
of a judgment, the parties may agree in writing to such a modification or
file suit before the court which will adjudicate the issue expeditiously
pursuant to its arbitral powers.
Attorneys who are asked to serve as divorce mediators shall assume
such responsibilities in their capacity as officers of the court. Attorneys
serving as divorce mediators shall neutrally advise fellow mediators and
impartially guide the participants in mediation. Fees and matters relat-
ing to the certification of attorneys as divorce mediators, as well as the
general rules and procedures for divorce mediation, shall be regulated by
the state bar association in conjunction with recognized mediation insti-
tutions. The bar association, with the assistance of institutes of higher
education in the state, should establish and require its members involved
in domestic relations practice to participate in professional programs in
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family counseling and therapy as well as the non-adversarial representa-
tion of client interests.
VII. CONCLUSION
Judicial arbitration, conjoined with the opportunity to effectuate res-
olution by private agreement, appears to constitute a remedial process
that responds to the full dimensions of divorce disputes. It avoids par-
ent-like juridical intrusions into the private emotional lives of divorcing
spouses, and allows the principles of individual accountability and self-
determination to have their necessary impact upon matrimonial matters.
In effect, the adapted traditional mechanism and the introduction of
other techniques of dispute resolution allow society to achieve its civiliz-
ing design upon individuals through rationality rather than obsolete
rituals.
